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A B S T RAe T 
The thesis extends the theoretical work on the 
multinational corporation and on the reasons for foreign direct 
investment. 
The reasons for foreign direct investment are considered 
by looking at a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for this 
type of investment to occur. This is extended by considering the 
range of objectives that a firm may have and by using the approaches 
of the managerial theories of the firm to look at the processes by 
which firms expand and diversify, where this includes expansion into 
foreign markets. 
The multinational corporation was considered in terms 
of a mathematical model of a profit maximizing firm. The static 
models in the existing literature were reviewed by developing a 
more general model, that includes many of these as special cases. 
This was extended by developing a dynamic model. Two mathematical 
approaches were used; optimal control theory and dynamic programming. 
These were used to consider the response of the multinational corpor-
ation to changes in elements of its external environment such as, 
profit taxes, import tariffs, and market size. The responses 
considered included: qualitative changes in the levels of product-
ion and trade undertaken by the multinational in the two equilibrium 
positions; and the levels of investments and the adjustment in 
capital stock required to move from one equilibrium position to the 
other. 
Chapter One 
I N T ROD U C T ION 
Chapter One 
I N T ROD U C T ION 
The multinational corporation has been steadily 
increasing in importance as one of the types of business organizations 
used to carry out commercial activities across international bound-
aries. It can be defined as a firm that engages in industrial, 
commercial, or financial activities in more than one country, and 
has ownership and control of the foreign affiliates vested in a 
parent firm located In one country. It has been subject to a 
considerable amount of study, this proceeding along either theoretical 
or empirical lines and using the methods of a variety of disciplines. 
This thesis extends the theoretical work on the 
multinational corporation using approaches from microeconomic theory. 
Both traditional profit maximization models and more recent managerial 
theories of the firm are used. The profit maximization approach IS 
used in both static and dynamic models, where these models are 
developed mathematically. The discussion of static profit maximiz-
ation models of the multinational corporation IS a review and 
consolidation of the existing literature in this area. It goes 
beyond the existing literature in presenting a model that is general 
enough to include several of the existing models as special cases 
and to explain why some of the results of these models differ the 
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one from the other. The dynamic profit maximization models are a 
new area in the theory of the multinational corporation. Dynamic 
theories of this type have been used to consider the one-country 
firm but there has been no application of this type of model to the 
multinational corporation. 
The managerial theories of the firm used in the thesis 
are those involving considerations of limited information and limited 
ability on the part of the firm to process and use information in its 
decision making process, and allowing for a range of objectives for 
the firm. This is used in conjunction with the literature on the 
reasons for foreign direct investment by firms. This literature 
is extended in the thesis by relating it to the range of possible 
objectives that have been attributed to the firm. Then, the ideas 
developed in the managerial theories of tr,e firm are used to develop 
an explanation of the process by which firms expand and diversify in 
order to further explain the process which leads to foreign direct 
investment. 
The thesis initially considers the reasons for foreign 
direct investment and the managerial theory of the firm approach, 
and then considers the profit maximization models. Thus, the 
process by which firms become multinational or increase the extent 
of their multinational activity is considered first. The profit 
maximization models consider aspects of the operations of firms 
that are already multinational. 
The second chapter of the thesis is used for some 
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preliminary matters. The definitions of the multinational 
corporation and of foreign direct investment are considered ln 
order to provide a context for the later discussion. The range 
of objectives that can be attributed to the multinational corpor-
ation is discussed, so that they can-be referred to when the 
reasons for foreign direct investment are considered. 
A number of explanations of why firms engage ln foreign 
direct investment have been advanced. Foreign direct investment 
involves the acquisition by the parent of the ownership and control 
of a firm in another country. The acquisition of ownership involves 
financial investment and it is the acquisition and use of control 
that distinguishes direct from portfolio investment. There has 
been some work on the consolidation of the literature in this area. 
In chapter three the thesis extends this by adding to it a consider-
ation of the possible objectives of the firm. A situation where 
different firms have different objectives, principally where multi-
national corporations and host-country firms have different objectives, 
is considered and is found to modify the conditions required for 
foreign direct investment to take place, from conditions developed 
under the assumption that all firms have the same objective. 
Foreign direct investment involves the expansion or 
diversification of the firm. Chapter four considers this further, 
using the approaches from the managerial theories of the firm to 
consider the process by which a profit seeking firm could expand 
and diversify. This allows for an improved explanation of why the 
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conditions found to be associated with foreign direct investment 
are important. 
The profit maximization models involve a mathematical 
approach to the theory of the multinational corporation, and there 
is a shift in the range of questions considered. The reasons why 
firms become multinational are not considered but aspects of the 
operations of firms that are multinational are considered. In 
particular, the responses of the multinational to changes in its 
environment are considered. These changes can be changes in 
government policy affecting such things as profit taxes and tariffs 
on imports and the responses can be changes in the level of production 
1n individual countries and in the level of trade undertaken by the 
multinational between those countries in which it operates. 
A mathematical model requires that the multinational 
corporation be precisely specified. The models 1n the literature 
are two- or three-country models with one or two levels of production 
being undertaken by the multinational. Increasing either of these 
dimensions increases the complexity of the model. 
The models in the existing literature are static. 
Chapter 5 provides a review and consolidation of them by developing 
a model that 1S general enough to include many of the features that 
are included 1n more narrowly specified models, thus allowing them 
to be treated as special cases of the general model. This allows 
for an explanation of the conflicting results that can be obtained 
from sets of the existing models. Conclusions concerning the 
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limitations on the interpretations of the results of these models 
are also drawn. The static model developed in the thesis lS a 
two-country model where the multinational produces and sells a 
final good in each country, can trade the good between those 
countries, and also produces an intermediate good in one country 
that it uses in the production of the final good in both countries. 
The intermediate good is exported from one country to the other. 
The dynamic model of the multinational corporation 
represents a new development. One model of the multinational was 
used with two different mathematical approaches, optimal control 
theory and dynamic programming. In the model specified ln 
Chapter 6, the multinational is a two-country firm that can produce 
a single final good in each country and can trade that good between 
the two countries. All three options need not be used in every 
case and under certain conditions will not be used. This is a 
simpler model than the one presented in Chapter 5, but given the 
extension being made is a reasonable starting point. A similar 
starting point was used for the initial versions of the static model. 
As with the static model, the dynamic model can be extended and 
made more complex. 
The two mathematical approaches used to develop the 
dynamic model have different strengths and weaknesses thus explain-
lng the use of two approaches. Optimal control theory, as with 
the calculus used in the static models, uses parameters specified 
as variables or as part of general functional forms, such as 
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generalized production or demand functions, and seeks to obtain 
necessary and sufficient conditions for a maximum while imposing 
no or minimal restrictions on the range of permissible parameter 
values and using functional forms that are as general as possible. 
The model is developed in Chapter 7 but the results obtained, when 
general functional forms are used, are rather limited. The 
restrictions required to achieve more specific results involved an 
assumption of a fixed capital to labour ratio in production. 
These results were not developed at length as the dynamic programming 
option is more useful if specific functional forms are required. 
Dynamic programming is a numerical technique that uses 
specific functional forms and numerical parameter values in order 
to calculate a maximum. The range of functional forms and parameter 
values that can be used with this technique is very wide and the 
effect of changing either of these can be considered by changing 
the functional forms or parameter values used in the model without 
making major changes in the dynamic program itself. In this way 
some of the assumptions required to obtain results from an optimal 
control theory model can be avoided. The program used in the 
thesis is specified in Chapter 8. 
When the dynamic programmlng approach is used for 
theoretical work the required functional forms and numerical 
parameter values are assumed in order to illustrate the types of 
responses that a multinational may make in a variety of circumstances, 
where these circumstances are characterized by the parameter values 
and functional forms. By varying the values assigned to 
individual parameters some impression of the importance of each 
parameter and of changes in its value can be obtained. The choice 
and range of parameter values used 1S specified in Chapter 8 and 
the results of the dynamic program are given in Chapter 9. Results 
are obtained for a variety of cases, including cases involving 
decreasing, constant, and increasing returns to scale in production. 
Both of these approaches to the dynamic model can also 
be used in conjunction with empirical work. The parameter values 
and functional forms for the specific case of interest may be 
estimated empirically. The functional forms are used when the 
structure of the model is set up. In the optimal control theory 
version the parameter values are then used in the solution 
equations to the model. In the dynamic programming version the 
parameter values are used when the program is run. This appli-
cation is considered for the dynamic programming model in the final 
section of Chapter 9, where possible extensions to and uses of the 
model are considered. This application was not considered for 
the optimal control theory versions of the model due to the 
restricted functional forms required in order to achieve results 
there. 
Dynamic models can consider questions that cannot be 
considered by static models. Static models can look at responses 
to changes 1n the external environment in terms of the qualitative 
differences in the equilibrium position of the multinational before 
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and after the change. Dynamic models can look not only at the 
differences in the equilibrium positions but also at the process of 
adjustment from one equilibrium to another. For some changes, suc~ 
as those involving a shift in the location of production, the 
adjustment period can be significant. 
While the thesis is a theoretical work it does not 
19nore the empirical work that has been done. In looking at the 
reasons for foreign direct investment and developing the explanation 
of it using the managerial theories of the firm the relevant 
empirical literature is consulted to try to obtain further insights 
into the theory. No attempt at an exhaustive review of the 
literature is attempted, as the size of the literature would make 
that a major work in its own right. The mathematical profit 
maximization models, however, follow from an existing theoretical 
literature in which little r~ference is made to the empirical 
literature. 
The purpose of this thesis is to extend the existing 
theory of the multinational corporation and, as a basis for this, 
to consolidate the existing theoretical work by using more general 
frameworks than hitherto established. The process by which foreign 
direct investment occurs is considered and the role of the firm 
itself, as opposed to external conditions, is highlighted. Dynamic 
models of the multinational corporation are developed, and their 
qualitative properties are explored using simulation methods. The 
dynamic framework developed also provides numerical procedures by 
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which the properties of models estimated from actual data on 
multinationals can be investigated. 
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Chapter Two 
F RAM E W 0 R K 0 F THE 
A N A L Y SIS 
Chapter Two 
F RAM E W 0 R K o F THE A N A L Y SIS 
In order to study the multinational corporation (MNC) 
it is useful to specify what type of firm is considered to be an 
MNC. This chapter provides both a theoretical and an empirical 
definition of the MNC and then uses the empirical definition to 
specify size classes of MNC's. The range of objectives that can 
be attributed to the MNC is considered in the third section of the 
chapter. The range of objectives is an important consideration in 
chapter three where the reasons for foreign direct investment are 
discussed. Also, the objectives to be assumed in the mathematical 
models developed in the thesis must be considered. 
2.1 DEFINITION OF THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION 
The definition of the MNC should specify the principle 
features of the MNC and the characteristics that distinguish it from 
a non-multinational corporation. At the same time it is useful to 
consider the definition of foreign direct investment (FDI), as a firm 
becomes multinational by engaging in FDI. This section is also 
used to specify some of the terms that refer to the MNC and to make' 
some distinctions between different types of ~~C's. 
The usual way of defining the MNC is to use a set of 
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criteria to divide corporations into MNC's and non-~~C's. The set 
of criteria can be extended to divide ~WC's into different groups 
or categories. The criteria can be set out in two ways they 
can be specified ln general terms or they can be given precise 
numerical values. The former is used for theoretical works and 
the latter for empirical works. As this thesis is a theoretical 
work the definition will be largely set out in general terms. 
Some aspects of an empirical definition of the MNC are considered 
in section 2.2. 
The criteria that have been used to define the MNC are 
of the following three types: structural criteria, measures of 
performance, and management attitudes to international business.
l 
The main structural criteria that have been used in the various 
definitions are: 
(1) the firm conducts industrial, commercial, and financial 
_ operations across national boundaries; 
(2) the firm operates through a parent corporation in one 
country and through affiliates owned and controlled by 
the parent in other countries; 
(3) the firm is involved in the collective transfer of 
resources between countries; 
(4) the shares of the firm are owned by the nationals of ' 
several countries; and 
(5) the top management of the firm is composed of the 
nationals of several countries. 
f · .. f th MNC based on these criteria have been discussed 1. De lnltlons 0 e 
by Aharoni (1971), and a definition based on four of these criteria 
can be found in Kopits (1976a, pp.626-627). 
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The first three of these structural criteria are more important 
than the last two. The measures of performance are based on the 
firm having a relative or an absolute amount of its resources 
committed to foreign operations, where the amount of resources may 
be measured by any of earnings, sales, assets, or number of employees. 
The measures of performance are similar to the first of the structural 
criteria. The structural criteria definitions are used mainly for 
theoretical works while the measures of performance definitions are 
used mainly for empirical work. The management attitude is that 
the top management of the firm has a cosmopolitan outlook, in that 
it has no special allegiance to anyone national jurisdiction. 
In using any set of criteria to define the ~mc one can 
have the problem that the criteria exclude some firms that would 
generally be considered to be multinational or the problem that the 
criteria include some firms -that would generally not be considered 
to be multinational. The purpose for which the definition is to 
be used will determine what type of definition is appropriate and 
will indicate where the line between included and excluded firms 
should be drawn. The definition required here is one that is useful 
for theoretical works.
l Such a definition should concentrate on 
the essential features that distinguish a multinational corporation 
from a non-multinational corporation and will not be concerned with 
the fine detail of specific cases. 
For this thesis the ~c will be defined as a firm that, 
(1) engages in industrial, commercial, or financial activities In 
1. In a theoretical work the definition, if it is followed, will have 
some influence on the structure of the model, and the structure of 
the model limits the range of firms to which the model can be 
applied. 
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more than one nation, and (2) has ownership and control of the 
foreign affiliated vested in a parent firm located in one country. 
Under this definition firms whose international business is limited 
to exporting or importing are not considered to be multinational. 
This is standard to most definitions of MNC's and is appropriate as 
such firms do not have the same scale of international commitment 
as firms with investments abroad. Firms which have sales operations 
abroad are counted as multinational under this definition. Where 
the firm's prImary activity is direct sales to consumers this is 
appropriate as multinational retailing firms can exist. Where the 
firm's primary activity IS industrial and the foreign sales offices 
are designed to improve the exports of goods produced in the home 
country, the classification of the firm as a multinational is not 
entirely appropriate as the level of foreign investment will be 
relatively small for the firm. Such firms are usually not counted 
as multinational but it has been noted that establishing overseas 
sales offices can be a preliminary step to further international 
.. I actIvIty. 
In the models developed in this thesis the existence of 
overseas sales offices will not be considered separately from export-
ing without overseas sales offices. Firms whose international 
operations include manufacturing or extractive operations are included 
as multinationals under the definition given here. Financial 
institutions, such as banks, and service firms, provided they operate 
1. Bergsten, Horst and Moran (1978, p.78, note 58). 
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in a number of countries can also be counted as multinational. 
It is worthwhile noting that the MNC, as defined 
above, is in many ways similar to a one-country firm. In 
particular, the assumptions about managerial objectives, production 
technology, and other aspects of the firm can be carried over from 
the theory of the firm where that theory has been concerned with 
the one-country firm. The essential difference is that the MNC 
operates in multiple national jurisdictions and the one-country 
firm only in one jurisdiction. The significance of operating in 
multiple jurisdictions will receive further consideration later. 
It should also be noted that the definition is general 
enough to apply to any MNC regardless of its size or the extent of 
its international operations, provided it operates in at least two 
countries. This is appropriate for theoretical work where the aim 
is to achieve reasonably general results. For some of the theories 
of the MNC developed or reviewed in the thesis the one-country firm 
may fit into the theory as a special case where the level in inter-
national activity by the firm is zero. 
A firm becomes multinational by establishing or 
acquiring operations or subsidiaries in foreign countries. The 
process by which this is done is foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and therefore the nature of FDI will be considered. FDI involves 
not only the transfer of capital but also the transfer of a package 
of items such as: entrepreneurship; managerial skills; 
organizational skills; technology or other productive knowledge; 
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and marketing skills. l The return on these items may be the reason 
for the firm becoming multinational and the capital a way of 
transferring these items. This is further considered in Chapter 3 
where the reasons for FDI are considered. It has also been noted 
that FDI involves an entry into the market of one nation by a firm 
that established itself in the market of another nation. Thus, the 
host country sees the subsidiary as foreign as well as the MNC 
seeing the host country as foreign. The discussion so far has 
considered the foreign owner to be another firm and this is required 
for an MNC to be involved. FDI can also occur where the foreign 
owners are individuals and not a firm but this is not very common. 
As this does not involve the MNC it will not be considered here. 
It is useful to distinguish direct investment from 
portfolio investment. Direct investment involves the purchase of 
both ownership and control while portfolio investment involves only 
ownership. Thus, in direct investment the package of resources are 
transferred internally within the firm and control is retained over 
their usage. In portfolio investment only capital is transferred. 
With portfolio investment there can however be a specific agreement 
to cover the transfer of other resources, but control over the use 
of the resources is not retained. 
It is also possible to divide FDI into either a 
horizontal, a conglomerate, or a forward or backward vertical extension 
1. The following discussion is based on Caves (1971, pp.1-4) 
and Dunning (1979, p.272). 
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to the existing firm.l A horizontal expansion involves the 
subsidiary in duplicating the activity of the parent firm by 
producing the same product or range of products. Forward vertical 
integration involves reaching beyond the parent's activity closer 
to the final demand for the product. Backward vertical integration 
involves linking the parent's activity to the supply of inputs. 
Conglomerate diversification involves cutting across product lines 
to engage in an activity unrelated to that of the parent. 
In the above definition of the MNC it was specified 
that the parent firm owns and controls the foreign affiliates 
without specifying the level of ownership. In empirical work this 
is something to be determined from the data. In theoretical work 
a decision about how to handle this is required. The options are 
to assume 100 percent ownership of the subsidiary by the parent, to 
investigate the optimal percentage of ownership from the point of 
view of the parent firm or of the shareholders of the parent firm, 
or to explicitly consider joint ventures. All three of these 
options have been used in the literature on the MNC. The first lS 
used to simplify the analysis and its use can be seen in the review 
of the comparative static profit maximization models given in 
Chapter 5. The second has been used on some of the theory of 
finance type models of the MNC which are not considered in this 
1. The definition of these terms is taken from Kopits (1979) and 
his empirical evidence on the importance of each type of 
investment is reported in section 2.2. 
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thesis. The third has received some discussion by a few of the 
models of both of the above mentioned types. In this thesis 
100 percent ownership of subsidiaries will be assumed unless 
otherwise specifically noted. 
The definition of the MNC given above excluded any 
consideration of the attitude of top management towards inter-
national business. This was done because the attitudinal part 
can conflict with the rest of the definition. A firm can have 
extensive international operations and still regard one country as 
home or a firm can be interested in world wide operations but find 
that its best option is to export from its traditional base. l 
The definition given here has used the word 
"corporation" since most multinational businesses are limited 
companies. It should, however, be taken to include multinational 
businesses that are organized as partnerships or proprietorships. 
Also no distinction is being made between the words "firms", 
"corporation", or "enterprise". In addition, no distinction is 
being made between the term "multinational", "international", 
and "transnational" although some authors have made distinctions 
between some of these terms. 2 In the thesis, when works by other 
authors are referred to, each author's own terminology will usually 
be replaced by the terminology used throughout the thesis. In 
addition, it should be noted that the foreign affiliates controlled 
1. For further discussion of this see Aharoni (1971. pp.33-3~). 
2. One author to do so is Copithorne (1971, p.32S). 
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by the parent firm can be established either as subsidiaries, 
separate host country encorporated entities, or as branches, 
1 legally a part of the home country parent. As most foreign 
affiliates are organized as subsidiaries the term "subsidiary" 
will be used in the thesis, but in most cases the analysis will 
also apply to branches, unless otherwise specifically noted. 
In considering the MNC it should be noted that its 
operations in each country (either home or host) can be relatively 
large and complex involving production, distribution, marketing, 
and management tasks, involving the operation of several plants, 
and covering a range of products. In much of the discussion of 
the MNC this complexity at the level of its component firms 1S 
ignored or simplified, and such a procedure will be used in this 
thesis. 
2.2 EMPIRICAL MATTERS RELATING TO THE DEFINITION 
It is possible to specify a definition of the MNC in 
empirical terms. This is necessary if the definition is to be 
used for empirical work and also makes it possible to specify size 
classes of MNC's. The concept of size classes is useful in some 
of the theoretical work but is best explained in the context of an 
empirical definition. In addition to specifying the size classes 
some indication of their importance is given. Some indication 
1. This is noted by Robbins and Stobaugh (1974, p.4) as it is 
important for some of the financial questions they consider later. 
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of the relative importance of horizontal, vertical, and 
conglomerate diversification, by MNC's, is also glven. 
The importance of cross-investment between countries 
1S indicated by ~he inclusion of appropriate data. Cross-
investment occurs when parent firms in each country have subsidiaries 
in the other country. When the reasons for FDI by firms are 
considered the need to explain such cross-investment is taken into 
account. 
The definition of the MNC used in empirical studies 
has varied from one study to another. A major study on MNC's 
was undertaken by the Harvard Business School and their definition 
has been used in a number of studies. One of these, Robbins and 
Stobaugh (1974, pp.lO-ll), defined the MNC as a firm controlling 
manufacturing or extractive subsidiaries in six or more foreign 
countries before 1965, wher~ the firm was included on the Fortune 
list of the 500 largest United States industrial firms in 1963 and 
1964. 1 
Using the above definition, size classes of MNC's can 
be distinguished and this was done by Robbins and Stobaugh (1974, 
pp.37-47). They specified three size classes, small, medium and 
large. Small MNC's were defined as enterprises with foreign sales 
of less than $lOOm in 1969. Medium MNC's were defined as 
enterprises with foreign sales between- $lOOm and $50Om in 1969. 
1. Vernon (1971, p.ll) also discusses the Harvard Business School 
definition. 
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Large MNC's were defined as enterprises with foreign sales greater 
than $500m in 1969. Their sample included 187 MNC's and 90 of 
these were classified as small, most of these operating in 6 to 12 
countries with foreign sales accounting for 10 to 20 percent of 
enterprise total worldwide sales. Seventy-five MNC's were 
classified as medium, most of these operating in 10 to 20 
countries with foreign sales accounting for 15 to 30 percent of 
enterprise total worldwide sales. Twenty-two MNC's were classified 
as large, most of these operating ln more than 20 countries with 
foreign sales accounting for more than 33 percent of enterprise 
total worldwide sales. Other works have also made use of the 
concept of size classes of firms. For example, Williamson (1975, 
pp.18l-l82) refers to small, medium, large, and giant firms but 
does not specify the size classes empirically. 
In the definition given above even the small MNC's are 
large firms. There are MNC's that are smaller than'allowed for by 
the above definition and they are excluded from the study. In 
order to consider the possible importance of smaller MNC's one can 
look at data indicating the total numbers of MNC's. Robbins and 
Stobaugh (1974, p.lO) found that in 1966 only 3700 United States 
corporations owned more than 50 percent of the stock in a subsidiary 
and that together these enterprises controlled almost 20,000 foreign 
subsidiaries and operated some 3000 branches. Under their definition 
only 187 of these were counted as MNC's. The importance of these 
smaller MNC's remains a subject for study. Some comments on them 
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are glven in the next two chapters of the thesis. 
In the previous section a distinction was made between 
horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate diversifications by MNC's. 
Kopits (1979, pp.10l-104), using data on United States controlled 
foreign investment for 1962 and 1968, found conglomerate 
diversification to be of increasing importance accounting for 
22 percent of FDI in 1968 while horizontal diversification accounted 
for 49 percent, forward vertical div~rsification for 22 percent, 
and backward vertical diversification for 7 percent. The per-
centages were found to vary considerably from industry to industry. 
Certain relations between theoretical and empirical 
definitions and between theoretical and empirical work should be 
noted. These involve the size of the MNC and the number of 
products handled by the MNC. In most theoretical work the MNC is 
a two or three country firm. with one of two levels of production, 
and a single final good that it sells to external customers. To 
meet the empirical definition the MNC must have subsidiaries in 
at least SlX countries in addition to its home base. Also, most 
firms have a range of products and not just one product. 
The theoretical models are restricted in size ln order 
to simplify the mathematics involved but, as indicated in Chapter 5, 
this may lead to results that appear to be much stronger than the 
results obtained with more complicated models. Models including 
more countries allow for a set of responses by the MNC to a change 
in its environment and some of these responses may partially offset 
one another. 
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Many firms deal in a number of finished products and 
semi-finished intermediate goods that fall within the same industry 
classification. This makes it difficult to compare theoretical 
and empirical results. Much of the data that have been used in 
empirical studies is based on industry classifications, thus 
covering a range of products instead of just a single product while 
theoretical models include only a single product. Empirical 
studies can show the subsidiary in one country as both shipping and 
receiving products from the same classification or as both producing 
and importing products from the same group. This does not 
necessarily mean that for any individual product either of these 
situations is the case although it does not exclude such a 
possibility. Some of the theoretical models considered later 
exclude such possibilities under certain conditions, but this does 
not imply a conflict between the theoretical and empirical results. 
To test the theoretical results empirical studies using data on 
individual products would be required. 
Another point that can be illustrated with data is the 
importance of cross-investment between countries. This importance 
indicates that any explanation of the reasons for FDI should allow 
for such cross-investment and explains the concern with it in the next 
chapter. Its importance is illustrated in Table 2.1 giving the 
dollar values of FDI from and into the United States in 1979. It 
should be noted that cross-investment occurs in individual industries 
and not just at the aggregate level, although it need not occur in 
all industries. 
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Table 2.1 - FOI from and in the U.S. at year-end 1979 




chemicals and fab- machin-
industries 
total products & allied ricated 
products metals ery . 
192,648 83,564 7,291 18,990 4,681 23,591 
52,260 20,029 5,562 7,081 2,971 3,343 
81,463 41,246 3,396 9,776 1,995 13,515 
35,999 13,487 1,608 5,254 1,534 2,071 
41,033 19,237 1,733 3,248 1,266 3,895 
6,974 3,617 838 101 821 1,173 
--
Survey of Current Business, Vo.60, No.8, pp.27 and 47, 
United States Department of Commerce 
















2.3 POSSIBLE OBJECTIVES FOR THE MNC 
The objectives of the firm have been the subject of 
a considerable literature. While most of this has been in terms 
of the one-country firm, much of it carries over to the multi-
national setting with very little change. This section does not 
give a full review of this discussion, but is used to indicate 
the range of alternative assumptions that could be made, to 
consider some of the PQssible effects of adopting different 
assumptions, and to consider specific questions which arise when 
this discussion is applied to the MNC. The discussion can be 
approached from two points of Vlew. One is to provide a reasonable 
assumption to be used in a theoretical model of the firm, especially 
where this is a mathematical model. The other is to provide 
a realistic description of the objectives pursued by the firm. 
Both of these will be given some consideration in this section. 
In the discussion of the objectives of the firm a 
distinction is made between the owners or shareholders of the firm 
and the management of the firm.l This distinction is useful 
because it is not the firm as a single entity that sets the 
objectives which the activities of the firm will be directed to 
attaining but it is certain individuals or groups of individuals 
within the firm that set them. The two possible groups are the 
owners or the senior management and it is useful to consider the 
possible roles of each group within the firm. 
1. There is a considerable literature related to this distinction. 
For one survey of it see Wildsmith (1973, Chapter 1). 
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The two groups considered here are the owners, 
usually shareholders, of the firm and the most senior management 
at the central or head office of the firm. The owners or share-
holders of a firm have the ultimate control of a firm through their 
right to appoint and replace the directors and management of the 
firm. For this right to be effective the shareholders must be able 
to act in a unified way to vote out an existing management, and if 
the shares of a corporation are widely held, with no individual 
having a large block, this may be difficult to do. In this latter 
case effective control of the firm may go to the existing manage-
ment. 
Three types of control of a firm were distinguished by 
McEachern (1978): an owner managed firm, where the owners or 
principal shareholders also act as the managers or directors of the 
firm; an owner controlled firm, where there is a single or small 
group of principal shareholders who can replace the management of 
the firm but do not themselves take part in the management of the 
firm; and a managerial controlled firm, where the shares are widely 
held and it is difficult to remove the existing management. In 
order to consider the importance of these types of control McEachern 
looked at the growth rates of a sample of large firms classified by 
type of control and by the industry of the firm. He found that in 
the owner managed and the managerial controlled type the objective 
attributed to management, growth, was higher than in the owner 
controlled type. He concluded that the interest of the average 
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shareholder 1S best represented 1n an externally controlled firm. 
It may be possible to relate the type of control 
to the Slze class of the firm and thus both to the size class of 
the MNC, as distinguished in section 2.2, and to the host country 
competitors of the MNC. This will be considered later and will 
be important in Chapter 3 when the reasons for foreign direct 
investment are considered. At this point it can be noted that 
for both large MNCts and medium MNCts, which are still large firms, 
it is reasonable to assume that managerial controlled firms will 
be the most common type although there will be some examples of 
the other two types. For small MNC's it is reasonable to assume 
that there would be a mixture of all three types. The same 
assumption could also be made for the host country competitors of 
MNCts as both of these latter two groups include a range of firms 
that would differ more widely in their characteristics than would 
large and medium MNC's. 
Within the MNC the senior management and the management 
of the individual subsidiaries can have different objectives and the 
subsidiaries could be represented as owner controlled firms where 
the owner is not a private individual but is another firm. In 
this situation both sets of managers could emphasize objectives 
that are more strongly associ~ted with management than with share-
holders but the senior management would be concerned with the 
achievement of these objectives at the overall MNC level while the 
management of an individual subsidiary could try to achieve its 
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objectives at the expense of other parts of the 0~C. The problems 
of the control of subsidiaries by the parent firm and the methods 
used to achieve this control are given further consideration in 
section 4.4 of the thesis where the organizational structures that 
can be used by an MNC are considered. 
This discussion of the possible objectives of the MNC 
will note which objectives of a firm are likely to be associated with 
decisions to undertake foreign direct investment (FDI). In 
addition, any special conditions that must be associated with an 
objective if it is to lead to FDI will be noted. The discussion 
of the reasons for FDI is, however, the subject of the next chapter 
of the thesis and major consideration of this topic is deferred to 
there. 
Before looking at the possible objectives of the firm 
it should be noted that the.managers or owners of the firm may have 
an attitude that is favourable or unfavourable to FDI, independently 
of what their other objectives for the firm are. A favourable 
attitude to FDI can be characterized in a few ways. It could be a 
willingness on the part of management to spend the extra time and 
effort that foreign operations involve compared to domestic 
operations, where this could be due to the need to deal with or 
understand different languages or different business standards 
and traditions. It could also be a desire for foreign operations 
due to the prestige that this may contribute to the managers or 
owners. An unfavourable attitude could be due to the converse of 
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the first item listed or it could be an aversion to some perceived 
risks of FDI or to a perceived higher degree of risk associated with 
foreign operations than with domestic operations. This will be 
referred to again when the reasons for FDI are considered and there 
is some evidence from empirical work to support its importance 1n 
1 that context. This attitude is important 1n two respects. It 
determines whether a firm is likely to be a leader or a follower 
in undertaking FDI and it influences how strong any incentive to 
FDI must be before a firm is likely to act upon it. 
There are a range of possible alternative assumptions 
that can be made concerning the objective of the firm. These can 
be divided into two parts; assumptions about what the firm tries to 
attain; and assumptions about how strongly the firm does or can try 
to attain it. The latter includes maximization, satisficing, 
or seeking. Assumptions arce also made about the extent of knowledge 
which firms have or can acquire about market conditions, technologies, 
and other relevant facts and about their ability to make use of 
this knowledge in making decisions. 
Situations ~here the firm does not have full knowledge 
can be described as situations of uncertainty. There are a number 
of different types of uncertainty, including uncertainty about 
the present or future values of relevant variables, and a number of 
. 2 
different approaches have been used to model uncerta1nty. The 
1. Horst (197Sb, p.4S). 
2. One major discussion of uncertainty 1S Hey (1979). 
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different approaches to uncertainty will be glven more 
consideration in Chapter 4. 
The profit maximization objective is the most well 
established of the objectives that have been attributed to the 
firm and has been used both as a possible description of the firm 
and as an assumption in theoretical models of the firm. It can 
be combined with an assumption of full and certain knowledge of 
all relevant facts and can also be combined with assumptions of 
incomplete knowledge and uncertainty. It has been subject to a 
number of criticisms. One set of these is based on the distinction 
between the owners and the managers of the firm and is concerned 
with which group has effective control of the firm. The other set 
is based on the limits in the ability of the firm to acqulre and use 
information, and claims that these limits are such that they make it 
impossible for the firm to carry out a maximization exercise. l 
Two alternative objectives that have been put forward 
are the maximization of either the sales revenue or the growth of 
the firm, where these objectives are usually pursued subject to a 
minimum profit level constraint. These objectives can be combined 
with assumptions of either certainty or uncertainty, and have been 
used on theoretical models as well as being used as a description. 
The objective of profit maximization is usually attributed 
to shareholders and the objective of sales revenue maximization or 
1. One discussion of the alternatives to profit maximization is 
given in Wildsmith (1973). 
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growth maximization to management. The existence of capital gains 
due to the reinvestment of retained earnings by the firm and of 
differences in the rate of tax on dividends and capital gains makes 
the discussion of shareholders preferences for dividends or capital 
gains more complex. This point, which belongs to the theory of 
finance literature, will not be pursued here but is noted in order 
to indicate the possible complexities in this area. l Certain 
types of uncertainty that are discussed below also make the distinc-
tion between profit maximization and sales revenue or growth 
maximization less precise and the results of assuming different 
objectives less distinct. While a theoretical distinction between 
the different objectives may be clear any empirical measure of the 
distinction may be small and difficult to detect, for the reasons 
discussed below. 
The assumption ~f profit maximization has been carried 
over to a substantial portion of the theoretical work on the MNC. 
It has been used both in models that assume certainty and in models 
that allow for particular types of uncertainty. One type of 
uncertainty that is particularly applicable to the MNC involves 
changes in or fluctuations in exchange rates. 
An approach that has been used to look at the object-
ives of management has been to assume the existence of a managerial 
utility function defined over certain variables including any or 
all of profits, sales, growth, salary, security, dominance, and 
1. For one discussion of this question see Mossin (1973) 
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professional excellence. This approach is consistent with FDI. 
An attitude favourable to FDI could be represented in this frame-
work by including in the utility function the level of or the 
presence of multinational operations within the firm. FDI could 
also contribute to the prestige of the management as the operations 
of the firm would be larger or more varied. 
A different approach to the objectives of the firm is 
to be found ln those works based on a satisficing principle. I This 
approach is founded on the cost of acquiring information and on the 
limits on the amount of information that can be used in making any 
decision. It concludes that management works to achieve satis-
factory levels of performance for the major variables that indicate 
how the firm is doing, with management attention being concentrated 
in those areas where performance is currently unsatisfactory. This 
approach has not been used in the literature on FDI. Where such 
variables as the rate of return or the level of sales are deemed 
unsatisfactory FDI could be considered as one of the alternatives 
that could be used to improve performance. Thus, a satisficing 
firm could be led to FDI. A more reasonable case is where the firm 
is a follower in FDI and other firms, with different objectives, 
have already led the way. This will be considered further in 
section 3.1 where the reasons for FDI are discussed. The concepts 
of limited information and the limited ability to process information 
are discussed further in section 4.1. 
1. For a review of this see Simon (1979) 
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Another alternative that has been used to deal with 
costly information and limited ability to handle information is to 
assume that firms use some form of "seeking" behaviour in trying to 
obtain an objective such as profits. l In this situation, where 
the management cannot maximize its objective, the management is 
trying to improve its attainment of the objective, which could be 
profits, sales, or any other item. In the case of profits it 
would do this by expanding activities that are making above average 
profits and contracting activities that are making below normal 
profits. Such a firm will also consider new activities and in the 
process of considering new activities could consider and adopt FDI. 
Thus, a seeking model is consistent with FDI. In considering new 
activities the firm will consider such items as: the character-
istics it should glve to its product; the number of competitors ln 
the market; and the extent.to which its product satisfied different 
demands than the competiting products. This objective is considered 
in Chapter 4 and particularly in section 4.3 where it is used in the 
development of a theory of the MNC. 
In situations of incomplete information the distinction 
between profit maximization and growth maximization becomes less 
clear. If any large firm has an equal ability to find new 
opportunities for profitable activities there will not be a major 
conflict between expansion by the firm and returning the funds to 
1. For one development of such a model see Lloyd, Rapport, and 
Turner (1975). 
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shareholders in the form of dividends so that they could invest 
in other firms, as they could not improve their return by doing so. 
Shareholders will adjust their portfolio to select, from the 
available opportunities, those that give them the combination of 
risk and expected return they desire. The distinction between 
profit and sales revenue maximization is also less clear. The 
effect of an increase in sales on profits is often not known and 
thus, the tendency will be to increase sales until profits turn down. 
There have been some works that have looked at the 
objective of the MNC. One of these is a comparison of profit 
maximization and sales revenue maximization that was done by Horst 
(1974). In this, two versions of a simple model of the ~wc were 
used to look at the amount of foreign sales and at the point at 
which the MNC would switch from exports to foreign subsidiary 
production, where foreign sales are growing over time. Horst 
found that the sales maximizing firm would at each point in time 
sell more than the profit maximizing firm, which is the usual result. 
He also found that the switch from exports to subsidiary production 
would take place at the same level of exports for both firms, although 
this would be at an earlier point in time for the sales revenue 
maximization firm due to the difference in the level of sales. There 
would also be a jump in foreign sales at the switchover point for the 
profit maximizing firm. The main conclusion was that the differ-
ences in behaviour due to the differences in motivation are so small 
that motivation cannot be determined from existing empirical data. 
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To determine motivation would require detailed information on 
costs and demand. 
There are empirical studies that have been concerned 
with the objective of the MNC. A number of such studies were 
reviewed in an article by Stevens (1974). Stevens first considered 
the difficulty of obtaining testable hypotheses from the different 
possible objectives where the hypotheses would be different for 
different objectives. He noted that maximization of the market 
value of the firm under uncertainty is equivalent to profit 
maximization and also that a mean-variance portfolio theory 
explanation of investment can be made equivalent to profit maxim-
ization under uncertainty. He was concerned with the alternatives 
to simple unconstrained profit maximization and concluded that: 
"there was not sufficient evidence 
to support the jettisoning of profit 
maximization; - in fact very little 1 
evidence supports the alternatives." 
The alternatives considered were growth maximization, the realm of 
behavioural theories, profit maximization or other behaviour 
subjected to financial constraints, and portfolio theories of the 
Markowitz variety. In view of Horst's (1974) results and Stevens' 
discussion of the difficulties of obtaining clear tests to differ-
entiate the hypotheses this conclusion is what one would expect. 
Stevens concludes by considering additional work that would be 
useful and the type of data that would be required for it. 
1. Stevens (1974, p.78) 
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W.L. Beedles (1977) considered whether the firm has 
one goal or has more than one goal. This was approached from the 
point of view of research into the financial management of firms, 
where it is frequently assumed that the objective of the management 
of a firm is the maximization of the market price of its common 
stock. Beedles contrasted this to a situation where a firm had 
multiple goals, each one treated as an end in itself, where there 
would be interactive effects between the goals. The goals 
considered were the stock price, profits, and sales. To test 
this empirically he used data on three firms for the period 1929 
to 1973, estimating his model using both ordinary least squares and 
two stage least squares. If the firm has one objective the former 
is the appropriate technique and if the firm has more than one 
objective the latter is appropriate. In order to compare the 
results he looked at the accuracy of the predictions obtained from 
each estimation, using five measures of the accuracy of predication. 
He found that two stage least squares was superior for four of the 
five measures and was always superlor when the individual firms 
were considered and when the prediction of individual objectives 
were considered. He noted that there were limitations to his model 
in that population parameters, or the objectives of management 
could change over time. He concludes that he has presented evidence 
for the existence of multiple objectives and that the approach is 
worthy of further study. 
This section has looked at a range of possible objectives 
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for the firm. It is shown here and ln Chapter 3 that most of 
these objectives are consistent with FDI. It has also been 
indicated that present empirical evidence is not sufficient to 
decisively confirm, or to rule out, any of the possible objectives. 
Thus, it is useful to continue to consider theories that use a 
variety of these objectives so that the differences between them 
may be further illuminated. 
In looking at the objectives of the MNC it has 
been assumed that the central management has an objective and 
directs the global operations of the MNC towards achieving it. An 
alternative is to assume independent pursuit of the objective by 
the individual subsidiaries of the MNC. A study by Stevens (1969) 
considers this empirically by looking at the level of investment in 
established subsidiaries. Two alternative explanations of the 
level of investment are considered. One is based on an assumption 
of global or joint profit maximization where all possible investment 
opportunities compete for the funds available and the levels of 
investment are decided centrally by the parent firm. The second 
involves independent activity by each subsidiary where each 
subsidiary finances its own investment out of its own retained 
earnings. Under the first alternative the parent firm may put 
new funds into an established subsidiary but it will not do so under 
the second. 
Stevens (1969) used microeconomic data on 14 United 
States firms with 300 subsidiaries, 71 of which were considered to 
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be established subsidiaries. Using regression techniques he 
tested models, based on the alternative hypothesis concerning the 
objective, that explained the level of investment in the subsid-
iariei. He concluded that the only theory consistent with the 
data for the level of fixed investment for the sample of 71 
established manufacturing subsidiaries was a model of global 
profit maximization subject to financial constraints. The 
financial constraints involved an assumption that all investment 
was financed from global retained earnings and depreciation a11ow-
ances. Stevens work supports the conclusion that a theory of the 
MNC should involve some form of joint or centralized pursuit of an 
objective instead of independent activity by individual subsidiaries. 
He did not consider global alternatives to profit maximi:ation so 
did not contribute to the debate on what the overall objectives 
of the MNC 1S. 
The theories considered in the thesis use the assump-
tions concerning the objectives of the MNC in a number of ways. 
The discussion of the reasons for FDI considers the range of 
possible objectives. The modern theory of the firm approach uses 
a profit seeking objective as its main assumption but gives some 
attention to other objectives. The static and dynamic models 
use an assumption of profit maximization. The static model, which 
involves a review of the existing literature, follows the assumption 
used in that literature. The dynamic models use the same 
assumption so that the dynamic and static results can be compared. 
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The lack of evidence for the alternatives to profit maximi:ation, 
noted when Stevens (1974) was discussed, is one of the reasons 
why profit maximization is retained in the mathematical models 
developed in the thesis. A second reason is the wide range of 
alternatives that could be used, with no single one having strong 
evidence to support it over the others. Beedles' (1977) 
conclusion in favour of multiple objectives opens the possibility 
of using any of a number of managerial utility functions that 
specify the importance of the objectives included in the function. 
In a mathematical model to change the objectives involves re-
specifying and re-working the model. The difficulty of obtaining 
precise testable hypothesis discussed above suggests that the 
return to such a line of research may be small. The differences 
in the results may be small and the policy implications similar 
for a range of alternative opjectives. 
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Chapter Three 
REA SON S FOR FOR E I G N 
o IRE C TIN V EST MEN T 
Chapter Three 
REA SON S FOR FOR E I G N D IRE C T 
I N V EST MEN T 
One aspect of the literature on the MNC has been the 
explanation of the reasons for, or factors that lead to, foreign 
direct investment by firms. This has been considered both 
theoretically and empirically and there are a number of summaries 
of this literature. l There have also been some attempts to 
consolidate the literature in this area, most notably by Dunning 
(1977 and 1979). This chapter presents a consolidation and 
summary of the literature in this area. It then extends this 
discussion by considering the implications of alternative 
assumptions about the objectives of MNC's, where this includes 
assuming that different firms have more or less favourable 
attitudes to FDI and assuming that MNC's and local host country 
firms may have different objectives. The difference in object-
ives may be due to differences in the size or type of control of 
the different firms. 
The consolidation of the theoretical literature, which 
builds on the work of Dunning, involves specifying a set of necessary 
1. Some places where this literature is reviewed are Hafbauer (1975), 
Kopits (1976a, pp.628-633), Buckley and Casson (1976, chapter 3), 
and Hood and Young (1979, chapter 2). 
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and sufficient conditions that must be met if FDI is to take 
place. Brief consideration is then given to some theories that 
do not appear to fit into the framework provided by these conditions 
to see if they are either special cases that can be derived from 
the framework or are alternative theories to that presented in the 
framework. 
The second section of the chapter looks at the 
empirical evidence reported ln the literature and connects it 
with the theories presented ln the first section. Some of the 
works on the reasons for FDI have combined theoretical and empirical 
considerations so some linking of these has already been done. 
This section also reviews some studies that consider 
the trade off between exports by the parent and foreign production 
by a subsidiary and links this to the discussion of the reasons 
for FDI. 
3.1 THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS OF FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT 
A number of theoretical explanations of the reasons 
for FDI have been advanced. Some of these presented sets of 
conditions that lead to FDI, where the basic conditions are the 
same but the statement of them differs from one work to another. 
This section presents one statement of the set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions and indicates why they are important, how 
they are related to each other, and the role that the objectives 
of the firm play ln this. A number of theories that do not 
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explicitly use this set of conditions will then be considered. 
It will be shown that some of them represent special cases of or 
specific applications of the framework, while others represent 
alternative explanations of FDI. 
In considering these explanations of the reasons for 
FDI it will be useful to keep in mind the definition of FDI ln 
section 2.1 where FDI involves the transfer of a package of 
resources. The approach considered here is primarily concerned 
with horizontal and conglomerate expansion and is less applicable 
to forward or backward vertical expansion. Kopits (1979, p.99) 
maintains that conglomerate diversification by MNC's has been 
subject to very little study and considers some reasons for it. 
The theories being considered presented the conditions 
ln a variety of ways with the number of conditions also varying. 
This reflects a range of choice in how the conditions are presented. 
Dunning (1979, p.275) grouped these into three conditions that 
would have to be met if the firm was to engage in FDI: 
1. The firm possesses net ownership advantages vis a vis 
firms of other nationalities in serving particular markets 
where these ownership advantages largely take the form of 
the possession of intangible assets and are, at least. 
for a time, exclusive or specific to the firm possesslng 
them. 
2. It must be more beneficial to the firm possessing these 
advantages to use them itself rather than to sell or to 
lease them to foreign firms. 
3. It must be profitable for the firm to utilize these 
advantages in conjunction with at least some factor . 
inputs outside its home country, otherwise al~ productlon 
would take place in the home country and forelgn markets 
would be served entirely by exports. 
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Attention will now be glven to why each of these conditions 1S 
required if FDI is to take place. 
A net ownership advantage 1S required because there 
are costs to operating at a distance which the MNC incurs but the 
local firm does not. These include higher costs to acquire 
information about host country market and other conditions than 
local firm, for reasons of much better access, will incur (see 
Caves 1971, p.5). These also include costs of controlling and 
communicating with a subsidiary over distance, where these may be 
increased if different languages, legal accounting requirements, or 
standard business practices or traditions are involved. In order 
to overcome these cost disadvantages and compete with local host 
country firms any MNC must have some offsetting advantage. 
An additional condition that has been attached to the 
advantage (Caves 1971, p.4) -is that it must be such that it can be 
transferred from one part of the MNC to another at reasonably low 
cost. In particular, this cost must be less than the amount it 
would cost the subsidiary to acquire the advantage independently. 
An alternative to this, not considered by Caves, is that the 
advantage be used by the parent firm in the production of a 
component of the final good and then the component be shipped from 
h b 'do 1 the parent to t e su Sl 1ary. 
The exclusive or firm-specific nature of the advantage 
1S required so that local firms competing with the ~mc are prevented 
1 . This idea resulted from a consideration of some of the ideas in 
Scherer, et.al. (1975), but there is no specific references for it. 
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from copying or adopting the advantage. This exclusiveness need 
not be permanent. If theMNC can continually acquire or produce 
new advantages all that is required is a sufficient time lag before 
any individual advantage is copied by local firms so that the ~lNC 
always has some advantage over them. 
Two alternative ways by which a firm can obtain a 
return on an advantage it possesses are to use the advantage 
itself to carry out some revenue producing activity or to sell 
or lease the advantage to some other firm or firms. The choice 
between these alternatives depends onlthe costs and revenues 
associated with each, with the costs of using market transactions 
compared with the costs of internal co-ordination and control in a 
single firm being particularly important. It is only when these 
factors favour the use of the advantage by the firm itself that 
FDI will result. 
When the advantage IS used in conjunction with factor 
inputs outside the home country it must be the case that the 
mobility of these inputs is limited or costly. In particular, the 
costs of moving the factors must exceed the costs of operating in a 
foreign country, otherwise the factors would be moved and FDI would 
not take place. 
Before gOIng on to develop this explanation of the 
reasons for FDI in detail it will be useful to consider the extent 
t~ which it is consistent with the possible objectives of the ~~c 
as given in section 2.3. 
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The requirement that the MNC have some advantage over 
local firms is consistent with the objectives of profit maximi:ation, 
or of maximization of sales revenue or growth of sales revenue 
provided that all firms have the same objective. Under profit 
maximization the advantage is required or the MNC's profits on FDI 
would be low because of their cost disadvantage. If sales revenue 
or growth maximization is the objective of all firms the advantage 
1S required for a cost disadvantage would make it difficult for MNC's 
to obtain any significant market share in the host country. If, 
however, it is postulated that the local firms have profit objective 
while MNC's have a sales revenue objective then MNC's could operate 
without any advantage as they would operate at a lower level of 
profits than local firms would and this could offset their cost 
disadvantage. 
The requirement that the MNC have an advantage over 
local firms is consistent with the objective of managerial utility 
maximization only if the management of the MNC's and the local firms 
have similar utility functions. If, however, the managements of 
some firms derive positive utility from the condition that their 
firm is multinational while other managements do not the former 
firms will tend to be multinational with a smaller advantage over 
other firms than they would otherwise require. 
The satisficing and seeking objectives are both more 
applicable to situations of limited or incomplete information than 
to situations of full or perfect information. In the discussion 
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of possible objectives for the MNC it was concluded that the 
satisficing objective had only limited consistency with FDI 
activity by a firm. Since, under this objective FDI is used 
only in an attempt to correct an unsatisfactory performance in 
some aspect of the firm the existence of an advantage over local 
firms would increase the likelihood of FDI being seen as a way of 
improving performance. 
The seeking objective is discussed in Chapter 4 of 
the thesis where consideration is given to a theory of a profit 
seeking firm. The theory looks at the diversification process of 
firms and uses it to explain how such firms become multinational. 
This theory embraces some advantages of MNC's over other firms. 
Under a seeking objective the objective can be anyone of profits, 
sales revenue, or managerial utility. Thus, it allows for a 
situation of differing obje~tives where the ~mc need not have an 
advantage over local firms. A seeking objective theory is, 
however, generally consistent with firms having different levels 
of efficiency, thus giving some firms advantages over others. The 
differing levels of efficiency or ability are due to the incomplete 
information assumed by the theory. 
The condition that the ~mc have exclusive use of its 
advantage depends on the requirement that the MNC have an advantage. 
If an advantage is not required the condition of exclusive use 
becomes empty. The second and third of the conditions for FDI to 
take place, that the firm use the advantage itself and that the 
advantage be used in a host country, also depend on the requirement 
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that the firm have an advantage. In a situation where the ~r,c 
does not require an advantage there must still be some incentive 
to FDI. This would be some condition favouring production in 
the host country over exporting from the home country and could 
be the use of a factor input from the host country that was included 
in the third of the conditions leading to FDI. 
In section 2.3 three types of control of the firms 
were distinguished viz., owner management, managerial control, and 
owner control, and their possible relation both to firms of different 
Slzes and to MNC's and local host country firms was noted. From 
this one could argue for a difference in the objectives of MNC's 
and local ho st country firms, with a substant ial portion of tvINC' s 
having objectives attributed to managerial control such as sales 
revenue or managerial utility, while a substantial portion of local 
firms would have an objective attributed to owners, namely profits. 
A situation of differing objectives of firms has not 
been considered in the literature on the reasons for FDI. One 
way to fit this into the set of conditions developed above is to 
consider as an advantage those objectives under which a firm will 
emphasize growth at the expense of profits. The advantage based 
on managerial objectives favouring FDI, could be found on its own 
and could also appear in conjunction with other advantages. Such 
an advantage is one that other firms could have, but not something 
that could be directly copied. The third condition would still be 
required in that the firm would need some incentive to operate 
so 
abroad. Since the objective can be related to the type of control 
of the firm, possession of the advantage would also be related to 
the type of control. Thus, if the type of control is important, 
there should be a relation between the type of control of a firm 
and the firm's level of FDI. The existence of an advantage 
based on the objectives of the firm would also help to explain 
which firms are leaders in FDI, as the total of the advantages of 
firms with growth objectives would excGed the total for other firms, 
so they would tend to engage in FDI sooner than other firms. 
In discussing the advantages that the MNC has over 
J 
other firms, the first step is to list the range of advantages 






proprietary technology, usually where this is related 
to production activities; 
product differentiation or trade marks; 
a high level of skill in the managerial, marketing, or 
technical activities required by the firm; 
large size, where this reflects an ability to make use 
of scale economies that exist in the industry or to 
achieve economies in the provision of activities such as 
administration, and research and development, to the 
overall MNC (parent and all subsidiaries), or to 
achieve economies of joint supply; and 
large capital requirements for the particular industry 
in terms of the minimum investment required. l 
In addition, there are also the advantages and disadvantages to 
1 • The list of advantages is constructed primarily from Dunning 
(1979, p.276). Other works using this approach are: 
Kindleburger (1969), advantage 1; Caves (1971), advantages 2; 
and Lall (1980), advantages 1 to 5. 
operating in multiple national J'url'sdl'ct' h' h lons, w lC are discussed 
later in this section. 
In the literature on FDI there has been little 
explanation of how the advantages arise. Part of the reason for 
this is that these advantages are also considered in the literature 
on the one-country firm, frequently in the context of market 
concentration and barriers to entry. Rather than summarize this 
literature many of the works on FDI just assume the advantages 
exist and make brief reference to the one-country literature. 
For example, Lall (1980, pp.103-l04) claimed that the advantages 
listed are barriers to entry that give rise to concentrated market 
structures within countries, but does not go on the explain why. 
There is, however, some limited explanation of these 
advantages in the literature on FDI. Dunning (1979, p.280) links 
some of the advantages to country-specific characteristics that are 
likely to generate and sustain them. Proprietary knowledge, which 
is primarily the result of research and development activity, is 
associated with government support of innovation and with the 
availability of skilled manpower. Product differentiation and 
trade marks are associated with national markets that have reason-
ably high incomes and high income elasticity of demand and where 
there is an acceptance of advertising or other persuasive marketing 
methods. A high level of skill is associated with the availability 
of the appropriate type of trained manpower and with the existence 
of the appropriate educational and training facilities. Large si:e 
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1S associated with having a large and standardized market and ~ith 
a liberal government attitude towards mergers, conglomerates, and 
industrial concentration. Large capital requirements are associated 
with reliable capital markets. 
An advantage based on innovation activity represents a 
situation where the advantage due to any particular innovation need 
not be permanently protected from being copied by other firms. By 
continuing to innovate the MNC continues to renew its advantage and 
a period of protection, due either to patents or to keeping inform-
ation secret, is all that is required. 
The types of advantages which MNC's have over other 
firms will also be considered in Chapter 4 of the thesis where the 
process by which firms diversify is considered. This is based on 
the various firms having different levels of skills in the various 
activities they undertake in order to carry out their business. 
Two additonal aspects of MNC's can be considered in 
order to say more about the costs of operating at a distance and 
about the types of advantages possessed by the MNC. These are that 
a MNC operates in several distinct national jurisdictions, and that 
it has multi-plant operations. 
The effects of operating 1n several jurisdictions were 
considered by Robbins and Stobaugh (1974, pp.2l-35). They noted 
that the risk of losses due to changes in exchange rates is endemic 
to international business and is related to all major financial 
decisions. The MNC has assets and liabilities denominated in 
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several currencies and carries out transactions between different 
currency areas. Changes in exchange rates can affect profits 
and will affect the recorded net worth of a subsidiary when it 1S 
translated into the home country currency. Further, the accounting 
principles used to translate assets and liabilities from one 
currency to another are complex and do not necessarily correspond 
to economic values. 
Costs of borrowing differ between countries and ~WC's 
can take advantage of this by borrowing in one country to use the 
funds in another country. This involves a risk that the exchange 
rate will change however, and the cost of uS1ng forward markets to 
cover this is almost equal to any losses due to the risk. Local 
borrowing, however, can offset the risk of having assets denominated 
in the local currency and can be used to establish local banking 
connections. 
The tax structures to which MNC's are subject are 
complex, with subsidiaries subject to taxes in the country in which 
they operate, the parent subject to tax on its overall income, and 
there being complex rules about when income is counted as being 
received and about the credits allowed for foreign taxes paid. The 
MNC will use this by arranging its financial flows to minimise the 
overall amount paid in taxes. 
Accepted accounting practices and legal requirments 
concerning accounting differ from one country to another. This 
causes problems when consolidated accounts for the overall ~~C are 
being prepared. There are also other differences in business 
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practices between countries, and subsidiaries 1,-iill frequently 
follow local practices and not those followed in the home country 
of the MNC. 
The government ln each country imposes a variety of 
laws and restrictions on the firms that operate there and frequently 
imposes special restrictions on foreign owned firms. For MNC's, 
restrictions on new investment, capital flows, and the repatriation 
of earnings are important. Also, import tariffs and quotas, and 
controls on exports limit the ability of the M~C to move products 
and semi-finished goods between its various subsidiaries and between 
them and the parent. 
The economics of multi-plant operations, including 
a few comments on their role in MNC's, were considered by Scherer, 
et al. (1975) and the following owes much to their work. They 
compared the multi-plant firm to a single plant firm, where the 
single plant firm was at or approaching the minimum optimum scale 
when the effects of the costs of transporting the product to market 
were taken into consideration. They also took into account the 
fact that a firm produces a number of products, not just a single 
product. 
A multi-plant firm can concentrate production at one 
or a few plants in two cases; where a product has high economies 
of scale in production, or where total world-wide demand for the 
product is small. It thus avoids either diseconomies of scale or 
costs of co-ordinating and controlling multiple small production 
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runs for a single product. Where economies of scale are small or 
total demand high multiple plants ata number of locations can be 
used ~o save on transportation costs and, for an MNC,on tariffs and 
other costs of international trade. This 1S particularly 
important where there is some advantage to producing a full range 
of some type of product. Examples of this are household appliances 
where retailers or distributors want to purchase a full range from 
a single producer, or supplies of machined parts, such as screws, to 
industry where a firm prefers to purchase the full range required 
from a single source. 
For the MNC the multi-plant advantage becomes an 
ability to produce products or components that are of low volume or 
have economies of very long production runs at a single plant which 
is used to serve several national markets. Thus, the MNC will be 
able to secure cost advantages not available to firms serving a 
single national market even if that firm has multi-plant operations 
in the one country. The production or final assembly of products 
that either do not require such long production runs or are subject 
to high tariff and transportation costs can take place at plants 
located in a number of national markets. The advantage of 
concentration of production may be particularly appropriate to 
components which are technically complex or of high quality as the 
MNC would only have to assemble one highly skilled work force. As 
components they may be subject to lower tarrifs than finished 
products and transportation costs may be less than for a finished 
product. 
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The local firms, however, retain one advantage over 
the MNC's. They can serve as a second and local source of supply. 
Not being dependent on goods or components corning from abroad 
they will not be subject to interruption due to disruptions in 
international trade. These can be due to stoppages or delays in 
international transportation or to changes in tariffs, quotas, or 
other restrictions on imports. 
The next condition to be considered is that which 
causes the MNC to use its advantage itself by having a local 
subsidiary instead of selling it or licencing it to local firms. 
The main idea used here is the market internalization concept found 
in the nature of the firm literature, for which the seminal article 
IS Coase (1937). A number of authors have put particular emphasis 
on this concept and have used it to try to explain why MNC's are 
common in some industries while they are uncommon in others. It 
has been argued that the markets for which internalization is most 
likely are those involving flows of commercially valuable inform-
. 1 atlon. Where bargaining takes place under conditions of fewness, 
in the limit bi-lateral monopoly, the bargaining costs may be such 
that it is more efficient to internalize the market within a single 
firm f
. 2 
than to bargain between lrms. This can explain vertically 
integrated MNC's, and in this case the MNC does not have to have an 
1. Two works where this is developed at some length are Buckley and 
Casson (1976) and Casson (1979). 
2. For a discussion of this see Dunning (1977, pp.402-408) and Dunning 
(1979, p.276). 
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advantage over local firms. 
Market transactions ln information involve certain 
problems, thus making internalization attractive. Once inform-
ation is given it cannot be taken back but before the information 
is fully disclosed it is difficult for the purchaser to determine 
how valuable the information is. Although the use of inform-
ation can be controlled by patents or other legal measures, partial 
disclosure often makes it easier for the firm obtaining the 
information to innovate in a way which gets around these restrict-
ions. This is particularly applicable to information advantages 
obtained by research and development activities. Buckley and 
Casson (1976, p.42) also maintain that the flow of information 
concerning such matters as how well a product is received by 
customers, and how a product can be better suited to a particular 
market, is greater when the.international transactions are 
internalized in a single firm than when the transactions take place 
between separate companies. This additional information flow can 
give the ~WC an advantage in the market place. 
Casson (1979, p.50 and p.95) noted that the incentive 
to internalize transactions in information depends in part on how 
well property rights in information are defined and could be 
reduced by improving those rights. With property rights better 
defined the FDI package could, in some cases, be unbundled and 
technology transferred separately. There are limits to this, 
because the return to proprietary knowledge goes to the entrepreneur 
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who recognises the opportunity for the use of the knowledge. 
Host countries could contract to have technology produced for them 
but some of them have only small amounts of the entrepreneural 
ability that is required to recognize opportunities. 
Market internalization can be used under conditions of 
fewness to avoid bargaining costs. In these conditions it can 
also provide another advantage by improving the ability of the firm 
to make use of its oligoplistic position in the remaining external 
1 
markets. This occurs because the transactions of the now inter-
nalized market can be organized to suit the overall objectives of 
the firm instead of being the result of bargaining between two 
firms with separate objectives. In particular the quantity traded 
can be different as it is not involved in any distribution of 
profits between firms. 
Market internalization can also be used in order to 
avoid the risks of default on a contract by one of the parties to the 
contract after the contract has been made. This is discussed by 
Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978). One example of this is the 
rental of an item of capital equipment. Once it is in place the 
renter may try to reduce the rent payable from the agreed rent to 
a level just above the level at which it would pay the owner to 
remove the asset and put it to another use. In the article a range 
of possible contractual arrangements and other alternatives are 
considered. In the multinational case an additional difficulty of 
1. Buckley and Casson (1976, pp.37-38). 
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contracts is that one party may have to use the courts in the 
country of the other party in order to enforce the contract. 
This difficulty may increase the incentive to internalize the 
transaction by forming an MNC. 
McManus (1972) also looked at the MNC as a method of 
co-ordinating economic or business activities in more than one 
country. He considered cases where the activity of a firm in one 
country had an affect on the return to the activities of a 
different firm in another country. Some of these cases, such as 
producing a commodity that other firms use as inputs, give rise to 
normal market transactions. Other cases, such as advertising 
spillovers where a brand name has been licenced, are much more 
difficult to handle by market transactions. In such cases a firm, 
by becoming multinational, can optimize the amount and type of ·such 
effects, given the objectives of the firm. Independent firms 
would have to reach agreement through bargaining and this would 
not be possible or practicable in all cases. 
It 1S useful to consider whether or not market 
internalization by itself, in the absence of conditions 1 and 3, 
an advantage possessed by the MNC and its use in the host country, 
can give rise to FDI. When proprietary knowledge is involved, 
that knowledge provides an advantage and condition 1 is satisfied. 
Where the FDI involves only the establishment of a sales office in 
the host country condition 3 would not be required. This 
situation, however, is usually defined not as MNC activity but as 
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international trade activity. For more substantial foreign 
involvement that would be counted as MNC activity condition 3 
would be required. For the vertical integration form of >NC, 
condition 1 (an advantage possessed by the MNC) is not required. 
Bargaining under conditions of fewness would be sufficient. The 
McManus argument involving spillover effects actually involves all 
three conditions. The spillover must provide an advantage or 
separate firms could compete effectively even if they did not reach 
any agreement. For example, if an advertising spillover did not 
reduce the total costs required to achieve a given level of 
advertising in the combined markets there would be no advantage to 
be gained by forming an MNC. 
The final factor to be considered is why the r~C uses 
local production ln the host country instead of serving the host 
country market with exports_from its home country base. There are 
two main alternatives that have been put forward. One is that 
barriers to trade discourage exports and encourage local production 
and the other is that comparative advantages of the host country 
d 
. 1 favour local pro uctlon. The barriers to trade can include 
tariffs or other restrictions on imports and also include transport-
ation, insurance, and other costs of conducting trade over 
substantial distances. The host country advantages can include 
the size of the host country market and the opportunities to make 
use of scale economies, the prices of the inputs obtainable there, 
1. See Dunning (1977, p.399) and Dunning (1979, p.276). 
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and the quality of those inputs including the productivity of 
labour, government policies including taxes and investment 
incentives, and the quality of the commercial, legal and transport-
ation infrastructures existing in the country. 
The barriers to trade argument provides a better 
explanation of investments that serve only the local market than 
it does of investments that produce products or components for a 
world-wide market. It can also be used to explain local production 
that involves only final assembly as tariffs or restrictions on 
components may be much lower than for the completed final product. 
This is consistent with an advantage that is embodied in the 
components shipped from the horne country, while the MNC has no 
advantage in final assembly. The host country advantages argument 
provides an explanation for either type of investment but is more 
applicable to the case where the investment involves production for 
the world-wide market. 
The use of host country production can also be linked 
to a consideration of the extent to which the advantage of the ~WC 
1S transferrable between the parent and the subsidiary. Lall 
(1980, pp.109-110) suggested the following hypothesis. A tech-
nology based advantage favours exports when the technology is being 
developed but later favours foreign production. Marketing skills 
favour FDI. Large minimum scales make the size of the market 
important and will delay FDI until the market reaches the required 
slze. Technical skills will have a mixed effect depending on the 
skills involved. 
62 
It is the combination of transferability of the 
advantage with either barriers to trade or local host country 
advantages that will finally determine the choice between exports 
or production by a subsidiary in the host country. 
The importance of cross-investment between countries 
was noted in section 2.2 and it is appropriate to see how well the 
set of three conditions presented in this chapter can explain 
cross-investment. This was considered by Dunning (1979) who 
argued that it is necessary for any theory to allow for cross-
investment. Dunning noted that advantages may not be spread 
evenly across countries. The way in which specific advantages may 
be related to specific features of the country has already been 
discussed in this chapter. If advantages are spread unevenly, 
cross-investments may take place with the investments from each 
country being based on the advantages of that country. Also, each 
country will be a host country because of local factor inputs which 
it is advantageous for any foreign firm to use by establishing a 
local subsidiary. In Chapter 4 of this thesis, the explanation 
of the process by which firms diversity will be used to look at 
the development of cross-investment. 
At this point it is useful to consider a few of the 
more specific theories or explanations of FDI that have been 
advanced. One of these is the product-cycle theory developed by 
Vernon (1966). The model has been outlined by Vernon (1979, 
pp.256-257) as follows. The stimulus firms have to innovate is 
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typically provided by the needs and opportunities of the market 
closest at hand, that is the home market. The home market ~ill 
also be the preferred location for the actual development of the 
innovation due to the need for close communication with scientists 
and engineers and for contact with customers. Because of this 
importance of the home market the innovations of a firm headquartered 
in some given·market will tend to reflect the characteristics of 
that market. The first production facilities will also tend to be 
located in the home market as this allows for quick communications 
between the different groups involved while product specifications 
and production technology are still changing. 
In this model the advantage of the ~WC is due to its 
innovative activity and is impermanent due to innovative or 
imitative activity by other firms. Initially the advantage will 
be used in foreign markets by exporting from the home country. 
The firm may later move to FDI, possibly because of the foreign 
market expanding and costs favouring such a move, but more usually 
because of the advantage being lost and costs becoming more 
important (Vernon 1979, p.257). The existence of some host-
country condition favouring production is thus included in this 
theory. 
The model was initially developed to explain FDI by U.S. 
based MNC's in the first and second decades after World War II. 
Vernon (1979, p.265) noted that it is less applicable nOh" as ~f\C's 
have changed in character. MNC's are based in more countries and 
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these wider operations lead them to look for opportunities over 
more markets. The applicability of the product cycle model has 
been reduced but it still indicates that when market conditions 
change the MNC's based 1n the market where conditions change first 
will gain an advantage over those based 1n countries where 
conditions change later. Thus, it can provide some explanation 
of why PDI may take place 1n different directions at different 
times. 
Another theory developed to explain an aspect of 
the PDI decision is the oligopolistic reaction theory of 
Knickerbocker (1973). This work found that FDI by United States 
bases MNC's in individual foreign countries was often closely 
bunched in time, with investment by a number of companies following 
the initial investment by some one company in a three to seven year 
period. Knickerbocker (197.3, pp.2l-29) suggested a set of motives 
that may lead to this behaviour. If a firm is successful in moving 
into a local market and. establishing production facilities there 
it could strengthen its competitive position against other home 
country firms both in the host market and on a world-wide scale. 
The investing firm will have an increased productive base from 
which to compete in all markets and if its move is not followed 
will be the only one to include any potential advantages of having 
production facilities in its new host country. The investing firm 
may also have an advantage in the host country market. It 1S now 
protected against tariff increases or other restrictions on imports 
and may benefit from such changes if other firms do not follow its 
6S 
investment. Also, the firm may be able to use its position in 
the host market to help support its competitive activities in other 
markets. 
In studying this investment pattern Knickerbocker 
(1973, pp.194-l9S) found that this industry concentration of 
foreign investment was positively associated with: the eight firm 
industry concentration ratio up to the seventy percent level but 
declining thereafter; the importance of marketing activities 
in the particular industry; the profitability of the industry; 
the rate of market growth in the host country; and is inversely 
related to the product diversity in the industry. 
The oligopolistic reaction theory does not, as 
Knickerbocker (1973, p.9) noted, explain the initial investment in 
a particular country. It can add to the explanation of FDI activity 
by firms that are followers-but not leaders in FDI. A firm can 
be a follower in FDI activity for a number of reasons. It was 
noted previously that a firm that followed a satisficing objective 
would tend to be a follower and not a leader ln FDI. The 
ologopolistic reaction theory suggests why such firms would follow 
others in undertaking FDI instead of remaining a one country firm. 
Another set of followers are those firms where the management has 
an unfavourable attitude to FDI. The leading firm not only sho~s 
that FDI in the particular country may be profitable but also 
changes the risks to the following firm, decreasing the risks of 
investing and increasing the risks of not investing, for the reasons 
mentioned above. 
66 
One additional consideration that a firm faces when 
undertaking FDI is whether to purchase an existing local firm or 
to start a subsidiary de novo. This does not appear to be 
discussed in the literature on FDI.l 
To consider this the attributes that an existing 
firm can provide to the MNC should be stated. These include: 
a market share for an existing product range; established 
marketing and distribution arrangements; existing brand names, 
in the case of a consumer goods firm; production capacity using 
given techniques, for a manufacturing firm, where this consists of 
both physical plant and the labour force to operate it; and an 
established set of suppliers. It may also bring new products or 
technologies to the MNC, where these can be exploited on a world-
wide scale. 
2 
(Leroy, 1976, p.156.) 
The value of each of these will depend on the cost to 
the MNC of acquiring them for a subsidiary established de ~, 
how well the local firm corresponds to the type of subsidiary the 
MNC wishes to acquire, the quality of each existing aspect of the 
local firm, and the cost of acquiring the local firm. The value 
1. For a discussion of related issues involving decisions concerning 
the replacement of existing plant and involving mergers or 
acquisitions see Scherer et al. (1975, pp.16?-168) .. 
2. For acquisition of a local firm to be a posslble opt~on, however, 
there must be at least one local firm of the approprlate type. 
If the MNC produce a highly specialized product range, . perhaps 
involving advanced technology, there may be no local flrms 
serving the same type of market, or producing the same type of 
goods. Thus, there may be no local firm that could serve as a 
subsidiary for the ~WC. 
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of these to the MNC will also depend partly on what the MNC 
perceives its own strengths and advantages to be, and on how well 
the existing firm can be fitted in with the existing operations 
of the MNC. 
The value of an established market share will depend 
on the presence and size of any market share possessed by the ~WC 
based on imports to the host country, on the size of the local 
firm's market share, and on the size of the market share the ~WC 
wishes to obtain. The smaller the MNC's import-based market 
share and the larger the local firm's market share the more 
attractive the purchase of a local firm is to the MNC. 
The value of any brand names and established marketing 
and distribution arrangements of the local firm also depends on 
the extent of any export-based market share of the ~mc. If the 
MNC uses international bran4 names the value of any local brand 
names is limited, although a publicity campaign associated \vith 
a name change to the MNC's own brand name may give them some value. 
The established distribution networks may be of more value to the 
MNC, particularly if it wishes to expand quickly from a small 
market share and limited market penetration to a large market share 
and much greater market penetration. 
The value of any existing production capacity depends 
on its quality. This 1S determined by the technology embodied In 
the capital stock, on how efficient it is compared to the best 
technology available to the ~mc, and on how productive the labour 
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force is. An existing plant is immediately available for 
production whereas it takes time to build a new plant and hire 
and train a labour force to run it. If the MNC's advantage is In 
efficient production technology this will reduce the value of any 
existing plant. The MNC will have to change -the technology used 
in the firm purchased before the MNC can make use of its advantage, 
and this process will take some time. Also if the existing labour 
force is too large, or of the wrong composition, it can be 
difficult and expensive to change. If working practices are 
considered to be inefficient it can be difficult to change them in 
an existing firm, and it may be easier to obtain changes from 
conventional practices if a workforce is being hired by a new firm. 
The existing suppliers to an established firm mayor 
may not be valuable to the MNC. To the extent that the MNC wishes 
to acquire suppliers of com~onents for use in the subsidiary from 
other parts of the MNC it will want to cease using local suppliers 
and there may be an adverse reaction to this in the host country. 
For a new firm, however, time will be required to establish 
contracts with local suppliers for those items that it wishes to 
acquire locally. This will involve management time, which will be 
a reasonable scarce resource when all the operations required to 
set up a new firm are involved. 
The final choice between setting up a subsidiary de ~ 
and purchasing an existing local firm will depend on the combination 
of costs and benefits involved for each of the above factors under 
each alternative. The ~mc will also have to look at a number of 
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local firms to consider which would be the best one to purchase 
if such a course of action is decided upon. 
The final consideration will be the cost of purchasing 
any firm and the ease or difficulty with which the firm can be 
purchased. It may be easier to negotiate with a single owner or 
small group of shareholders who own 100 percent of the shares than 
to make a bid for shares on the stock market. Also, negotiations 
with a group of shareholders can be kept private, while a stock 
market bid is public. To attempt to purchase control of a firm 
can lncrease the price asked for the shares of the firm. 
This section has presented a set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions for FDI to take place and has shown that 
objectives of the firm that favour growth over profits may be an 
advantage to an MNC under this set of conditions. It then related 
a few of the existing theories to this set of conditions and also 
showed that the decision concerning purchasing an existing local 
firm or setting up a subsidiary de novo could be treated 
separately from the main set of conditions. 
3.2 EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF THE REASONS FOR FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTMENT 
A number of empirical studies have considered the 
causes of, or reasons for, FDI. These include specific studies 
and parts of studies concerned more generally with r.1NC's. This 
section reviews some of this literature in order to provide an 
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empirical comment on the theories presented in the previous 
section. This review serves its purpose by raising certain points 
for consideration and need not be exhaustive. The empirical 
studies have considered a number of questions including: the range 
of conditions that are associated with FDI; the role of 
diversification as a factor in FDI; and the relation between exports 
from the home country and production by a subsidiary in the host 
country. 
The set of conditions that have been considered are 
glven below, with a positive association with FDI being expected 
in each case. Then, the studies reviewed are listed with the 
conditions found to be of greater or lesser importance. The 
conditions are: 
1. Research and development expenditures by the MNC, which 
are used as a measure of the technical advantage held by 
the MNC. 
2. The size of the parent firm or of the overall MNC, 
usually measured either by sales or assets. 
3. Measures of the degree of product differentiation or 
of the level of advertising by the parent. 
4. A high level of marketing expertise being possessed by 
the parent firm. 
S. A high level of capital intensity in the particular 
industry. 
6. Measures of scale economies or of the minimum efficient 
plant size. 
7. Measures of the skill levels required based 
proportion of technically trained employees 
number of employees. 
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on the 
to the total 
8. The importance of multi-plant operations ln the home 
country. 
9. The size of or the rate of growth of the host country 
market. 
10. The size or importance of tariffs or other barriers to 
trade established by the host country_ 
11. Internalization of markets for information. 
Items 1 to 8 represent advantages according to the 
theory given in the previous section. Item 9 is a condition 
involved in the choice of host country. Item 10 is one of the 
conditions that should lead to foreign production instead of 
exporting from the home country. Item 11 should lead to internal 
use of an advantage instead of licencing it to a local firm. 
The studies reviewed are listed in Table 3.1. For 
each study, the second column lists the conditions found to 
explain or to be associated with FDI, while the third column 
lists the conditions found to have no significant association 
with FDI. Where a condition is not listed it was not considered 
by the study. Additional points from some of the studies are 
noted later in this section. 
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1 Caves (1974) 
Horst (1974b) 








Conditions found to be 











Type of Study 
survey article 
study of MNC's 
regression analysis 
firm level data 
regression analysis 
industry level data 
industry study 
study of MNC's 
study of MNC's 
regression analysis 
industry level data 
regression analysis 
regression analysis 
industry level data 
1. Caves (1974) found condition 3 to be sometimes but not always 
significantly associated with FDI. 
There are some conflicts in these results, as 
conditions appear under different headings to be both significant 
and not significant. This occurs because some of the conditions 
are alternative causes or advantages with some, but not all of 
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them being present in any particular case. The ones found to be 
important in any particular study depend on the specific data set 
used. To explore this further a theory explaining why, and under 
what circumstances, the particular reasons for, or causes of, FDl 
are important is required. Some steps in this direction are taken 
in Chapter 4. 
The relation of the above conditions to exports and to 
FDI was considered in some studies. Lall (1980) found that 
conditions 1, 6, and 7 favour exports and 3 favours FDl. Buckley 
and Pearce (1979) found 1 to favour exports and 2 to favour FDl. 
Lall (1980, p.ll9) concluded that the conditions that lead to 
internal concentration also lead to greater success in foreign 
markets and that transferable advantages promote foreign production 
while non-transferable ones promote exports. The latter conclusion 
was based on a comparison of a priori assumptions about transfer-
ability, with the above noted empirical results on which advantages 
explain each type of foreign involvement. 
In a study on the foreign operations of the American 
food processing industry Horst (1974b) made a number of observations 
concerning the causes of FDI. For food processing firms an 
advantage in marketing skills was more important than any technical 
or production based advantage. This supports the suggestion 
that the different advantages are alternatives to each other. For 
some parts of the food processing industry domestic expansion was 
restricted by anti-trust decrees and foreign expansion appeared to 
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be used as an alternative to domestic expansion. In comparing 
the firms that established foreign operations with those that did 
not do so, Horst (1974b, pp.36-39) found that part of the difference 
depended more upon the attitude of management than upon anything 
else. This supports the inclusion of the attitude of management 
among the causes of FDI. He also found that foreign investment 
may improve a firm's competitive position at home over non-foreign 
investors by opening up new opportunities for and defences against 
predatory behaviour. In addition, the feed-back effect of FDI 
may represent an increase in the barriers to new competition 
1 at home. 
Robbins and Stobaugh (1974, p.4) in their study of 
MNC's concluded that the most prevalent motive for undertaking FDI 
was to meet a '>competitive threat. For a manufacturing firm this 
could be a threat to an established export market and for an 
extractive firm it could involve access to a better source of raw 
materials. This partly reflects a desire to reduce risks and to 
acquire knowledge about new markets. Other factors will be 
important, but will be secondary to the main motive. 
Wolf (1977) was primarily concerned with 
diversification and looked at exporting, FDI, and domestic 
industrial diversification as alternative parts of a single 
diversification strategy used by United States manufacturing firms. 
He found that exporting and FDI were alternative means of using a 
1. Horst (1974b, p.119 and p.129). 
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technical or expertise advantage possessed by the firm as his 
technical manpower variable was more closely related to the sum 
of exports and subsidiary production than it was to either 
individually. Domestic diversification to other industries , 
however, was not as strong a substitute form of diversification 
as exports and subsidiary sales were. 
The relation between exports by a patent firm and 
sales by a host country subsidiary were considered in an empirical 
study by Horst (1972a). This was later reconsidered by Orr (1975) 
who used more detailed data. Horst used data on 17 two-digit 
United States industries and on their exports to and subsidiary 
sales in the Canadian market, and concluded that there was some 
form of trade-off between exports and subsidiary sales. Orr (1975) 
used data on 71 three-digit industries and found no evidence that 
subsidiary sales are substituted for imports, but did find evidence 
that higher tariffs discourage imports. Orr, and Horst (1975) 
in a reply, noted that the actual relation between exports and 
subsidiary production may be complex and differences in the data 
can change the results obtained. 
In a study that looked at how a MNC would exploit its 
products on the international markets, starting from the initial 
development, Leroy (1976, pp.163-l70) drew a number of conclusions 
on the choice between exports and foreign subsidiary production. 
These were that the need to differentiate a product across countries 
favours local production while the novelty of a product or technology 
and the complexity of the production process favours home production 
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and export. These conclusions were based on case studies of 
five firms looking at the activity and decisions with respect to 
individual products of the firms. 
Leroy (1976, p.128) also noted that four of the five 
firms studied developed as multinationals along the same path. 
They initially became international with a unique product that 
had been a success in their domestic market. After achieving a 
dominant position internationally with the product they diversified 
into other product lines. They then developed a world wide outlook 
and saw the potential of any new technology on a world scale. The 
initial stage is consistent with the product cycle model discussed 
in the previous section, and the later stage is consistent with the 
decline in importance of the product cycle model. 
Kopits (1979) looked at conglomerate diversification in 
the foreign operations of MNC's using observations on United States 
based companies in 45 two-digit industries. Diversified foreign 
operations were operations of foreign subsidiaries in industries 
other than the primary industry of the parent and this was measured 
by the proportion of diversified foreign subsidiary assets weighted 
by the number of industries in which the subsidiaries operate. 
The factors considered as possible explanations of 
this diversification were: 
(1) research and development expenditures by the parent, 
(2) the size of the parent, 
(3) a proxy for the concentration ratio in the parent 
industry, 
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(4) the growth of foreign subsidiary assets, and 
(5) domestic diversification by the parent. 
Using regression techniques it was found that the first, fourth, 
and fifth of these were important although the overall level of 
explanation of the dependent variable was low. Support was also 
found for the view that horizontal and vertical foreign investment 
and domestic product diversification are complementary rather than 
alternative routes of corporate growth. The low overall 
explanatory power was attributed to variables left out, some of 
the more important ones being the degree of risk and uncertainty 
perceived by the investor, and country specific variables in the 
host country that may attract investment. The two items found 
to be insignificant, have no implications for whether or not they 
are important in explaining other types of FDI, and hence create 
no conflict with any of the.previous results. 
Some empirical studies have looked at diversification 
as a means of reducing the variance in the expected rate of return 
of a firm. Foreign diversification could provide a greater 
reduction in variance than diversification within the home country. 
A study by Miller and Pas (1980) which looked at product 
diversification, export diversification, and multinational 
diversification by 264 United States corporations provided evidence 
to support this conclusion. Using a mean-variance model of direct 
investment, and measuring risk as the deviation from a fitted trend 
in the net income to assets ratio and the operating income to 
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assets ratio, they found that multinational diversification had a 
stronger relation to profit stability than did either product 
diversification or export diversification. In their work they 
did not try to give any theoretical explanation of this result. 
The empirical studies considered here have shown that a 
number of conditions are associated with FOr. The results are not 
all consistent, reflecting the existence of alternative forms of the 
conditions that lead to FOI, such as alternative advantages for the 
MNC. The studies have also found that FOI is part of a diversi-
fication strategy used by firms, but the extent to which FOI is 
alternative to or complementary with domestic diversification and 
export diversification is unclear. The next chapter considers 
this further by developing a theory of the diversification processes 
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Recent work on the theory of the firm has developed 
an approach that has explicitly considered the behaviour of firms 
under conditions where information is incomplete and is costly 
to acquire and where the ability of people to process and use 
information to make decisions is limited. This approach has 
seen only limited use in the study of the MNC. This chapter uses 
the ideas of this literature to develop a theory that explains the 
growth and development of MNC's. The resulting theory is used 
to explain the role of the various causes of FOI by indicating 
how, and under what conditions, these may be important. This 
allows for some of the conflicting evidence obtained in the varlOUS 
studies of the reasons for FDI to be explained. The theory can 
also explain cross-investments between two countries. The import-
ance of this was noted in section 2.2 and in Chapter Three. 
The work on this approach to the theory of the firm has 
been carried out by a number of authors including economists and 
individuals from other disciplines including business studies and 
the study of organizational behaviour. l Within the area there 
1. For some discussion of this area see Simon (19~9), 
Williamson (1975), and Caves (1980). 
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is some variation in the concepts and the methods of analysis 
used. In this chapter one approach involving a consistent set 
of concepts will be adopted whilst the possible alternatives 
that could be used will be noted in passing. 
The first section of the chapter explains the type 
of theory being considered, indicating the choice of concepts to 
be used and explaining the reasons for the choice. Then, noting 
that MNC's usually start from existing one-country firms, a 
characterization of an existing firm is given as a starting point 
to explaining how such firms become multinational. This 
explanation is based on a model of the processes by which firms 
expand or diversivy. 
4.1 TYPE OF THEORY BEING CONSIDERED 
In considering this type of theory the concepts of 
limited information and bounded rationality should be explained and 
the objectives to be attributed to the firm or its management should 
be considered. The concepts of limited information and bounded 
rationality are best understood by comparing them with the 
alternatives of full information and perfect rationality. As 
required by neoclassical economics full information and perfect 
rationality involve: knowledge of all of the alternatives that 
are open to choice; complete knowledge of, or the ability to 
compute, the consequences of adopting each of the alternatives; 
certainty in the decision maker's present and future evaluation of 
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these consequences; and the ability to compare consequences, no 
matter how diverse and heterogeneous, in terms of some consistent 
f ·1· 1 measure 0 utl lty. Under conditions of limited information the 
firm has actively to seek out information about what alternatives 
are available and about the nature and consequences of these 
alternatives. This will involve costs, both of time and of other 
resources. In addition, the possible information about the 
consequences of any alternative may be limited due to uncertainty 
about the future. Extending the concepts of full information and 
perfect rationality to a MNC involves assuming that the firm knows 
for all possible markets all of the items mentioned above, instead 
of knowing them for just one market. 
The consideration of situations involving limited 
information has given rise to a substantial literature, covering a 
number of questions. This-literature will not be reviewed here 
but the appropriate parts of it will be referred to as required. 
There is also a substantial literature concerning situations 
involving uncertainty and this too will be referred to as required. 
Bounded rationality specifically refers to the fact 
that the amount of information that can be processed or used in 
any given amount of time in order to make a decision is limited. 
This limitation depends both on the limits of human abilities and 
on the limits of information handling and processing equipment, 
such as computers. Although this limit is being shifted outward 
1. Simon (1979, p.SOO). 
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over time it is never entirely removed and increasing 
organizational size and complexity, which can occur when a firm 
becomes multinational, can lncrease the importance of bounded 
rationality. 
The objective of the firm was considered in section 2.3. 
Not all of the objectives discussed are consistent with limited 
information and bounded rationality. In particular, maximizing 
behaviour requires full information and perfect rationality. 
This is independant of the particular item that is to be maximized. 
The two main alternatives considered, both of which are consistent 
with limited information and bounded rationality, are satisficing 
behaviour and seeking behaviour. 
The distinction between satisficing behaviour and 
seeking behaviour was given in section 2.3. Briefly, satisficing 
involves a situation where management watches several indicators 
of company performance and concentrates its attention on those areas 
where performance is deemed unsatisfactory. Seeking involves a 
situation where the management has an objective, such as profits 
or sales revenue, which it is always trying to increase, but which 
it cannot maximize due to incomplete information and bounded 
rationality. Seeking is thus the direct alternative to maximiz-
ation. It is to be noted that under conditions of uncertainty the 
difference in the behaviour of firms seeking profits or sales 
revenue may become small. Also, the difference between seeking 
managerial utility over several variables, and satisficing 
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behaviour based on the same variables, may be small. In 
considering the MNC in this chapter it will be assumed that the 
management of the MNC follows a pattern of seeking behaviour where 
it tries to increase profits as much as possible. Some comments 
on other seeking objectives will also be given. In the section 
on the objectives of the firm it was noted that seeking behaviour 
is more consistent with FDI than is satisficing behaviour. 
In considering how a firm pursues its objectives it 
will be useful to divide the decisions made by the firm into two 
categories; strategic decisions and operating decisions. l These 
categories are not mutually exclusive and can be defined as 
follows. Strategic decisions are concerned with the commitment 
of increases in the resources available to the firm to new or 
existing activities or with the switching of existing resources 
between activities. Operating decisions are concerned with the 
use of existing resources in the activity to which they have 
already been committed. The set of strategic decisions will be 
aimed at the firm's objective, here considered to be profits, and 
can be referred to as the corporate strategy, which would be a 
long run plan for attaining profits. Under alternative objectives 
it could be a long-run plan for attaining sales revenue on 
managerial utility. In addition to its corporate strategy a firm 
1. These concepts are used in much of the organizational 
literature but are not always precisely defined. For a 
discussion of them see Caves (1979, pp.64-6S). 
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has an organizational structure. This consists of: the internal 
allocation of tasks and responsibilities including lines of 
authority and communication; sets of decision rules and operating 
procedures; and procedures used for appraisal and reward. The 
organization structure is selected in the light of the corporate 
strategy in order to achieve the corporate objectives. 
The senior management of any large firm is primarily 
concerned with corporate strategy and organizational structure while 
middle and lower management is concerned with operational decisions. 
The reason for this distribution of authority is that bounded 
rationality limits the number of decisions that can be made at any 
one level of management. Organization structure gains some of its 
importance through its influence on the decisions that will be made 
at the middle and lower management levels. In addition to their 
decision-making function all levels of management have a supervisory 
responsibility for the levels of employees below them. 
4.2 CHARACTERIZATION OF AN EXISTING FIRM 
MNC's generally develop from existing one-country firms, 
and to consider this process of development some points about 
existing firms will be noted. A firm has a set of products, 
markets, methods of production, sources of inputs, and management 
or head office operations. An important aspect of these activities 
is the efficiency or effectiveness with which they are carried out 
by the firm. This depends on a number of factors and can vary 
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widely from one activity to another. Some approaches that have 
been used to look at this efficiency are considered briefly below. 
The obvious point to be noted here is that any firm, in the process 
of carrying out its business, engages in a wide variety of activities 
and carries out different activities with different degrees of 
efficiency. As noted by Caves (1980, p.66), firms competing in 
the same market can use different combinations of inputs and 
activities. The combination chosen will emphasize the strength 
and minimize the weaknesses of the firm. This point will be 
important when the processes by which firms expand or diversify 
are considered. 
The efficiency of a firm is determined by a number of 
items including the following: the production technology used by the 
firm and how recent or up to date it is; and the degree to which 
the employees of the firm a~e motivated to work to achieve the 
objectives of the firm, which will vary around a norm depending on 
the standards of diligence and effort that prevails in society at , 
f ff ·· 1 any particular, time and is related to the concept 0 x-e lClency. 
Another explanation of the situation where a firm has 
an advantage in carrying out a particular activity can be found in 
Nelson (1980). He considered a case where the advantage was 
specific to the firm and involved carrying out a particular activity 
with a high degree of skill or excellence. This skill or 
excellence is a result of the experience and learning-by-doing 
1. Leibenstein (1976) and (1979) 
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that a firm acquires in carrylng out its activities. Firms 
will concentrate on products and methods of production that make 
use of their particular skills and thus the experiences of 
different firms will be different. This type of excellence, 
which involves more that basic skills, is difficult to transfer 
to another firm and involves sending over a number of personnel. 
It may be done to set up a subsidiary, where it would not be done 
to sell the advantage to an outside firm. Where the skill can be 
used in the production of a component that can be shipped to a 
subsidiary it may also be a basis for FDI as discussed in section 3.1. 
The activities of the firm produce an outcome, or set 
of results, including levels of sales and profits. The objective 
being considered here is profits, which in some cases could be 
negative, l.e. losses. It is not possible to assign profits or 
losses to each of the activities of the firm. The organizational 
structure of the firm and the methods of cost accounting used will 
determine the number of profit centers within the firm. A profit 
center can be defined as a set of related activities that produce 
a revenue where all of the costs required to produce the revenue 
are incurred by the particular activities or can be attributed to 
the particular revenue source. One example of this would be a 
product division of a multi-product firm, where the revenue would 
come from the sale of the product and the cost involved, production, 
marketing, etc., are incurred by or attributable to the division. 
For each profit center the recorded profit or loss will depend in 
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part on the degree of efficiency with which the various activities 
of the firm are carried out, and this will be the main factor in 
determining how these profits compare to those of competitors. The 
other factor determining the level of profits will be the state of 
a particular market. In an expanding market with high and increas-
ing demand even a relatively inefficient firm may make profits 
while in a declining market even a relatively efficient firm may 
make losses. 
The profits or losses made by, or attributed to, the 
different profit centers or activities of a firm will be one of the 
factors that is taken into account when the strategy of the firm 
is decided upon. 
4.3 CORPORATE STRATEGY AND EXPANSION OR DIVERSIFICATION 
Corporate strategy is concerned with the allocation of 
increases ln the resources of the firm to new or existing activities 
and with the switching of existing resources between activities. 
There are several items to be considered in relation to corporate 
strategy: the range of options available to the firm; the 
evaluation procedures used to consider the options; 
structure in which the whole process takes place. 
and the time 
The range of options available to a firm can be 
outlined as follows. One is to cut back or eliminate a parLicular 
activity. This differs from the others as they involve expansion 
or diversification. Horizontal expansion can involve: expanding 
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with an existing product ln an existing market; using an existing 
product 1n a new market; or introducing a new but related product 
to an existing market. Conglomerate diversification involves 
introducing a new product in a market that is new to the firm. 
Forward or backward vertical integration are also possible. 
The range of options that exist and are appropriate 
to a particular firm will be larger than the range of options that 
the management will be aware of at any particular time. More of 
the options, and more details about any option, can be found by 
some expenditure of managerial time and other resources. The 
time framework in which the management of a firm makes its 
decisions can be considered by using the concept of cause as 
discussed by Hicks (1979, ch.7). Hicks 1S concerned with decisions 
by economic agents and divides the sequence into two steps: 
"a prior step from the.objective cause to the decisions 
that are based on it, or influenced by it, and a posterior 
step, from the decisions to their (objective) effects."l 
The option of reducing the level at which a particular 
activity is carried out is always open to the firm, and can be 
carried out in a number of ways. It can be done by failing to 
make the necessary outlays to sustain the activity at its current 
level, by laying off employees and storing or scrapping equipment, 
or by selling off the part of the firm that is engaged in the 
particular activity. The last strategy can only be used where 
the part of the firm engaged in the activity forms a reasonably 
1. Hicks (1979, p.88). 
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discrete unit and this will frequently be the case for the 
subsidiaries of a MNC. There may be some costs to cutting back 
an activity, particularly where redundancy payments must be made 
to any employees that are laid off. 
There are a number of reasons why a firm can decide to 
cut back or eliminate a particular activity. This was considered 
for MNC's by Boddewyn (1979, pp.22-24) who listed several factors 
and these can be generalized to apply to all firms. Financial 
considerations such as poor performance, inability of the parent 
to sustain further losses, or lack of capital to finance necessary 
modernization is important but is more of a necessary than a 
sufficient cause. Adverse conditions in a particular market or 
activity, or in the host country, due to changes in regulations, 
union demands, or increases in competition, can cause an activity to 
be cut back or eliminated. - Operations that do not fit in with the 
firm's major activities or that require a disproportionate amount of 
management's time can also be eliminated. 
The options that involve expanding particular activities 
are only open to the firm when it has or can acquire the necessary 
resources. The sources from which a firm can acquire these re-
sources include retained earnings and depreciation allowances, 
issues of new equity, and borrowing from financial institutions or 
by way of a bond issue. As noted previously, this thesis is not 
considering financial questions concerning the MNC. Thus, the 
questions involving the acquisition of financial resources and the 
choice of capital structure for the firm will not be considered here. 
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Another condition imposed on any possible expansion 
is that there must be no external constraint limiting such expansion. 
There are two types of limits to domestic expansion. One set of 
limits are government-imposed through anti-trust and related 
policies that limit expansion within the home country market. Such 
policies usually do not limit foreign expansion by the firm. The 
other set of limits are due to oligopolistic interdependence and 
considerations of how a firm's competitors will react to any attempt 
by it to increase its market share. It has been noted that firms 
will try to avoid expansions that require substantial additional 
market share. l Scherer et al. (1975, p.153) noted that new large 
plants are sometimes put adjacent to low cost transportation 
systems so as to minimize disruptions to existing marketing arrange-
ments. Expanding in a foreign market is another way of avoiding 
disruptions to the domestic.market. 
The decision to expand or cut back an activity depends 
not only on the resources and condition of the firm but also on the 
state of the market. Expansion of an existing activity will be 
easler to carry out where a market is expanding and increased sales, 
with a constant market share, are available to all firms; but will 
be more difficult in a stationary market where increased sales must 
come from the market shares of other firms. In the latter case, 
expanding by purchasing an existing firm may represent a useful 
alternative. 
1. See Scherer et al. (1975, p.155) and Sylos-Labini (1969, 
pp.100-l0 l ). 
92 
One type of new market for an existing product of a 
firm is the market ln a geographic area or country where the product 
was not previously marketed. Going into a new country involves 
establishing, or increasing the extent of, the multinational 
operations of the firm. This can involve either exports or 
setting up a foreign subsidiary. Only in the later case does 
FDI take place. 
The rate at which a firm can expand or diversify is 
limited, due to limitations imposed by the resources available to 
the firm. The process of investigating opportunities and making 
decisions is itself costly and time consuming. Aharoni (1966) 
found that it was usually broken into two phases, a check of 
available indicators to form an opinion of a project, and, if the 
project was not dropped, a more detailed investigation. He also 
found that firms tended to look at single projects and did not 
always compare alternatives. 
The sources and amounts of funds available to the 
firm were already mentioned, but their use also involves questions 
f 1 ° ·do 1 o 1:qUl lty. A firm with funds available from internal sources 
or with sources from which it can borrow quickly will be able to 
meet the financial commitment required to take advantage of an 
opportunity that may come along, while a firm that has no more funds 
available will have to delay. Thus, by taking advantage of one 
opportunity a firm may reduce its ability to take advantage of 
1. Hicks (1977, pp.77-79). 
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other opportunities that appear in the near future. 
For an MNC the location of its available funds is 
. 1 lmportant. Its funds will be in a number of currency areas, and 
government controls on capital movements will limit the speed with 
which the funds can be moved from one area to another. The 
financial flows involved in moving funds also have tax implications 
and the MNC will desire to minimize the taxes payable, while 
having the funds where it needs them. Changes in the exchange 
rates can also influence financial flows and this was considered 
in Chapter Three, where operations in multiple national jurisdictions 
were considered. 
The procedures by which alternatives are evaluated 
have been considered, for a profit-seeking firm, by Lloyd, Rapport, 
and Turner (1975). For existing areas of the firm the rule of 
expanding those making above normal profits and contracting those 
making below normal profits can be used. This rule works best 
where the areas are well defined profit centers, and is used because 
the information required is available to the management as part of 
normal business activity. Subsidiaries of ~WC's can be organized 
as profit centers, and the conditions under which their profit 
figures are likely to be accurate as a guide for decision making 
will be considered later. Some of the conditions that lead to 
above or below normal profitability were discussed in the previous 
section. 
1 . The flows of funds within MNC's are considered by Robbins and 
Stobaugh (1974) and the following points have been noted from 
there. 
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A similar decision-making rule applies to a sales 
revenue seeking firm. Areas with high profits will be expanded 
but expansion will stop when profits fall to a constraint level 
and not to some normal level. Similarly, an area will be 
contracted only if profits are below a constraint, or in the more 
extreme case negative, instead of when they are below some normal 
level. For either objective, it is only when low profits are 
expected to persist that the activity will be cut back. 
The decision rules used for considering new areas 
are more complex and a brief digression on what is involved in 
diversification is appropriate. The adding of a new product, 
market, or other activity to a firm is a diversification move. 
The new activity will in some way and to some degree be related to 
the existing activities of the firm. This relation can involve 
the use of similar productien technology, the use of existing 
research and development skills or results, the use of existing 
product designs or marketing skills, and to a lesser extent the use 
of managerial resources that are particularly skilled at controlling 
certain types of activities. 
The more closely the new activity is related to an 
existing activity the more information about it the firm is likely 
to have. Also the costs of gathering and processing additional 
information about it are likely to be lower as the firm will have 
some idea of what type of information is most useful, where is the 
best place to start looking for it, and how it is to be interpreted 
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and processed. Also, the more useful will be the existing skills 
and resources of the firm and the fewer the new skills and resources 
that it will have to acquire. The more efficient or proficient 
the firm is in the use of the skills that are related to the new 
activity, the more likely it is that the firm will be relatively 
efficient ln the new area and thus able to compete effectively. 
In considering any diversification move the firm will 
consider certain characteristics of the market that it is proposing 
to enter. Lloyd, Rapport and Turner (1975, pp.128-l29) suggest the 
following. The profitability of the firms already in the industry 
is a weak guide, but profitability will vary between these firms 
and the firm considering entering the market will only want to do 
so if it can make a reasonable profit there. The characteristics 
of existing products and the amount of space left in the market for 
a product with a different arrangement of characteristics is 
important. The more the product characteristics can be varied the 
less the extent to which the firm's product will compete directly 
with existing products. This can explain why some studies of the 
reasons for FDI found advertising and product differentiation or a 
high level of marketing expertise to be important, as they are 
associated with markets where product characteristics can be varied. 
Another factor is the size of the market in relation to the minimum 
scale of operations needed for profitable operations. The more 
firms that an industry can hold the more likely it is that the firm 
can achieve at least the minimum efficient scale. The firm will not 
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have precise knowledge of these market characteristics but will 
have some estimate of them. 
The same set of characteristics will be considered 
by a sales revenue seeking firm but the emphasis will be changed. 
The firm will look for large potential sales at or above a minimum 
profit constraint. Where a firm is seeking managerial utility 
the emphasis will be on those items that contribute to managerial 
utility. As noted in section 2.3 this could include having 
foreign operations. 
When the diversification possibility considered 
involves going into a market in another country this can lead to 
multinational activity, initially exporting and later FDI. For a 
firm, exporting an existing product may be more closely related to 
its existing activities than diversification to a new product or 
market at home. Once expo~ting is undertaken FDI in that market 
will become more closely related than it was previously. This can 
be part of an explanation of MNC's that are of relatively small 
size with a narrow or specialized product range. 
The process by which management considers new opportuni-
ties will now be considered. l The process involves: becoming 
aware of possible opportunities; gathering information on opportuni-
ties that look promising; and making a decision. 
The first stage is usually unstructured and involves 
accepting information that becomes available to the firm. A 
systematic search for all possible opportunities is time consuming 
1. The discussion of this IS based partly on Aharoni (1966). 
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and expensive and will be used only when management believes that 
the opportunities it is aware of are significantly inferior to 
others that should be available, or when management decides it 
wants to diversify into unrelated activities to obtain advantaaes 
o 
such as a more stable return. Unsystematic search tends to 
reinforce the tendency of firms to move into activities that are 
related to existing activities, as it is these that it is most 
likely to receive information about. 
Aharoni (1966, pp.S4-SS) found that there were several 
sources of information about opportunities abroad that could lead 
to FDI: a foreign government; the company's distributors, 
suppliers, or customers where these are other firms; and represent-
atives of other firms. These are sources that it may be difficult 
for the firm simply to ignore. The movement of competitors or 
customers abroad can also be a signal that causes FDI to be 
considered. The reaction to such information will depend in part 
on the attitude of management and of the individuals recelvlng it 
to new opportunities, including opportunities involving FDI. The 
more favourable the attitude, the less detailed the information 
can be and the less important the source can be, while the inform-
ation is still acted on. 
The process of considering new opportunities which 
has been described can give rise to a general pattern of expansion 
for firms. The first method of expansion will be in existing 
profitable markets at home. The next will be to related markets 
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at home, where these can be related in any of the ways mentioned 
above, including similar products, production technology, or 
marketing skills, or the ability to add new products to an 
existing distribution network. The final will be foreign 
activity, first exports and then FDI. If the firm's initial 
markets are not profitable, the relation used will involve produc-
tion skills, technology, or marketing skills, and not particular 
products or their uses. Unrelated activities will be considered 
where related ones do not appear to be profitable. 
There are variations to this pattern depending on 
the size and type of firm involved. Small firms that are suppliers 
to larger firms may follow such firms abroad. The small firm may 
see this not so much as diversification but as a defensive measure 
designed to protect its position as an important supplier to its 
customer. 
The pattern postulated, particularly for profitable 
products, can be used to explain some of the observed characteristics 
of MNC's. These were described in section 3.2 where some empirical 
evidence on the reasons for FDI is presented. The relation between 
the size of the parent firm, or the overall MNC, and FDI is explained 
by the tendency of firms to expand at home before considering 
activity in foreign markets. The importance of the size or rate 
of growth of the host country market follows from the tendency of 
firms to look at relatively large diversification opportunities. 
This tendency exists because the costs of investigation will be 
largely independent of the size of the opportunity, and it also 
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explains the observation that subsidiaries tend to be among the 
larger firms in the host country. The conflicting evidence 
concerning the effects of minimum efficient scale can also be 
explained. The tendency to look at large opportunities should 
lead to a large minimum efficient scale while the tendency to look 
for markets that can hold a reasonable number of competing 
products and firms should lead to a small minimum efficient scale. 
The importance of research and development activity 
has been explained by other theories but 1S consistent with the 
above presentation as an important skill area that is related to 
a large number of commercial activities, thus giving the firm a 
considerable range for possible expansion or diversification. 
Having a high proportion of technically trained employees in the 
work force of the firm is consistent with an explanation based on 
the firm carrying out some activities with a high level of skill. 
Again, this is something that could be related to a large number 
of possible commercial activities. 
For the pattern of diversification presented above 
domestic conglomerate diversification and foreign horizontal or 
vertical diversification will tend to be alternatives. By 
starting in any direction a firm will relate more activities in 
that area to itself and thus may continue in the same direction. 
As a firm continues to expand it may use up the opportunities 
1n one direction and switch to another direction. Thus, a firm 
that has been growing for some time may exhibit both types of 
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diversification. A study of how firms expand and diversify over 
time would be needed to determine if the types of diversification 
are alternatives or are complementary, as studies using cross 
sectional data could show either result depending on the firms 
included in the sample. 
The process of diversification described above can 
provide some additional explanation of the nature of the advantages 
that a MNC may have over local host country firms. 
Some advantages will lead to FDI in countries with 
similar markets to the home country, where this is defined in terms 
of the incomes and tastes of consumers. Advantages which can be 
embodied in product design, such as those due to research and 
development activities, require similar markets to allow the same 
product, or minor variations of the product, to be sold on both 
markets. An advantage based on marketing skills requires 
similar markets if the same type of marketing techniques are to be 
effective. Such a skill area, which is embodied in a relatively 
small and specialized staff, can be transferred by sending a limited 
number of staff to the subsidiary. 
Advantages in production mayor may not be difficult 
to transfer. If the advantage can be embodied in a component of 
the final good it can be transferred by shipping the component from 
the parent to the subsidiary. If the advantage results from specific 
production techniques or arrangements it may be possible for a 
limited number of plant management personel to transfer these to a 
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plant ln another country. This will be easiest when the general 
skill levels and standards of the workforce are similar. If the 
advantage depends on getting a high level of performance from the 
firm's work force it may be difficult to transfer as it may take 
a long time to get a new work force up to such a level. 
The process of diversification considered can also 
be related to a situation where firms have a variety of objectives. 
In considering this, the point, noted previously, that firms often 
consider single opportunities and do not compare opportunities, 
will be used. A firm with a growth objective instead of a profit 
objective will tend to grow faster and consider opportunities at a 
faster rate. Thus, such a firm may use up its domestic opportuni-
ties and consider its foreign opportunities sooner than it otherwise 
would. It has also been noted that a favourable attitude to FOI 
on the part of managment will lead to a more favourable response to 
foreign opportunities. This could be combined with any objective 
so the results will not be clear-cut for an objective considered in 
the absence of the attitude to FDI. 
The importance of cross-investment was noted in 
section 2.2 and discussed in Chapter Three, where it was noted that 
the advantages possessed by MNC's will not be spread evenly across 
countries. Under the theory presented here the types of advantages 
possessed by firms can vary within, as well as across, countries. 
The point added here is that firms will tend to set up foreign 
operations in countries where the markets are to some extent similar 
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to, or related to, its horne country markets. Such a relation will 
go in both directions, thus making FDI in the reverse direction 
attractive to firms based in the other countries. The reason for 
. 
host country production instead of exporting from the home country 
remains the use of local factor inputs. 
The explanation of which firms, from a given country, 
will tend to become MNC's and which firms will tend to remain one-
country firms depends on: which firms are most efficient; which 
firms have an objective favouring growth over profits; and which 
firms have a favourable attitude to FDI. 
4.4 STRUCTURE AND ADAPTABILITY 
Any firm concerned with expanding must adapt to new 
opportunities and circumstances. The organizational structure of 
the firm will both result from and influence the process of 
adaptation. The literature on this is limited and Caves (1980, p.8l) 
mentions it as an area that needs further research. 
The choice of organizational structure is influenced 
by the need to economize on managerial time due to bounded rationality, 
the requirement for each level of management to monitor performance 
at lower levels of the firm, and the requirements for adaptability. 
The combination of these factors will determine the organizational 
structure that best suits the firm at any point in time, with this 
structure changing as the size and range of activities of the firm 
changes. 
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Two main types of organizational structure have been 
described in the literature, the unitary form and the multi-
I 
divisional form. In the unitary form the firm is organized along 
functional lines such as sales, manufacturing, finance, and 
engineering, with management for each functional .area reporting 
to the senior managment of the firm. Profits cannot be assigned 
to functional areas as they do not see any product through all 
stages from inputs of materials to final sales. The multi-
divisional form is organized along product or geographic lines with 
each division having a unitary form organization and carrying out the 
full range of functions required by the division. Each division 
reports to the head office of the firm and can be treated as a 
profit center, as a full set of revenues and costs can be assigned 
to it. The operational decisions should be made by the individual 
divisions while decisions ahout corporate strategy should be made at 
the head office. 
Certain additional types of organizational structures 
have also been defined.
2 The holding company is a divisional 
enterprise but lacks the internal controls that are present in a 
mUlti-divisional company. A transitional multi-divisional is an 
enterprise that is in the process of adjusting, and the relations of 
the divisions to the parent are still being developed. A corrupted 
multi-divisional is one with a structure where the general management 
1. For one discussion of these types see Williamson (1975, pp.132-l4l). 
2. Williamson (1975, pp.15l-lS4). 
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has become extensively involved in the operating affairs of 
individual divisions. The mixed multi-divisional occurs where 
some divisions are under loose holding company control while other 
divisions, because of their importance, are under close uni tar), 
control. 
A range of organizational structures can be used by 
MNC's.l The unitary form, with the functional areas of the 
subsidiary reporting to the corresponding functional areas in the 
parent, is possible provided that the parent firm has a unitary 
form itself. It is only likely to be used if the foreign 
operations are a relatively small part of the total operations of 
the firm. The geographical proximity of the home and host countries, 
so that they could be seen as a single market, would increase the 
possibility of this type of structure. For a vertically integrated 
MNC a unitary form could be.appropriate. The subsidiaries involved 
in resource extraction would be part of the functional division 
controlling the extractive activities of the firm in the home country 
and in any host countries. 
A second form is a multi-divisional structure based 
on product groups. This would require that the subsidiaries also 
be divided into product groups and each group within the subsidiary 
would come under the corresponding group of the parent. The 
1. For some empirical studies of the organizational structures 
used by ~mc's see Litvak, Maule, and Robinson (1971) and 
Robbins and Stobaugh (1974). 
105 
subsidiary's head office would have no control over its individual 
divisions and its main function would be to prepare such consoli-
dated financial statements as are required for tax or other purposes. 
Such an arrangement can work where the host and home country 
markets are closely connected but may not be practical in other 
I cases. Such a structure also assumes that any benefits of co-
ordinating the activities of the product groups within the host 
country are outweighed by the costs of doing so. With such an 
arrangement it would be possible for each division in the host 
country to be a separate subsidiary. This can explain some of the 
cases where a parent has several subsidiaries in one host country. 
A third form is a multi-divisional structure where the 
divisions are based on geographical areas. The foreign subsidi-
aries would report to a divisional head office that could be located 
in the home country or in one of the host countries in that geo-
graphic area. The divisional offices would in turn report to the 
general managment at the head office of. the parent. The simplest 
version of this is where all subsidiaries report to one international 
division, the geographic divisions being the home country and the 
rest of the world. As the number of subsidiaries and host countries 
increases the number of geographic divisions can be increased. 
Where a regional structure is used there will also be 
a structure within each region, and within each subsidiary. The 
unitary form and the product division could be used and their 
1. See Litvak, Maule, and Robinson (1971, pp.S3-60). 
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advantages and disadvantages would be much the same as previously 
discussed for an overall MNC. With product divisions, however, 
the head office could also have head office groups concerned \.;i th 
each set of products, to improve the flow of product related 
information between geographic divisions. Some discussion of the 
use of this type of structure is given 1n Caves (1980, pp.7S-76). 
Within a multi-divisional firm the central management 
has a problem of evaluating the performance of the individual 
divisions and within a MNC there is a need to evaluate the performance 
of individual subsidiaries. Robbins and Stobaugh (1974, pp.143-l60) 
examined this in their study of MNC's. They noted that the rate 
of return on investment is used as one of the measures of performance 
but there are difficulties with it. When the MNC is run as an 
integrated system it is difficult to allocate profits to individual 
subsidiaries. If transfer.prices, management fees, or royalties 
are used as a means of shifting profits for tax purposes the stated 
profit or return figure may not be an accurate measure of the 
subsidiary's performance. The budget is also used as a tool for 
evaluating performance and there are both capital budgets and 
operating budgets. The budgetary procedures are standardized 
across the MNC, with management trying to make sure that suitable 
objectives are included in the budget for each subsidiary. These 
budgets are usually approved at the highest levels of managment in 
the head office. 
There 1S some relation between the size of a MNC and its 
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structure. It has already been indicated that as the size and 
number of foreign operations increase the number of divisions used 
to control these operations will 1ncrease. Thus, this relation 
1S best looked as the process of adapting the structure of the 
MNC to changes 1n the MNC and its environment is considered. 
Changes in structure can result from expansion or 
diversification and can also Occur independently of any other 
change, in order to improve the operations of the firm, including 
improvements due to improved control. There are a number of 
different types of changes that can be made to the structure 
including: (1) the addition of new functional areas or operational 
divisions; (2) assigning new responsibilities to an existing 
functional area or operational division; (3) the addition of new 
staff departments to the head office; (4) changing the procedures 
of the firm and; (5) changing the lines of cornrnunciation and 
authority. Substantial modifications of the structure in order 
to improve the operations of a firm often appear after a period of 
expansion or diversification. The modifications to the structure 
made during the period of expansion often give rise to problems or 
inefficiencies which only become obvious later, leading to further 
changes. In considering changes in structure the distinction 
between small, medium, and large MNC's, made in section 2.2, will 
be useful. The growth of a firm from one size class to another can 
be important in this context. 
There are costs to making changes ln the structure and 
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these will have to be considered in addition to considering the 
incentives to change the structure. The first point to consider 
is the factors that influence the choice of structure. 
One of the factors that will influence the choice 
of structure by a MNC will be the effect of any structure on the 
flows of information between the different parts of the MNC. In 
particular, there will be little incentive for divisions to 
share intangible assets such as productive knowledge and skills 
with other divisions. l This can give rise to a structure 
emphasizing both geographic and product aspects mentioned previously. 
The choice of structure is also linked to the method 
used to control the, operations of a subsidiary. Close control 
can be achi~ved by having the product or functional divisions of 
the subsidiary report to the corresponding divisions of the parent. 
Control using rates of returns and the budget can be achieved by 
organizing the subsidiary as a profit center with its local 
management being glven control of its divisions. 
For a new or existing MNC the addition of a subsidiary 
is one of the major structural changes. An existing MNC can also 
add new responsibilities to an existing subsidiary. The decision 
process concerning expansion or diversification has already been 
considered. The items to be considered here are the changes in 
structure required to accommodate the expansion, and any feedback this 
will have on the original decision. 
1. See Caves (1980, p.73). 
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When a new division is established, lines of 
communication and authority linking the new division to the 
existing organization must be established. Accounting, 
administrative, and budgetary procedures for the new division 
will be required and the new division must be appropriately staffed. 
The process of adding a division on a subsidiary to a firm is an 
acquired skill. A new MNC, having little experience with this, 
will be in the process of developing the required structures and 
procedures. An established MNC, however, will have existing 
structures and procedures that can, possibly with some modification, 
be applied to a new subsidiary. The need to acquire this skill 
may delay the initial FDI activity by a firm, but once FDI activity 
1S started it may be expanded at an increasing rate as this skill 
is acquired. 
The organizational structure used by a MNC will tend 
to change as the MNC expands its operations. It has been noted 
that a firm setting up its first foreign operations tends to keep 
these separate from the domestic operations of the parent, due in 
part to the perceived risks of foreign operations.
l 
As the firm's 
experience with foreign operations increases the perceived degree 
of risk may decrease. 
The choice between setting up a subsidiary de novo 
and acqu1r1ng an existing local firm was considered in Chapter Three 
and was shown to depend on the costs of each alternative. One of 
1. Caves (1980, p.73). 
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the costs depends on the organizational structure and operational 
procedures of the existing local firm, which mayor may not fit in 
with those of the MNC. In particular, the accounting and budgetary 
procedures may have to be changed to fit the financial reporting 
and control techniques used by the MNC, and other changes in 
procedures may be required to introduce some of the production or 
marketing skills possessed by the MNC. To make the required 
changes will involve managerial time and other costs, but these 
will be smaller the closer the local firm fits the pattern the 
MNC wishes to achieve. 
A specific illustration of how a MNC may change its 
structure as it grows is found in Robbins and Stobaugh (1974, 
pp.37-42). They consider changes in the structure relating to 
financial control. For a small MNC with one or a few subsidiaries 
the financial staff of the parent will receive reports on the 
financial activities of the subsidiary but the financial staff of 
the subsidiary will make their own decisions. For medium sized 
MNC's where foreign operations are larger, more important, and 
have a greater effect on the consolidated financial reports of the 
overall MNC a need for tighter control will be felt. Some sort of 
shock, such as severe losses on foreign operations, may be required 
before the need for control will be noticed. To achieve this 
control an increased financial staff at the parent will make all 
the major financial decisions and a small financial staff at each 
subsidiary will implement the decisions concerning that subsidiary. 
This also allows for better use of the financial flows between the 
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parts of the MNC to reduce tax liabilities and to take advan~age 
of interest rate differences to reduce the costs of borrowing. 
As the MNC continues to expand, increasing the number 
of subsidiaries and the complexity of its financial operations, 
it becomes impossible for the financial staff at the head office 
to make all of the financial decisions for the overall MNC. At 
this stage more authority to make financial decisions is given to 
the subsidiaries, but rules and procedures under which these are 
to be made are established by the head office. The transition 
from the second to the third phase of financial structure and 
control may be more gradual than the transition from the first to 
the second phase. 
The structure of financial control in large MNC's 
may exhibit considerable variation. If the MNC has its foreign 
operations organized into geographical divisions the head office 
of each division may have a financial staff with tight control 
over the subsidiaries in that division, while transactions between 
geographic divisions will be subject to the rules and procedures 
established by the financial division of the parent firm. This 
discussion illustrates that MNC's are not static organizations, 
but have to change their structure and methods of operation ln 
order to accommodate any expansion they wish to undertake. 
4.5 STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONAL DECISIONS 
A distinction between strategic and operating 
decisions has been made and the operating decisions remain to be 
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discussed, including the aSS1" t f d " " " h" gnrnen 0 eClslon-maklng aut orlty 
and the procedures used to control those decisions. This 
distribution of authority, which is due to the limitations imposed 
by bounded rationality, constitutes part of the structure of 
the firm. 
The management at each level of a firm wants to 
ensure that the decisions made at a lower level contribute to the 
objectives established at its own level. For intermediate levels 
the objectives depend on the objectives and instructions given 
from higher levels but are made more specific and detailed when 
they are applied to the particular division or department of the 
firm. In being made more specific the objectives may be modified 
to suit the specific interests of the intermediate level management. 
The problem of management is to delegate the work involved in 
making decisions to lower levels, while retaining sufficient control 
to ensure that the decisions made are appropriate to the objectives 
of the firm. The delegation of such authority is one of the methods 
used to allow the firm to expand in the face of bounded rationality. 
Two methods by which the head office can control the 
activities of the divisions or subsidiaries were considered in the 
previous section of this chapter. These are: looking at rates of 
return on investment; and the use of budgets. The process of 
expansion and diversification of firms described in this chapter glves 
rise to one incentive on divisional managements to strive for the 
objectives of the head office management. Where profits are the 
objective of the head office management under seeking beh~\'iour, 
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with divisions organized as profit centers, the management of a 
division will have an incentive to produce profits in order for 
their division to be favoured for expansion and to avoid the 
possibility of their division being cut back in order to obtain 
funds for use in other areas of the firm. 
be applied to other objectives. 
Similar reasoning can 
One type of control that can be applied at all levels 
is the use of procedures and rules of operation in order to limit 
the range of action open to the managers at the lower level. For 
such procedures to be useful they must allow for most of the 
possible circumstances and situations that can arise. The revision 
of the procedures to keep up with changing circumstances will be 
an important activity. The amount of effort required to establish 
the procedures must be substantially less than that required to 
make the individual decisions. Having standardized procedures 
that can be applied to all divisions will help in this. 
Individual types of decisions and the level to which 
they are assigned in the firm can be considered. This assignment 
depends in part on: the type and size of the firm; the type of 
competition, in particular the degree of oligopolistic reaction 
expected; and the costs of transmitting information and decisions 
between the different parts of the firm, where this is partly 
determined by its structure. Inst&ad of considering the 
distribution of decision-making authority for a number of types of 
decisions or a number of firms, one type of decision will be 
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considered ln detail in order to illustrate some of the points 
involved. The one used is the pricing decisions of a manufacturing 
firm in an oligopolistic industry. 
There are a number of different types of prices that 
must be set by a MNC: prices on goods which are sold to external 
customers but are not traded within the MNC; prices on intermediate 
goods that are traded within the MNC but are not sold to external 
customers; prices on goods that are both traded internally and 
sold to external customers; prices on services traded within the 
MNC, such as fees for management services, for research and develop-
ment, and for technology; and prices, interest rates, on funds 
loaned from one part of the MNC to another. 
The prices set by the MNC have two affects: prices to 
external customers effect the level of sales and the revenue of the 
MNC; and prices on interna1 transactions, where these take place 
across international boundaries, effect the tariffs and other taxes 
payable by the MNC. 
There have been a number of different explanations of 
how prices are set. One that is consistent with the limited 
information and bounded rationality assumed in this chapter is some 
form of cost-plus pricing, which a number of authors have suggested 
is the type of pricing technique used by oligopolists. It will 
therefore be used to illustrate the allocation of authority to make 
pricing decisions, without making any claim that it is the only 
prlclng scheme that could be used. 
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Before considering the operation of this pricing 
scheme the constraints on the prices set by the MNC will be noted. 
Prices on internal transactions that take place ln one country are 
unconstrained as they have no direct on revenue or on taxes payable. 
Prices on internal transactions that cross international boundaries, 
referred to as transfer prices, have implications for tariffs and 
profit taxes payable and will be subject to some control by the 
appropriate customs and income tax authorities. Certain limits have 
been suggested, one of these being that the MNC would probably not 
try to declare the value of its exports to be less than the marginal 
costs of production or greater than their market price in the 
1 exporting country. One standard that tax authorities have used 
is that transfer prices should approximate to the prices that would 
apply in transactions between separate independent firms. 2 While 
there are difficulties in enforcing these limits they still impose 
some limitation on the MNC's freedom of action. In an oligopoly 
setting there are limits on prices charged to external customers. 
Prices that are substantially above those charged by competitors 
will result in a loss of sales while attempting to charge prlces 
that are substantially below those charged by competitors may result 
in retailiatory price cuts. Cost-plus pricing was developed to 
apply in such a situation and would provide a common method of 
determining prices and of working out any price adjustments. 
1. Horst (1971, p.106l). 
2. Kopits (1976, p.6SS). 
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For a decentralized pricing system to work, the 
divisions or subsidiaries of the firm must be able to make 
appropriate decisions under procedures established by the head 
office. For cost-plus pricing there will be two parts to these 
procedures. The first will be those of cost accounting, which 
partly depend on the accounting standards of the home country. 
The second will be the procedures used to determine the "plus" 
part, and these will be internal to the firm. In addition, 
where shipments of components between divisions of the firm are 
involved the procedures must allow the prices of one division to 
be used as costs by the other division. Also, the head office 
must be able to vary the prices set by individual divisions by 
changing the procedures given to the division while not setting 
any prices itself. 
Under cost-plus prlclng the use of standardized cost 
accounting procedures across all divisions of the firm combined 
with appropriate procedures for determining the "plus" component 
will meet these requirements, and should result ln transfer prices 
that usually fall within any limits set by customs and tax 
authorities. The simplest procedures for calculating the plus 
part of any price would be for each division to use a specified 
percentage of the costs incurred in that division. These costs 
would include any costs paid by that division on external markets, 
for labour, services, and material inputs purchase from external 
suppliers, but would exclude any amounts paid for components or 
services received from other divisions of the MNC. Thus, the 
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mark-up would be added in stages by each division accordina to a 
o 
percentage specified by the head office. This percentage 
could differ for different types of products or for different 
divisions. 
With this pricing structure the head office of a 
MNC can use transfer prices to move profits from one subsidiary 
to the parent or to another subsidiary. The first subsidiary 
would be instructed to use a reduced or zero percentage when 
calculating the mark-up to be included in any transfer price 
charged to other parts of the MNC. The receiving subsidiaries 
would be instructed to add a mark-up to those prices as well as to 
the costs they normally consider. 
Some prices would be exceptions to the above procedures. 
For a MNC, head office charges, such as fees for management services 
or for research and development, are particularly useful for 
shifting profits. They are more difficult to cost and therefore 
more difficult for tax and customs authorities to control. Thus, 
they will be under the direct control of the head office financial 
section so they can be used to the best advantage of the MNC. 
The above discussion is intended to illustrate that 
the MNC can establish an allocation of authority to make operational 
decisions subject to procedures established by the head office that 
satisfy two criteria: the making of individual decisions, including 
the time and other costs involved, is the responsibility of the 
individual divisions and subsidiaries; and the head office can 
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vary the decisions made by changing the procedures and instructions 
given to the divisions and subsidiaries. Also, the procedures 
can be standardized for all subsidiaries, thus reducing the 
effort required to establish and maintain the procedures. 
This chapter has presented a model of the process by 
which firms expand and diversify and has related this to the FDI 
decisions of MNC's. This process is based on expansion into 
areas related to the commercial activities and related functions 
already carried out by the firm, using the skills and abilities 
that the firm has already acquired. This gives rise to a pattern 
of expansion which starts with related markets at horne then moves 
to related foreign markets, initially by exporting and then by FDI. 
This pattern is shown to be consistent with, and to explain, the 
evidence on FDI presented in section 3.2. The pattern also adds 
to the explanation of the reasons for FDI. 
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S TAT I C MOD E L S o F THE M U L T I NAT I ON A L 
COR P 0 RAT ION 
In the preceding chapters the reasons for FDI and 
the process by which FDI 1S undertaken have been considered. The 
next stage in the thesis is to consider the operations of existing 
MNC's and how they respond to changes in their environment. No 
single theory covers all of this and one approach that has been used 
is comparative static modelling of a profit maximizing MNC. The 
changes in the environment considered include changes 1n rates of 
profit tax and tariffs on imports, as these are items of government 
policy. The responses include changes in the level of production 
in the home and host countries and in the level of trade between 
these countries that the MNC undertakes. 
This chapter reviews the comparative static profit 
maximization models of the MNC that are in the literature, by 
developing a model that is general enough to include many of these 
models as special cases. Using this model, it will be shown that 
the results obtained are particularly sensitive to the assumptions 
used, thus accounting for some of the differences in the results 
observed in the existing literat~re. From this follow certain 
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limitations on the interpretation of the results of the models 
when policy implications are being considered. These limit-
ations arise because a policy change will affect a number of 
MNC's and the description of them may involve more than one set 
of assumptions, thus leading to more than one set of results, 
and these results may tend to be offsetting at an aggregate level. 
The models being considered here have, in general, 
been based on revenue and cost functions for the firm in each 
country in which it operates, and on trade between the different 
parts of the firm. The comparative static profit maximi:ing 
models of the MNC that have been developed can be divided into 
two categories: those that look at a vertically integrated firm, 
where the different levels of production may take place in 
different countries, referred to as "the vertical integration 
models", and those that look at a firm that is engaged in only one 
level of production, referred to as "the one level of production 
models". The one level of production models have generally been 
two-country models and the vertical integration models have 
generally been three-country models with each of the two stages of 
production taking place in separate countries, although one model 
was a two-country model with both stages of production in one 
1 country and only the final stage of production in the other country. 
-This limitation to two- or three-country models has been used in 
1. The vertical integration models can be considered to have . 
started with Copithorne (1971) and the one level of prod~ctlon 
models with Horst (1971), as a number of more recent artlcles 
were based on or were extensions of either one or the other of 
these articles. 
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order to simplify the mathematical analysis, and is particularly 
important when the second-order conditions and the comparative 
statics are considered. l The expansion of the model to include 
more countries and more trade connections between the different 
parts of the MNC can lead to the comparative statics results being 
indeterminate. 
The mathematical model developed is a version of the 
two-country vertical integration model developed by Itagaki (1979) 
that has the final good produced in both countries and the inter-
mediate good produced in one country. It allows for trade by the 
MNC in both the final and the intermediate good and thus, in terms 
of the MNC modelled, is as general as any of the models in the 
articles being considered. In allowing for a single country that 
exports both the final and the intermediate good instead of just one 
or the other, the model developed here is more general than any of 
those being reviewed. Two of the articles extended the model in 
other directions, one by considering the firms that were competing 
with the MNC and the other by putting the MNC in an international 
trade theory setting. 2 
1. Copithorne (1971, p.337) developed, but did not present in 
detail, more complex models in order to check the results of 
the three-country model. He found that, "the only apparent 
effect was to increase the number of degrees of freedom at the 
disposal of the international corporation", and profits could 
be shifted while the government's wishes on the setting of 
transfer prices on major products could be met. 
2. These are Adler and Stevens (1974) and Batra and Ramachandran 
(1980) respectively. 
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The models of the MNC considered here, including the 
version developed, are special or limited cases. Most MNC's have 
more than one or two subsidiaries, as noted in section 2.2 where 
the distinction between small, medium, and large MNC's was 
considered. Also, most MNC's have a range of products, not just 
a single product. While single product models can be applied to 
individual products of a multi-product MNC they do not extend to 
aggregate values over groups of products (see section 2.2) and they 
do not include the case of joint production. In addition, 
vertical integration may involve more than two stages of production. 
This allows components to be exported from one country, further 
processed, and thenreimported to the original country, a situation 
not allowed for by the models considered here. 
The models considered here were developed to extend 
microeconomic theory to cover the MNC, and to consider the following 






What are the determinants of transfer prlces, and does 
an optimal transfer price for the ~WC exist? 
What are the effects of the introduction of, or changes 
in, the rates of,various types of taxes on any or all of 
the following; transfer prices, local production, local 
prices, or exports? 
What is the effect of reciprocal tariff reductions? 
What determines the level of production and the price 
level in each country? 
And, is there a trade-off for the parent firm between 
exporting or satisfying a foreign market by local 
production by the subsidiary, and if so what is it? 
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As stated these questions are not mutually exclusive. The 
types of taxes referred to in the questions and included in the 
various models will be discussed later. Question I has been, 
ln some form .or other, considered in most of the works, as has 
question 2 for profit taxes and tariffs. The other questions 
have only been considered in some of the articles. 
5.1 ASSUMPTIONS USED 
A first step in considering the models is to consider 
the assumptions used, noting any differences between the various 
articles, and any differences in the results due to differences in 
the assumptions used. The embodiment of the assumptions in the 
mathematical models, and any additional implicit assumptions 
involved in the mathematics, are also considered. 
The theories being considered have assumed that the 
objective of the MNC is to maximize its global after-tax profits. 
This assumption is distinct from an assumption that the profits of 
each of the firms that comprise the ~WC are to be maximized 
separately and the two assumptions will give different results. 
The first assumption is preferred because it is consistent with 
the definition of the MNC, where the parent firm has overall 
control. The use of a profit maximization assumption has usually 
not been justified in these works, as it is a standard assumption 
of the theory that the authors were concerned with extending to 
a multinational setting. The range of assumptions that could be 
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used and the reason for using profit maximization are discussed 
in section 2.3, concerned with the objectives of the ~wc. 
Certain assumptions have been used by all of the 
models. The assumption, standard to much microeconomic theory, 
of full and perfect knowledge of all relevant prices and 
technologies 1S used. Also, exchange rates are assumed to be 
fixed and to be known with certainty and unrestricted currency 
transfers are assumed to be allowed. The theories have also 
assumed that the products sold on the two final goods markets are 
identical goods, with the exception of Adler and Stevens (1974) 
who allow for differentiated products. 
The additional assumptions used are not constant 
across all of the works being reviewed. In some cases the 
assumptions are alternatives and in other cases the assumptions 
impose restrictions on the behaviour of the MNC that are not 
included in other models. The existence of alternative assumptions 
makes it difficult to develop a fully generalized model and in some 
cases a choice of assumptions must be made. The importance of the 
alternative assumptions will be considered when the results of the 
models are considered. 
Assumptions concern1ng the percentage of the 
subsidiaries that are owned by the parent firm of the MNC are 
required. Most of the works have assumed one hundred per cent 
ownership, although Copithorne (1971) also considered joint 
ventures. The mathematical model presented will assume that the 
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parent firm owns one hundred per cent of its subsidiary and will 
also assume that all finance is equity finance. The use of 
joint venture subsidiaries imposes some restrictions on the ~WC and 
questions about the percentage of ownership of subsidiaries and 
the use of debt and equity financing are better handled by theory 
of finance type models than by the models being considered here. 
The presence of outside shareholders of part of the subsidiary 
will limit the use of transfer prices to shift profits and cause 
dividends to be the main method of paying profits to owners. 
The use of transfer prices to 'shift profits would have the effect 
of shifting profits from the other shareholders to the parent of 
the MNC, and would thus be opposed by the outside shareholders. 
Models have frequently, but not always, been set up 
ln such a way that it is not necessary to specify which firm is 
the parent firm of the MNC.· This, in part, involved assumptions 
about the structure of profit taxes in all countries and about the 
tax credits allowed in the home country. Many of the articles have 
assumed that the home country tax rate and the effect of the credits 
allowed for foreign taxes paid by the subsidiaries can be combined 
into a single effective rate of tax. Under this assumption the way 
in which the profit tax variables are included in the model will 
involve some implicit assumptions about the types of tax credits 
allowed by the home country. This was discussed by Batra and 
Hadar (1979). Where separate profit taxes are included for each 
country, as in Horst (1971), the home country rate must be lower 
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than the host country rate, if the model is to correctly reflect 
a tax credit that is restricted to the lesser of the foreign 
taxes paid and the domestic taxes that would have been payable on 
the same level of income. If all profits are taxed at the horne 
country rate, as in Batra and Hadar (1979), the horne country rate 
must be higher than the host country rate to reflect correctly 
the tax credits and the taxes payable. Since corporate profit 
tax rates are similar in most countries there is no strong argument 
in favour of either alternative assumption. The only way to 
avoid making some such assumption is to include a much more detailed 
tax structure in the model. 
In describing the market structure that the MNC faces 
1n the countries in which it has operations, the theories have 
not given consideration to the competition it faces from other 
f
o 1 1rms. Two main assumptions have been used to do this; it is 
either explicitly or implicitly assumed that the MNC is a 
monopolist, or it is assumed that some form of imperfect competi-
tion theory that provides a downward sloping demand curve can be 
used and no further mention is made of the competitors to the MNC. 
This allows the use of a downward sloping demand curve so that 
marginal revenue is variable, depending upon quantity sold, and 
is not an external parameter to the firm. The mathematical model 
presented will assume that the ~NC is a monopolist in all of the 
countries in which it operates. Oligopoly models have been 
avoided because, even for a one-country setting, oligopoly theory 
1. An exception to this is Adler and Stevens (1974) which 1S 
discussed later. 
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1S 1n an unsettled state and more precise results can be obtained 
by using a model where the reactions of other firms in the 
industry do not enter the model. By avoiding the problems of 
oligopoly, more emphasis is put on the questions that arise from 
a multinational setting. Some works on MNC's have considered 
the oligopoly aspects, but these have not been based on the 
microeconomic theory approach being considered 1n this chapter. 
Some mention of oligopoly considerations has been given in 
Chapters Three and Four of the thesis. 
In addition to assumptions about demand conditions, 
assumptions about cost conditions are required for the models. 
Two alternative ways of proceeding are to make assumptions about 
the shape of the cost curves or to use the stability conditions of 
the model to determine restrictions on the shape of the cost curves. 
Both of these alternatives have been used and a variety of 
different cost curves can be assumed. One alternative is to assume 
that the average cost curves have the U-shape that is frequently 
assumed in microeconomic theory.c From the second-order conditions 
it turns out that the existence of increasing or decreasing costs 
is important. Horst (1971) has shown that with decreasing costs 
the MNC either becomes a one-country firm that serves the second 
market by exports, or produces in both countries but does not engage 
in international trade between the two countries. Increasing 
costs in each country are required if the MNC is to produce in all 
countries and engage in international trade. When the mathematical 
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model is presented this point will be given further consideration. 
This result applies only to a single product. It also applies 
to each of the products in a group but, as noted in section 2.2, 
will not apply to aggregate measures of a group of products. 
In developing a vertical integration model some 
assumption concerning how much of the intermediate good 1S required 
to produce a given amount of the final good is required. It has 
usually been assumed that the intermediate good is used in fixed 
proportions so that the requirement does not depend on the level 
of production. Some of the articles have assumed proportions of 
one to one, by assuming a suitable definition of the units of each 
commodity. The model presented will use the assumption of fixed 
proportions but will not require that they be one to one. 
All of the models allowed for international trade 
by the MNC in the commodity.it produces but they make different 
assumptions about trade in this commodity by third parties. The 
vertical integration models have assumed that arbitrage in the 
final good sold by the MNC is not possible so the MNC can maintain 
any price difference it wants between the two markets. As the 
intermediate good is sold only to other parts of the MNC arbitrage 
by third parties does not arise. The alternative is to assume 
that third parties can trade in the good sold by the MNC and this 
puts a limit on the difference between the prices in the two 
countries and the limit is a function of the tariffs imposed on 
imports by the two countries. Which assumption is most reasonable 
depends on how much control the MNC has over the marketing of its 
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particular product. Copithorne (1971) used an example of farm 
machinery where dealers in the low price country were forbidden 
to sell for export. For other types of markets firms do not have 
sufficient control over final marketing to prevent exporting from 
a low-price country. To allow for arbitrage by third parties an 
explicit price difference constraint must be included in the 
mathematical model. 
Some of the models have also made assumptions about 
the limits on either, or both, of transfer prices and the minimum 
level of profits declared in each country. The assumption of a 
minimum profit constraint is justified by the argument that local 
tax authorities would not accept losses for a subsidiary if the 
MNC is making substantial global profits. An alternative assumption 
is that if customs and tax authorities in each country were reason-
ably diligent, transfer prices could not be less than the marginal 
cost of production in the exporting country and could not be greater 
than the market price ln the exporting country.l Assuming limits 
on the profits declared in each country could be inconsistent with 
a transfer price limitation in certain situations. Both of these 
types of limitations are reasonable, and which is the most approp-
riate depends to some extent on the type of industry being considered. 
The transfer price limitation will be considered in more detail 
later. 
Most of the models of the MNC considered here have 
included corporate profit tax functions and tariffs on imports. 
1. This is used by Horst (1971, p.I06l). 
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When taxes were considered the tax rates were allowed to vary 
between countries and the effects of introducing various taxes 
or of changing the tax rates were frequently considered. 
Additional taxes have been considered by some authors. 
Copithorne (1971) considered sales taxes and excise taxes. Horst 
(1977), in order to consider the possible effects of certain 
changes In the United States tax policy towards the parent firms 
of MNC's, developed a very specific and detailed tax structure. 
This included: home and host country profit taxes; host country 
taxes on interest, dividends, and head office charges paid to 
the parent firm; and home country (United States) tax credits 
allowed for foreign taxes paid by the MNC. 
The mathematical model presented is a two-country 
vertical integration model with one final good and one intermediate 
good. As mentioned previously it is assumed that the intermediate 
good is used in a fixed proportion In the production of the final 
good, that the exchange rate is fixed and known with certainty, and 
that the MNC is a monopolist in the final good in both markets and 
faces downward sloping demand curves. It is also assumed that the 
MNC produces the intermediate good in the quantity it requires and 
that there is no market on which the intermediate good can be 
purchased or sold. 
There are a number of additional assumptions that 
must be made, either explicitly or implicitly, when a mathematical 
model is set down. The assumptions that have been used, and 
variations in them, are discussed below. 
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In the model set out the ~mc produces both the 
intermediate and the final good in country 1 and produces only 
the final good in country 2, importing the intermediate good from 
country 1. The model also includes exports of the final good 
from country 1 to country 2. This structure is used to include 
both two-country final good production with trade, which is typical 
of the one level of production model, and two levels of production 
with trade in the intermediate good which is typical of the 
vertical integration models. It should be noted that both the 
final and the intermediate good are exported from the same country. 
To have country 1 export the intermediate good while importing the 
final good would requlre that some of the trade terms in the model 
be changed. 
The model does not specify a specific country as the 
home country for the firm. . Instead, the effects of each country 
in turn being the home country are considered, with the assumptions 
about relative profit taxes rates being specified in each case. l 
Changing which country is the home country has the effect of changing 
the direction of trade and can influence the interpretation of the 
results of the model. The effects of changes in the relative 
profit tax rated, whose importance was discussed by Batra and 
Hadar (1979), will be discussed as per Itagaki (1979). 
The initial model includes separate profit tax rates 
for each country. When the results are presented both the separate 
1. Considering each part of the ~C as the parent follows 
Copithorne (1971). 
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tax rate and the single tax rate cases are considered. This 1S 
done by substituting in one tax term for both in the results. 
From some of the results to be developed determinate results will 
only be obtained in the single tax rate case and not in the 
separate tax rates case. This occurs because in the former case 
it will sometimes be possible to divide out all of the tax terms 
ln the result while this is usually not possible in the latter case. 
In considering the limits on transfer prices a number 
of assumptions have been made. The model being developed 
includes two transfer prices, one for the final good and one for 
the intermediate good. Many of the models being considered 
include only one transfer price but any assumption used can be 
easily extended to cover both transfer prices. One alternative is 
to assume that there are no restrictions of the transfer price 
and this was used by Copithorne (1971). Another alternative is 
to assume that income tax authorities and customs authorities in 
both the importing and exporting countries will try to restrict the 
choice of transfer price in order to avoid a loss of revenue. This 
was used by both Horst (1971) and Itagaki (1979). Horst (1971, 
p.106l) assumed that "a firm would probably not try to declare the 
value of its exports to be less than their marginal cost of prod-
uction or greater than their market price in the exporting country", 
where this applied to a final good. Itagaki only required a lower 
bound for his model and assumed that the transfer price would have 
to be greater than, and not equal to, the marginal cost of 
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production. The distinction between being strictly greater 
than, as compared to equal to, the lower bound will turn out to 
be important. Some of the comparative static results are non-zero 
ln the former case and zero in the latter case. 
There is another lower bound that a case can be made 
for, and for the model being developed it will turn out to be 
important. The lower bound could be the average cost and not the 
marginal cost of production. The effect of such a lower bound has 
not been considered in the literature. Marginal cost is difficult 
to determine especially for someone outside the firm, and 
average cost is easier to determine. Thus, tax and customs 
authorities may be persuaded to accept an average cost figure. 
In the model developed, and in the models reviewed, increasing 
marginal cost is assumed or may be required by the second order 
conditions. The cases where decreasing costs or constant costs 
are allowable are limited and will be discussed later. The point 
to be made here is that with increasing (or non-constant) marginal 
costs the average cost will, except for one point, be different 
from the marginal cost. If average cost is less than marginal cost 
the transfer price could be less than the marginal cost. It will 
be shown later that the MNC will frequently want to have its 
transfer prlce at the lowest possible level. Having the transfer 
prices below the marginal cost will change some of the results from 
the case where the transfer price is equal to, or is greater than, 
the marginal cost. This will be considered further hhen the 
results are developed. 
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These assumptions must be slightly modified to fit 
the final and intermediate goods of a vertically integrated firm. 
For the intermediate good transfer price the lower bound is 
either the marginal or average costs of its production and for the 
final good transfer price the lower bound is either the sum of the 
marginal cost of processing the final good and the marginal cost of 
processing the quantity of intermediate good required for one unit 
of the final good or the sum of the average cost of processing the 
final good and the average cost of producing the intermediate good. 
For the final good transfer price the upper bound is its price in 
the exporting country. For the intermediate good transfer price 
the upper bound is the final good price in the exporting country 
less either the marginal cost or the average cost of processing 
the final good. All of the bounds can be defined either as 
equalities, where the transfer price can equal the bound, or as 
inequalities, where the transfer price must be above or below the 
appropriate boundary. 
5.2 STRUCTURE OF THE MATHEMATICAL MODEL 
The model starts with equations for the earnings of 




= (1-'[ ){R (Q ) - C (Q +N) + TfN+S( ) 
1 1 1 1 1 a. 
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(1) 
E = (l-T ){R (Q ) - C (Q -N) - (l+T ) TI N 
2 222 2 2 2 e 
The total earnings are given by, 
E = E + e E 
1 2 2 (3) 
where 
R = revenue from the sale of the final good and = P.Q 
C = cost of processing the final good 
Q = quantity of the final good sold 
N = quantity of the final good exported from country 1 to country 'J .... 
TI = the transfer price on the final good, ln currency 1 
a. = the proportion in which the intermediate good is required to 
produce the final good, thus 
(Q±N)/a. = a quantity of the intermediate good 
S = the transfer price on xhe intermediate good, ln currency 1 
g = the cost of producing the intermediate good 
T = the rate of profit taxes 
T = the rate of tariff on imports of the final good 
r = the rate of tariff on the intermediate good 
e = the exchange rate 
It should be noted that ln order to use only one 
set of notation the above symbols are used when any article is 
being discussed. The original articles have used a variety of 
symbols and some articles have given different meanings to some of 
the above symbols. 
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The equation for E 1S easier to interpret if it 
1S rearranged to the following. 
E = (l-T ){R (Q ) - C (Q +N) - g((Q +N)/a+(Q -N/a)} 
III 11 1 2 
+ e (l-T ){R (Q ) - C (Q -N)} 
22222 
+ {(T -T ) - (l-T )T }nN 
2 1 2 2 
+ {(T -T ) - (l-T )r }S{(Q -N)/a} 
2 1 222 
The last two terms of equation (4) can be re-written as, 
{(l-T) - (l-T )(l+T )}nN 
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+ {(l-T ) - (l-T )(l+r )}S{(Q -N)/a} 
1 2 2 Z 
Also note that, 
g{(Q +N)/a+(Q -N)/a} = g{(Q +Q )/a} 
1 2 1 Z 
The first order conditions for a maximum are as follows. 
aE ag aR2 acz) 
aQ2 = (1-T 1 )(- aQ2) + e(1-T 2)( aQ2 - aQz 
+ {(T -T ) - (l-T )r }~ = 0 
2 1 2 2 a 
aE (l-T ) (- aCd + e(l-T )( + aC2) aN = 
1 ar:r z aN 
+ {(T -T ) - (l-T )T }n 
2 1 Z 2 
+ {(T -T ) - (l-T )r }S (-1) = 0 






In deriving equation (7) the terms 
{ dn (l -l ) - (l-l )T } ~N N 
2 1 2 2 0 
and 
have been ignored as being of the second order of smallness. 
This follows Horst (1971) and Itagaki (1979). These terms 
indicate the effects of any change ln the limits to the transfer 
price that result from a change in the level of exports. 
The transfer price limits, when based on marginal 
costs, can be expressed mathematically as specified below. 



















P = the prlce of the final good. As noted previously, the 
transfer price limits can be either equalities or inequalities. 
5.3 RESULTS OF THE MODEL 
The model produces a number of results. The first 
to be considered is the choice of the transfer prices. This can 
be determined from equation (4) and for the final good transfer 
Price, involves the maximization of the term ((l -L ) - (l-L )T ). 2 1 2 2 
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If country 2 is the home country and T < T it can be seen that 
2 1 
the term will always be negative, and the MNC will choose the 
mlnlmum possible transfer price, which could be zero if no higher 
minimum lS imposed. If T < T then, to reflect the tax credit 
1 2 
T should be substituted for T and the expression becomes 
2 1 
(-(l-T )T ) which will always be negative, so the minimum transfer 
2 2 
price will be chosen. This corresponds to the results obtained by 
Itagaki (1979). To obtain the results obtained by Horst (1971) 
the case where country 1 is the home country must be considered. 
If T < T the term ((T -T ) - (l-T )T) can be either positive 
1 2 2 1 2 2 
or negative. By rearranging, by dividing through by (l-T ), the 
2 
relative profit tax differential can be compared to the tariff. 
This gives (T -T )j(l-T ) <> T . 
2 1 2 2 
If the "less than" inequality 
holds the MNC will choose the minimum transfer price but if the 
inequality is reversed the MNC will choose the maximum transfer 
price, paying more in tariffs but saving on the high taxes of the 
importing country. If the home country tax rate is higher than 
the host country rate the reduced expresslon is again always 
negative and the minimum transfer price is chosen. The choice of 
the transfer price on the intermediate good depends on the term 
((T -T ) - (l-T )r2), since (Q - N) is always positive. 
2 1 2 __ 2 
Thus, 
the reasoning and results are the same as given above. 
These results show that the assumption about the 
direction of trade, from the home country to the host country or 
the reverse, can affect the results obtained. 
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Transfer prices are indeterminate if there are no 
taxes, as was shown by Copithorne (1971), unless the firm has a 
desired distribution of profits. This holds for the model 
presented here. If there are no taxes, the limits on transfer 
prices serve no purpose and the option of assuming only a lower 
bound of zero, used by Copithorne (1971), becomes reasonable. 
The interpretation of the first-order conditions 
1S done first with the tax terms excluded and then with them 
included. 1 Equation (5) gives 
MRl = MC 1F + MC I (8) 
where MC
1F 
and MC I are the marginal costs of process1ng the 
final good and the intermediate good, and MR is the marginal revenue. 
This holds whether or not the taxes are included and says that in 
the exporting country the marginal revenue will equal the sum of the 
marginal costs. 
In the no tax case, with the exchange rate equal 






From this it follows that the marginal cost totals will be equal 
in both countries and that the marginal revenues will be equal. 
This condition will be obtained by the MNC by adjusting the amount 
1. This follows Copithorne (1971). 
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of the final good traded. Copithorne (1971) obtained the same 
conditions for the relation of the marginal revenues to the marginal 
costs, but because he did not include trade in the final good did 
not obtain a condition requiring an equality of the marginal costs 
of processing the final good nor an equality of the marginal 
revenues. He obtained a weaker condition. Specifically, 
Where the tax variables, the exchange rate, and both 













These two expressions can be arranged as per Horst 
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When the home country profit tax rate exceeds the host country rate 
the assumptions concerning the tax credit require that the home 
country rate be applied to all income, and after the resulting 
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substitution conditions (13) and (14) lose their final term as 
(T -T )/(e(l-T )) = 0 when one tax rate appears throughout. 
2 1 2 ~ 
Condition (13) states that the marginal revenue in 
country 2 IS equal to the sum of the marginal cost of processing 
the final good in country 2 plus the marginal cost of importing 
the required intermediate good from country 1. The marginal 
cost of importing includes the marginal cost of processing the 
intermediate good, adjusted so all values are in the same currency 
units, plus the tariff costs on the quantity required to produce a 
unit of the final good, less any tax saving in the exporting 
country. 
Condition (14) equates the marginal cost of processing 
the final good in the importing country to the marginal cost of 
importing the final good from the exporting country. The import-
ing costs equal the marginal. cost of production, adjusted to be in 
the same currency, plus the unit tariff cost, less any tax advantage 
to producing in the exporting country. These two results corres-
pond to those obtained by Horst (1971, p.1063). When there is only 
one tax rate in the model the tax advantage becomes equal to zero. 
The second-order conditions must also be considered. 
These are specified in the Appendix as equations (A2) to (A6). 
These conditions require that the marginal revenue for the final 
good in each country be decreasing and the marginal costs of the 
final good in each country, and of the intermediate good, be 
. . 
IncreasIng. With the imposition of two additional conditions, 
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specified below, decreasing costs for the intermediate good can 
be allowed for. The initially stated conditions correspond to 
those obtained by Itagaki (1979), who did not consider the case of 
decreasing costs for the intermediate good, but conflict with those 
obtained by Horst (1971), who included only a final good and found 
that the slope of the marginal cost curve in either country could 
be negative (decreasing costs) provided that the sum of the two 
cost curves was positive (increasing costs). Part of the reason 
for this conflict of results is the inclusion of an intermediate 
good produced only in one country, which is related to the final 
good in both countries. This replaces some of the zero elements 
in the Hessian with non-zero elements. Horst (1971, p.1063) 
pointed out that if the slope of the sum of the marginal cost 
curves was negative the firm would either produce everything in one 
country and serve the other DY exports, or would produce in both 
countries but refuse to export between the two. 
For decreasing costs in the production of the 
intermediate good to be consistent with the second-order conditions 
the following conditions must be met. The marginal revenue of 
the final good in each country must decrease faster than the marginal 
cost of the intermediate good. For each country the sum of the 
marginal cost of the final good plus the marginal cost of the 
intermediate good must be increasing. This is explored in the 
Appendix as equations (AS) and (A6). In deriving any additional 
results from the model it will be assumed that all costs are 
increasing. 
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Copithorne (1971, pp.325-326) did not use the 
second-order conditions to determine the restrictions on the cost 
and revenue curves but followed the other option and assumed curves 
of a conventional shape, specifically decreasing marginal revenue 
curves for the final product and U-shaped short-run marginal cost 
curves for both the final and the intermediate good. In this he 
was followed by Booth and Jensen (1977) and by Eden (1978). 
The comparative static results are sensitive to 
the precise mathematical formulation of the model, and to the 
assumptions about the relative rates of profit taxes, the transfer 
price limits, and to the choice of transfer price made by the ~WC. 
Because of this a number of different cases are possible for the 
model presented here, but results for all of them are not worked 
out. Results for a sufficient number of cases are worked out to 
show that they are sensitive· to the particular assumptions made. 
Some of the cases not worked out require additional assumptions 
about the extent to which transfer prices differ from marginal 
costs (see equation (AlS)), and only one of the possible cases 
was worked out. Some additional results are reported in the next 
section where more of the works in the literature are reviewed. 
The main equation from which the comparative static results are 
derived is given in the Appendix as equation (AI). 
The comparative static results for a change in the 
profit tax rate in country 1 produce a number of cases. Where 
both transfer prices are equal to a lower bound that is based on 
l4S 
marginal costs then the comparative statics equations equal :ero 
(see equations (A9) , (AIO) , and (All)). This says that the 
quantity of the final good sold in each country and the quantity 
exported from country I does not change, from which it follows 
that the quantities of the final and intermediate goods produced 
also do not change. Thus, a change in the profit tax rate of the 
exporting country has no effect on the production and sales 
decisions of the MNC. These results are consistent with, but not 
identical to, those obtained by Horst (1971). Horst looked at 
the results for a tax difference term (T -T )/(l-T ), and results 
2 1 2 
for such a term cannot be obtained from the model presented here, 
due to the inclusion of the intermediate good. 
When the transfer prices are at lower bounds based 
on marginal costs and defined in terms of inequalities the 
comparative statics for the above case are no longer zero. 
Equations (A9) , (AI2), and (AI3) specify the effects of assuming 
these limits on the various elements of equation (AI). To sign 
(AI3) it is necessary to make assumptions about the relative 
amount by which each transfer price exceeds its lower bound. These 
are offsetting in (AI3) and were assumed to be equal so that (AI3) 
was set to zero. This was done because any value it has will be 
less than the amount by which either transfer price exceeds its 
lower bound. The comparative static results are given by (A16) 
and are, 
~> 0 aT ' 
aQ2 < 0 d 
dT ' an 
aN aT < 0 
1 1 1 
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The first two of these correspond to the results obtained by 
Itagaki (1979), but the country subscripts are reversed (1 for 2 
and 2 for 1) because the model is set up differently. These 
results depend on the retention of two separate profit tax rates 
in the model, which depends on the previously discussed assumption 
and requires that the home country profit tax rate be less than 
the host country rate. When only one tax rate is used throughout 
the model the comparative statics equations equal zero. The non-
zero comparative statics equations state that an increase ln 
the profit tax rate of the exporting country will result in an 
increase ln sales of the final good ln the exporting country, a 
decrease in sales of the final good ln the importing country, and 
a decrease in the quantity exported. If the transfer prices are 
less than the marginal costs these comparative statics will be 
reversed (see the discussio~ after equation (A16)). This reversal 
was also noted by Itagaki (1979, p.444). These results are 
considered further in the. next section when Itagaki (1979) is 
discussed. 
The comparative statics for a change in the profit 
tax rate in country 2 are also equal to zero when the transfer 
prices equal a lower bound based on marginal costs. When the 
lower bound is an inequality the comparative statics are, assuming 
(A23) to be zero in the same way as was done for (A13), as follows 
(see (A24)), 
~< 0 aT ' > 0, and 
aN a:r > o. 
2 2 
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These again correspond to the results obtained by Itagaki (1979). 
Comparative statics for transfer prices based on an 
upper bound have not been worked out. These were considered by 
Horst (1971), and this article is discussed further in the next 
section. 
The comparative static results for an increase in 
the tariff imposed on imports of the final good by the importing 
country are as follows, (see (A27)), 
~ aT 
2 
> 0, ~ aT 
2 
< 0, and aN dT < ° 
2 
The second and third of these correspond to the results obtained 
by Horst (1971, p.l07l). These state that imports will decrease, 
sales in the importing country will decrease, and sales in the 
exporting country will increase in response to an increase in the 
tariff. The effects on production in each country could go in 
either direction due to the offsetting effects of the changes in 
sales and in the quantity traded. 
The comparative static results for the tariff on the 
intermediate good are glven by (A26) as, 
~ ar 
2 






Eden (1978) in a three-country vertical integration model considered 
the effects of these types of tariffs and obtained the above results 
for the tariffs on both the final good and the intermediate good. 
The results for the tariff on the intermediate good state that an 
increase in the tariff will increase imports of the final good but 
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will reduce local sales of, and production of, the final d goo . 
Imports of the intermediate good will decline due to the decrease 
in production of the final good. 
More results could be produced from the model 
presented here and the results could be discussed in more detail. 
As this chapter is a review of the literature this is left to 
the next section. This section has served to illustrate how the 
results change as the assumptions are changed. 
5.4 RESULTS OF OTHER MODELS 
The model developed here can produce a number of 
additional results and can be extended ln a number of ways. As 
this chapter is a survey of the literature, these results, their 
interpretation, and the extensions that have been developed, will 
be summarized from the existing literature. This will proceed by 
reviewing individual articles in turn. 
Before considering these results, a point about the 
interpretation of conflicting results obtained from alternative 
assumptions will be made. Each version of the model describes a 
specific situation and the aggregate real-world policy situation 
is likely to be a combination of a number of cases. For example, 
for most home countries the profit t~x rate is likely to be above 
some of the host country rates and below other host country rates. 
Thus, the aggregate effect of a tax change on domestic production 
will be a weighted combination of zero and non-zero effects with the 
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relative weights depending on the importance of each type of case 
in the total. A similar weighted combination of results applies 
when other factors, such as transfer price limits, can result in 
mUltiple cases being possible. 
Models developed to consider specific policy questions 
can be structured to avoid some of the restrictive assumptions that 
generate multiple cases. This is illustrated by Horst (1977), 
where a model was developed to consider the possible effects of 
certain changes in United States tax policy towards the parent 
firms of MNC's. It included a very specific and detailed tax 
structure including: profit taxes in both the home and host 
countries; host country withholding taxes on interest, dividends, 
and head office charges paid to the parent firm; and a detailed 
treatment of the tax credit allowed by the United States for foreign 
taxes paid by the MNC. Horst also allowed for borrowing by the 
parent and the subsidiary and for the use of intra-firm debt. He 
was concerned with the effect of changes in the deferral of taxes 
on income not repatriated as dividends, and found that the current 
United States tax structure provided an incentive to invest abroad 
but that the repeal of the t~x deferral would remove most of the 
incentive. The repeal of the tax credit, which would result in 
double taxation, would encourage debt over equity financing of 
subsidiaries and would reduce foreign, and in some cases domestic, 
investment. The model still has limitations, a notable one being 
the exclusion of trade between the parent and the subsidiary, which 
is included in many of the other models considered here. Although 
ISO 
only one subsidiary is included, the more detailed tax structure 
removes the need for assumptions concerning the relative tax 
rates. The shaping of this model to a specific purpose, and its 
limitations, further illustrate the difficulty of developing a 
completely general model. 
In considering any results there are two ways ln 
which the countries can be distinguished: the home and the host 
country; and the importing and the exporting country. The second 
distinction may not always be precise as a model could be set up 
where a country exports the intermediate good but imports the 
final good. 
Itagaki (1979) used a model of a vertically 
integrated two-country MNC where the home country imported the 
intermediate good and obtained the following results. When the 
home country profit tax rate is increased home country production 
and sale of the final good is increased by the MNC and host country 
production and sale of the final good is decreased. 
To explain this result Itagaki goes back to the first 
order conditions and rearranges them to show a separate gain or 
loss in each country. Under the assumptions used, at the margin 
the parent firm will show a loss while the subsidiary shows a gain. 
Thus a rise in the profit tax rate results in a decrease in the net 
marginal loss from home sale, which encourages home sale, which in 
turn requires a decrease in the sale in country 1 for the first 
order conditions to be met. This change shifts profits from the 
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horne country to the host country, and is shown to ralse the 
production of the intermediate good in the host country. Itagaki 
(1979, pp.443-444) also showed that the tax revenue of the host 
country would increase, but the effect on the tax revenue of the 
horne country could go either way, and that the balance of trade 
in goods and services of the horne country is adversely affected, 
but the increased repatriation of profits has the opposite effect. 
An increase in the host country (the exporting country) tax rate 
was shown to result in an increase in the production of the final 
good in the host country and a decrease in its production in the 
horne country. 
Horst (1971) found that his results depended on 
whether the firm had increasing or decreasing costs. This was 
considered when the second-order conditions were discussed and it 
was shown that in the more g~neral model presented here increasing 
costs could only be allowed under specified conditions. In the 
decreasing cost case the firm will not mix imports and local 
production. The firm will tend to produce in the larger market and 
may do so even if costs are higher there, provided the cost difference 
is less than the tariff. The effects of tariff changes will be 
small unless the firm decides to change its strategy. 
Horst (1971) extended his basic model by considering 
the case where there is a limit on the differences in the prices 
the MNC can charge in the two countries due to arbitrage by third 
parties. This limit depends on the tariffs on imports and can be 
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expressed as 
T P ~ (P -P ) ~ - T P 
2 1 2 1 1 2 
Horst went on to derive a condition giving the price difference 
desired by the MNC and examined the conditions under which this 
would or would not fall within the range allowed by the constraint. 
He found that "the higher the level of existing tariffs and the 
closer the elasticities of demand in the two markets are the more 
likely it is that independently chosen prices will be sustainable."l 
Horst also considered the effect on the comparative 
static results of the price difference constraint being binding 
on the MNC and found that an increase in tariffs could no longer 
be counted upon to encourage local production. A change in the 
rate of profit tax, however, can have a substantial effect, but the 
effect depends on which country has the higher price, the importing 
or the exporting country. . The decreasing cost case also becomes 
more complex when prices are constrained. 
Copithorne (1971) considered the effects of the 
existence of, or changes in, the rates of profit taxes, tariffs, 
sales taxes and excise taxes on the decisions of the ~1NC. He 
concluded that pure profit taxes would not affect output, sales, or 
final prices. This result is partly due to the fact that he did 
not impose any restrictions on the transfer price or on the 
difference in the prices of the final good in the two countries 
1. Horst (1971, pp.1065-l066). 
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where it is sold. Tariffs, sales taxes, and excise taxes would 
effect the choice of transfer prices, which would be used to 
minimize the total tax bill, and could also effect output and sales 
by affecting the prices of the final good. Copithorne also 
concluded that limits on transfer prices may cause the MNC to 
engage ln additional intra-firm trading in order to have more 
degrees of freedom in shifting profits. 
The model developed by Copithorne (1971) was 
extended in articles by Booth and Jensen (1977) and by Eden (1978). 
Booth and Jensen were concerned with determining the conditions 
under which transfer prices would be determinate. They assumed 
that transfer prices could not be negative, while Copithorne did 
not assume this for all of his article. Booth and Jensen obtained 
the same profit maximizing condition as Copithorne. They also 
found that the minimum profi~ constraint in each county that the 
model included put a bound on the range of transfer prices that the 
MNC could use. Also, if transfer prices are at this limit, 
changes in the rates of profit taxes can affect the allocation of 
output between the countries as transfer prices could not be used 
to shift profits. The cases where transfer prices must be non-
discriminatory between countries was considered and the results 
obtained depended upon the cost conditions and the shape of the 
tax functions. 
Eden (1978) allowed for trade between the two 
secondary product firms, which Copithorne (1971) did not consider 
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as a possibility. Eden also assumed that the transfer price IS 
fixed and does not change in response to changes in the tax rates. 
This was done so the effects on output and trade could be 
considered but some comments on how the MNC would like to change 
transfer prices were included. Eden obtained the same profit 
maximization conditions as were obtained from the model presented 
above, and the directions and types of trade allowed in the two 
models are the same. Eden's comparative static results for 
import tariffs have already been considered. Eden also allowed 
the MNC to vary the proportion of dividends remitted by the 
subsidiary to the parent, instead of assuming repatriation of all 
profits, and found that the MNC would use this in responding to 
changes in taxes and tariffs. 
Some of the models considered here have included the 
effects of changes In the exchange rates and two of these have also 
considered the effects of having fluctuating exchange rates instead 
of fixed rates. The comparative statics results obtained depend 
on whether the parent exports to, or imports from, its subsidiary. 
Where the parent exports the final good to the subsidiary it was 
found that a devaluation of the home currency leads to an increase 
In home country production, an increase in exports, and a decrease 
In production in the host country by the MNC. This was shown by 
Batra and Hadar (1979, pp.262-263) who also found that the ~INC 
profited from the devaluation as long as its foreign operations were 
profitable. Kohlhagen (1977, p.4S) obtained similar results, in 
ISS 
that a devaluation of the home currency caused a reduction in 
foreign investment by the MNC and an expansion of exports and 
domestic investment. 
Itagaki (1971, pp.445-446) considered the effect 
of the devaluation of the home country currency when the parent 
imports an intermediate good from its subsidiary and found that 
home sales of the final good decrease and that host country sales 
of it increase. Imports of the intermediate good also decrease. 
This reversal of results further indicates the importance of the 
assumptions about the direction of trade. 
The case of a fluctuating exchange rate was considered 
by Batra and Hadar (1979) and by Itagaki (1977). They both 
assumed that the exchange rate was a non-negative random variable 
and that the objective of the MNC was to maximize profits or a 
profit utility function that was a strictly increasing and strictly 
concave function. Batra and Hadar (1979) included a forward 
foreign exchange market in their model but Itagaki (1977) did not 
include such a market. Batra and Hadar also assumed that all 
profits were repatriated and all foreign exchange was converted to 
the horne currency at the end of each period. 
Batra and Hadar (1979, pp.267-269) found that the 
impact of the fluctuating exchange rates depended on the firm's 
assumption about the value of the expected exchange rate relative 
to the forward rate. They concluded that if the firm expects the 
exchange rate to exceed the forward cost when all marginal costs 
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are rising then home sales are increased while foreign sales and 
exports are decreased, and the firm reduces its production at 
home and increases it in the host country. They also concluded 
that in the absence of a forward market, the MNC reacts to 
uncertainty about the exchange rate in the same way as it reacts 
to a fall in the value of the exchange rate (a devaluation of the 
home currency) when it is known with certainty. 
Itagaki (1977, pp.62-69) considered the case where 
the subsidiary was making profits and also where it was making 
losses while Batra and Hadar considered only the first of these. 
If the subsidiary is making profits the MNC will be a seller of the 
host country currency and if it is making losses the ~WC will be a 
purchaser of the host country currency. In comparing fixed and 
flexible exchange rates he assumed that the fixed rate equalled the 
mean of the flexible rate. . When the subsidiary profit is positive, 
production of both the final and the intermediate good is higher 
under a flexible than under a fixed exchange rate and intra-firm 
trade in the intermediate good is also greater. These results are 
reversed when the subsidiary is making losses. Itagaki (1977, p.89) 
also compared some of the comparative static results under the two 
exchange rate regimes. When the home country profit tax rate 1S 
greater than or equal to the host country rate, changes in the home 
.tax rate will affect the behaviour of the ~mc under a flexible 
exchange rate but will have no effect under a fixed exchange rate. 
When the relative profit tax rates are reversed the comparative 
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statics for profit tax and tariff rate changes are indeterminate 
under a flexible rate but determinate under a fixed rate. 
Since the exchange rate regime must be either fixed 
or flexible this only implies that the appropriate model should 
be used at anyone time. However, when some currencies are 
fixed relative to each other but flexible against other currencies, 
such as the currencies of the European Monitary Union, the 
situation becomes more complex. For MNC's based in those areas 
with subsidiaries both inside and outside the fixed exchange rate 
currency area the effect of any tax or tariff change could be a 
weighting of two different effects depending upon the amount of 
investment subject to each type of exchange rate. 
Horst (1973) extended his 1971 results to include 
consideration of the development of new technology. The new 
technology was assumed to ma~e the product more attractive to 
buyers in both countries and was incorporated in the model by a 
demand shift parameter. By assuming that the returns to research 
and development (R and D) are known with certainty Horst was able 
to derive conditions for the optimal expenditure on Rand D and 
for the distribution of these costs between the two countries. 
This assumption of certainty is, in the case of Rand D, unrealistic 
and limits the value of the results. The article is useful, 
however, in indicating that it should be possible to extend the 
theory of the MNC to consider Rand D, which is a significant 
activity for many MNC's. 
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Adler and Stevens (1974) modified the basic one 
level of production model in two ways. They assumed that the 
good produced by the subsidiary of the MNC could be differentiated 
from the good produced by the parent firm. They also added a 
second stage to the model that included competition by local host 
country firms and exports to the host country by third country 
firms, each group being represented by a single firm. The host 
country firm produced an identical good to that produced by the 
subsidiary of the MNC. The good imported from the third country 
firm could be a differentiated product. Adler and Stevens solved 
their extended model numerically using empirical estimates of 
production and cost functions and using a range of reasonable 
parameters for the demand functions. This method was used because 
of certain mathematical complexities in the solution of the full 
model. Adler and Stevens found that Horst's (1971) results were 
partly due to his assumption of identical goods being produced and 
sold in both countries, but they also found that the slopes of 
the cost and demand functions were still important. In considering 
export displacement they found that the results are sensitive to 
the demand parameter measurements and that foreign direct investment 
usually reduces the exports of the parent firm. The interactions 
between the MNC and its competitors was also found to be important. 
This model is limited in that the export of components or inter-
mediate goods from the parent to the subsidiary is not included in 
the model, and the inclusion of these could alter the conclusions 
on the extent of export displacement. 
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Batra and Ramachandran (1980) added the ~WC to an 
international trade theory model. Their primary concern was with 
the effects on international trade theory, which is not a concern 
of this thesis. Their model included a two-country ~wc that could 
shift production and engage in trade, and was concerned with the 
effects of tariff and tax changes on production, rates of return on 
capital, and real wage rates in both countries. Their model is 
not considered in detail, as that would require the specification 
of the international trade theory setting they use. The model is 
noted here to illustrate that there is a considerable range of ways 
in which a MNC model can be developed. 
The models considered in this chapter have a number 
of limitations. They are static models and some of the authors 
1 have stated that dynamic models would be useful. Dynamic models, 
and the way they extend the model, are considered further in the 
next chapter. The models are also limited to two or three 
countries, to one final good, and to one or two levels of production. 
The restrictions these impose on the interpretation of the results 
have been discussed, and serve to illustrate the importance of using 
the correct model and assumptions when considering any specific 
situation or policy proposal. 
1. Copithorne (1971, p.336), Horst (1977, p.376), and Adler and 
Stevens (1974, p.67S). 
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5.5 MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX 
The objective function and the first order conditions 
are given in the main text as equations (1) to (7). To consider 
the second order conditions and the comparative static results the 
total differentials of the first order conditions are taken and 
arranged in matrix notation as equation (AI). This does not, 
however, include the terms for changes in the proportion of the 
intermediate good used in the production of the final good and In 
the exchange rate. The latter is considered in the section 
where additional articles are reviewed. Equation (AI) includes 
both profit tax terms. If only one profit tax rate is used for 
all profit taxes in the model, all the profit tax terms can be 
eliminated from the first order conditions, changes in the profit 
tax rate will not effect the results of the model, and the comparative 
static results for such changes will be :ero. 
For the second order conditions to be met the Hessian 
must be negative definite. To determine the signs of IH I 
2 
and 
IH I it is necessary to multiply out the determinants as assumptions 
3 
about the signs of the elements of the matrix do not yield signs for 
the determinants. These are specified as equations (:\2) and (.'\3) 
below. For IH I to be negative it is required that, 
1 
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In order to have IH I > 0 and 
2 
IH I < 0 it is required that the 
3 
marginal revenue of the final good in each country be decreasing, 
and that the marginal costs of processing the final good in each 
country be increasing. The intermediate good can have either 
increasing or decreasing costs. To allow for decreasing costs 
for the intermediate good some additional restrictions are required 
and these are specified below. From the above conditions, with 
increasing costs for the intermediate good the elements of the 
Hessian have the following signs. 
f-
+ 
With decreasing costs for the intermediate good this becomes, 
+ 
+ 
To show the multiplication of the determinant of the 
Hessian, where the marginal revenues are decreasing and the marginal 
costs are increasing, let 
(l-T ) 
a2Rl 
- a = aQl 2 1 
a2Cl a
2Cl (l-T ) 3
2C1 
b (-T ) (l-T ) = 3:-J 2 = = aQ1aN 1 aQ 12 1 1 
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c = = 
- d = 
f = 




(l-T ) "IQ::> 
1 a L 
2 
All the letters themselves are positive, In this case, and the 
determinant becomes, 
- a - b - c - c - b 
- c - c - d - f f 
- b f - b - f I 
Multiplying this out and then cancelling all the cases where the 
same term appears twice, but with opposite signs, gives, 
IH I = -abc -acf -abd -adf -abf -bdf -bcd -cdf 
3 
This has the appropriate negative sign. To consider decreasing 
cost cases later, only these eight terms need to be considered. 
Multiplying out IH I 
2 
and cancelling terms gives, 
IH I = ac + ad + af + bc + bd + bf + cd + cf 
2 
Since all these terms are positive 
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To consider the case of decreasing costs for the 
intermediate good c is changed to -c, so that the letter itself 
still represents a positive term. Then IH I becomes, 
2 
IH I = - ac + ad + af - bc + bd + bf - cd - cf 
2 C-\4 ) 
This can be either positive or negative so the second order conditions 
are not met. For example, it will be negative if a = 1, b = 2 , 
c = 1.6 d = 1 ,and f = 2 Imposing additional conditions 
can make IH I positive. 
2 
Imposing a condition that the sum of the 
marginal costs of the intermediate good and the final good be increas-
ing is not sufficient. Imposing a condition that the marginal 
revenue decrease faster than the marginal cost of the intermediate 
good increases is also not sufficient, but imposing both of these 
conditions is sufficient. The first of these conditions gives, 
(b - c) > 0 and (f - c) > 0 
while the second gives, 
a > C and d > C • 
Rearranging IH I 
2 
gives, 
/H I = a(-c+f) + b(-c+d) + d(-c+a) + f(-c+b) 
2 
(.-\5) 
which shows that the above conditions are necessary. 
To consider the conditions required for /H I 
3 
to be 




= ab(c-d) + ae(c-b) + bd(c-f) + df(c-a) (A6) 
which shows that the above conditions are sufficient to make it 
negative. 
The comparative static results depend on the assumption 
about the relative profit tax rates. If the home country rate 1S 
" 
lower than the host country rate both rates are included in the 
model (case 1) and if the home rate is greater than the host rate 
the home rate is substituted for the host rate (case 2). In case ' 
some of the first order conditions are simplified, as noted in the 
main text, and equations (6) and (7) become, 
dg (dR2 dC2) r .§. 0 -- + eaq = dQ dQ 20. 2 l 2 
(A7) 
and 
dCl dCl T 'IT + S 0 -- + eaN"" r = dN 2 20. (AS) 
In developing the comparative static results the signs 
of the elements of the vectors of equation (AI) should be stated. 
These come from the first order conditions and the upper and lower 
bounds assumed for the transfer prices. 
For the vector associated with 




dCl ~) = 0 




the first order 
(A9) 
If both transfer prices equal a lower bound that is based on marginal 
costs than, by rearranging the definitions from table 5.1 and using 
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the appropriate derivative of the cost function, it can be sho\ffi 
that, 




1T + S 0 aN + = Cl. 
(AIO) 
(All) 
In this case the comparative static results for dT will be zero. 
1 
If the transfer prices are greater than but not equal to 
a lower bound that is based on marginal costs then (AID) and (All) 
become, 
ag 
- -- + aQ 
2 
and 





By letting the difference between each transfer price and its lower 
bound equal € with an appropriate subscript it can be shown that 
(AI3) will be near zero and its sign will depend on the extent to 
which each transfer price differs from its lower limit. (AI3) will 
be assumed to be equal to zero In order to work out some of the 
comparative static results. 
If the transfer prices have a lower bound based on 
average cost, where average cost is less than marginal cost, then 
(AID) and (All) become, 
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'IT + S indeterminant. -- + 1S ClN a (A1S) 
These results are the same whether the lower bound .is treated as an 
equality or an inequality. The sign of (AIS) depends on the extent 
to which each transfer price is less than the related marginal cost 
term and can be either posi ti ve or negative. If (A1S) equals :ero, 
a possible but not necessary case, the comparative statics using 
(AI4) and (A1S) will be the reverse of those using (A12) and (AI3). 
The comparative statics using (A9), (AI2), and (AI3), 
with (AI3) set equal to zero are, 
ClQl > 0 
d1' ' 
1 
aQz < 0 
d1' 
1 
and aN < 0 8:r 
1 
(AI6) 
The comparative statics uS1ng (A9), (AI4) , and (A1S), with (A1S) set 
equal to zero, are the exact reverse of those given in (A16). The 
first and third result of each set can be determined from the signs 
of the elements of the determinant but the second requires that the 
a g .§.) determinant be multiplied out, keeping (- aQz + a as a single term. 
ag S 
The result depends on the sign of (- aQz + a)· 







and retain the notation used to obtain (A2). Then for 
the determinant 1S, 
0 - c b 
- h + S d - f - c f (Al-) ex 
0 f - b - f 
For ~ the determinant 1S, dT 
1 
- a - b - c 0 b 
- c - h S f + - (AlB) ex 
- b 0 - b - f 
For dN the determinant is, 8-[ 
1 
I - a - b - c - c 0 
c c - d f - h + S (A19) - - - ex 
- b f 0 
The reversal of the sign of s - h + ex due to the assumptions used to 
specify the limits on the transfer price lS the reason for the 
reversal of the comparative static results. 
Two further sets of comparative static resul ts could be 
worked out by assuming (AlS) to be positive or negative. This has 
not been done for the reasons given in the main text. 
In the case where both transfer prices are at the upper 
bound, either as an equality or an inequality, 
dg 
- -- + 
dQ 





since the upper bound exceeds the lower bound, and 
dCl + ~ ~ > 0 
- ~ II + -(1. (:\21) 
by rearranging the definitions in table 5.1 and using a term € for 
each trasnfer price where the bound is an inequality. The compara-
tive statics for this case have not been worked out for the reasons 
given in the main text. 
For the vector associated with d1" the term 
2 
e(dR2 _ dC2) (1 + "' 6 - r ).-dQ dQ 2 a. 
2 2 
can be signed by solving the first order condition glven by equation 
(6) for, 













If the so that the sign of the expression depends on (~~2) - ~ . 
transfer price equals the lower bound based on marginal costs this 
expression equals zero and if the transfer price is greater than 
this lower bound the expression is negative. 
( dC2) d Similarly, solving equation (7) for e 3~ an 
substituting this into the third element of the vector and rearranging 
glves, 
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substituting in values for the lower bound transfer prlces based on 




(dCl + ~) _ ~} 
dQ dQ dQ 
1 1 1 
(A23) 
which will equal zero. If the transfer prices are greater than the 
lower bound the two differences will be offsetting and the result is 
indeterminate. Following the reasoning given after (A16) the above 
expression can be treated as being zero in this inequality case. 
Where transfer prices are equal to lower bounds based on 
marginal costs the comparative statics are equal to zero. Where 
the transfer prices are greater than the lower bounds the comparative 
statics are as follows, 
dQl < 
dT 0 , 
dQ2 > 
dT 0 , and 
~> 
dT 0 . (A24) 
2 2 2 
These are the opposite of the results obtained ln (A16) , but the 
country where the tax rate is changing is also reversed. 
If the transfer prices are allowed to be less than 
marginal costs, the comparative statics given in (A24) will be 
reversed, in the same way as the same change in the transfer prices 
reversed the results given in (A16). 
For the vectors associated with 










(1 - T ) .§. > 0 
2 a. 
(1 - T ) ~ < 0 
2 -a. 
(1 - T ) 7T > 0 . 
2 
comparative statics are 
aQl < 











, and aN > dr 0 (A26) 
2 
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Chapter Six 
I N T ROD U C T ION TOT H E 
OFT HEM U L TIN A T ION A L 
D Y N A M I C MOD E L S 
COR P 0 RAT ION 
6.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE DYNA}IIC MODELS 
The purpose of this part of the thesis is to develop 
a dynamic model of the MNC. Developing such a model is one of the 
possible extensions to the theoretical literature of the MNC. A 
variety of comparative static models of increasing complexity have 
been developed but corresponding dynamic models, of even the 
simplest version of the MNC model, have not been developed to date. 
The comparative- static models have indicated a range 
of possible responses of the MNC to changes in its external environ-
ment, some of these being rather substantial. For example, Horst 
(1971, p.1065) noted a case where the MNC would switch production 
from one country to another. Static theories give no indication 
of the time required for these responses to be made but a dynamic 
model may say something about this. It may also be used to consider 
how the process of adjustment will change if different initial 
conditions are assumed. 
The dynamic model is developed uSlng mathematical 
techniques and two different approaches are used: optimal control 
theory, and dynamic programing. The model used is a dynamic 
version of one of the simplest models of the MNC, the two-country, 
one level of production model. The assumptions and structure of 
the model used including any variations between the two versions , 
are specified in the next section of this chapter. The type of 
results obtained from a comparative static version of the model 
can be seen in Chapter Five. There are differences between the 
two approaches and from these follow reasons for using two 
approaches instead of using one approach and following it further. 
An optimal control theory approach, as with the 
calculus approach used in Chapter Five, uses parameters specified 
as variables or as parts of functional forms, such as production or 
demand functions, and seeks to obtain necessary and sufficient 
conditions for a maximum while imposing no (or minimal) restrictions 
on the range of permissible parameter values and using functional 
forms that are as general as possible. In order to obtain some 
of the results, however, restrictive assumptions on some of the 
functional forms or parameter values may be required, and the former 
are required for the MNC model. For example, an assumption 
concerning the direction of trade is required. 
Dynamic programing is a numerical technique that 
uses specific functional forms and numerical parameter values in 
order to calculate a maximum and is usually executed on a computer. 
The range of functional forms and parameter values that can be used 
with this technique is very wide and the effect of changing either 
of these can be considered by changing the functional forms or 
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parameter values used in the model. In this way some of the 
assumptions required to obtain results from an optimal control 
theory model can be avoided. For the MNC model developed the 
optimal control theory requires an assumption of a fixed capital 
to labour ratio in production in order to go beyond initial 
results while the dynamic programing technique does not require this. 
The limitations of the optimal control theory version are discussed 
further in Chapter Seven. 
The optimal control theory model is set up using 
continuous time while the dynamic programing model is set up using 
discrete time periods, each of which represents a year. 
6.2 STRUCTURE AND ASSUMPTIONS OF THE MODEL 
In the model developed the ~WC is a two-country 
manufacturing firm that produces and sells an identical good in 
each of two countries and may also export that good from one country 
to the other. These exports are sales from one branch of the 
firm to the other, and sales to the customers in each country are 
made by the local branch of the MNC. The basic structure of the 
~WC model used here builds on Horst (1971) and the basic model of 
the investment decision used is inspired by Nickell (1978, chapter 2). 
This section specifies the assumptions of the model, the reasons 
for, implications of, and limitations of these assumptions, and also 
specifies any differences in the assumptions used in the two versions 
of the model. 
1~6 
In order to develop an initial version of a dynamic 
model a simple version of the MNC model is used. This is 
chosen so that there is a correspondence with some of the work on 
a static model of the MNC, with a number of simplifying assump-
tions being taken over from the static case in order to allow for 
a comparison of the static and dynamic results. 
There is one major difference between the two 
mathematical versions of the model that are developed and this 
effects some of the other assumptions that are used. The optimal 
control theory version does not include any tax variables while 
the dynamic programing version includes a set of tax variables. 
The tax variables included are specified in the next section of 
this chapter. The model without taxes is simpler than the model 
with taxes. For the optimal control theory version, which involves 
the manipulation of equations, this makes a difference and the 
simpler version was considered first. For the dynamic programing 
version, where the equations are calculated by computer, the 
difference is not as important so taxes were included. It should 
be noted that the exclusion of taxes is unrealistic, particularly 
when looking at the MNC where differences in tax rates between 
jurisdictions can be important. The procedure of developing a 
model without taxes and then adding taxes in a second stage was used 
by Copithorne (1971). 
The model retains the assumption that the objective 
of the firm is the maximization of profits, as this assumption has 
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used 1n the static models discussed in Chapter Five. In dynamic 
form this becomes an assumption that the firm maximizes the net 
present value of its income stream where this income stream is the 
difference between its revenues and its costs at each point 1n time. 
In order to calculate a present value an interest or 
discount rate is required. To simplify this and to allow a single 
interest rate it is assumed that there exists a perfect capital 
market. This ensures that economic agents are price takers in 
the market for funds and that any income stream can be changed for 
another by borrowing or lending so that only the total size and 
not the time path of any income stream has utility, where the size 
is measured by the present value. 
An assumption of certainty, specifically that the 
world is one of perfect certainty concerning the future (or 
equivalently all individual~ hold the same certain expectations 
about the future), is used. One reason for this is that it is 
required by the capital market assumption above so that all 
individuals will have the same belief about what the future 
interest rates will be. A second is that uncertainty is a 
complication that 1S not considered in the initial dynamic model 
presented here. The role of uncertainty in the investment question 
is considered by Nickell (1978, chapters 5 and 6). There are a 
number of possible different approaches to modelling uncertainty 
and a considerable literature in this area exists.
l 
This 
1. For one discussion of uncertainty see Hey (1979). 
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diversity of possible approaches is another reason for developing 
the initial model without including any type of uncertainty. 
The model also assumes that the parent firm owns 
100 per cent of the subsidiary. This assumption allows for the 
exclusion of any restrictions that would be imposed if outsiders 
owned a share of the subsidiary. The presence of such share-
holders would limit the use of transfer prices to shift profits 
and force dividends to be the main method of paying profits to the 
owners. The use of transfer prices to shift profits would have 
the effect of shifting profits from other shareholders to the 
parent of the MNC, and thus would be opposed by the outside share-
holders. 
Further, it is assumed that all of the parent's 
investment in the subsidiary is in the form of equity. Thus, the 
use of intra-company debt and interest flows need not be considered. 
In the model it is not specified which firm is the 
parent firm of the MNC and in the interpretation of the results 
both cases can be considered, as was done in Chapter Five. This 
allows for more cases to be considered than if one firm is specified 
as the parent at the start. 
In the optimal control theory verSlon of the model the 
direction of trade is specified and the MNC exports from country one 
to country two. As which firm is the parent firm is not specified 
and any of the characteristics of country one and country two can be 
varied the model remains completely general. The dynamic programming 
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version of the model allows for trade in either direction and, for 
each set of parameter values used calculates the optimal direction 
of trade. 
In considering trade it is further assumed that only 
the MNC can engage in international trade in the good it produces 
so that there is no constraint on the difference in the price of 
the good between the two countries. If others could trade in the 
good, arbitrage between the two markets would lmpose a constraint 
on the price difference where this constraint would be a function 
of any costs of trade and any tariffs on imports. This point was 
considered by Horst (1971) and Copithorne (1971) and is considered 
in Chapter Five where the static models are discussed. A price 
difference constraint is another item that could be included in 
a later version of the model. 
The basic versi~n of the model does not include any 
restrictions on international transfers of funds. Thus, no 
restrictions are imposed in this way on the level of investment in 
either country or on the transfer of profits from the subsidiary 
to the parent. 
Where taxes are included assumptions concernlng the 
remittance of profits to the parent and the level of the transfer 
price are required. As the only implications of these are for 
tax liability they are not required for the no tax case. Assumptions 
concerning the repatriation of profits, and the implication of them, 
were discussed in Chapter Five. Similar assumptions are used here 
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and are discussed in the next section where taxes are discussed. 
The assumption concerning limits on transfer prices was also 
discussed in Chapter Five and again is important when taxes are 
included, and these limits are discussed in the next section. 
To produce its product the MNC is assumed to transform 
inputs of capital and labour into a homogeneous output according 
to some production function. The capital input is in the form 
of a capital stock in each country which can be increased in 
either or both countries by investment. The labour is hired In 
a perfectly competitive market and the amount can be freely varied 
in either country. The production function and factor prices 
that the MNC faces in each country can differ between the two 
countries. 
, Capital is assumed to have the same productive 
characteristics whatever it~ age or birthdate. However, as it 
ages it depreciates at an exponential rate. This assumption 
simplifies the analysis by allowing all capital, regardless of its 
age, to be treated as a single variable. Also, depreciation 
depends solely on the stock of capital existing at any time and 
is independent of the age structure of the capital stock. 
The.optimal control theory version of the model uses 
a general rather than a specific production function. One condition 
imposed on it is that it be a twice differentiable function. The 
general functional form does not yield very concrete results and 
the reasons for this are explained in Chapter Seven. The type 
of functional form needed to obtain further results is also 
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discussed and requires an assumption of a fixed capital to labour 
ratio in production. Results for this are not developed as the 
dynamic programming version of the model allows for more freedom 
of choice of functional forms. 
The dynamic programming version uses a Cobb-Douglas 
production function. This was chosen because it is one of the 
simplest production functions that has been widely used in the 
literature. It includes both capital and labour terms and allows 
for decreasing, constant, or increasing returns to scale in 
production. 
developed. 
Other functions could be used in the type of model 
Assumptions concerning the methods by which the ~mc 
may reduce its capital stock in either country are also required. 
The optimal control theory version includes no specific limit-
ations on investment so includes an implicit assumption that negative 
investment, that 1S, sale of existing capital stock for its 
current purchase price, is allowed. Such an assumption is 
unrealistic and leads to the result that the firm will make large 
adjustments 1n its capital stock to make capital gains or avoid 
capital losses just before the price of the capital good is to rise 
or fall, and to reverse the change 1n capital stock immediately 
after the price change. For this to happen the assumption of 
certainty is also required. This is explored by Nickell (1978, 
pp.14-lS) but will not be further considered here. 
The dynamic programming version of the model does not 
allow for negative investment. The only way of reducing the 
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capital stock is to make no investment and allow depreciation 
to reduce the level of the capital stock. This involves an 
implicit assumption that there is no market for used capital 
goods. This model does not include any costs for having unused 
capital stock and allows capital stock to be left unused by 
combining it with a zero level of labour. These assumptions are 
not completely realistic but are used to simplify the initial 
model developed. 
An upper limit on the level of investment can also 
be imposed. If no such limit is imposed any adjustment involving 
an increase in the capital stock can take place in a single period 
and there is an implicit assumption that the firm can obtain 
sufficient financial resources to carry out any level of investment 
it wants. Such an assumption 1S unrealistic as there are limits 
to the amount that any firm.can borrow. Such a limit on the upper 
level of investment was not included in the optimal control version 
of the model as it requires that a separate constraint be included 
1n the mathematics, and to determine the effect of the constraint 
requires that two sets of mathematical equations be worked out. 
In the dynamic programming version, constraints on 
investment levels can be included by minor variations in the program 
used. Thus, three alternatives were used. One involved no limit 
on positive investment. The second involved a constraint that the 
total investment in any time period be limited to the net operating 
income of the MNC in that time period, that is its income less 
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operating costs. The third involved some costs to having the 
level of investment exceed the net operating income in the same 
period and in the model these costs are a proportion of the 
extent to which the investment exceeds the net operating income. 
Assumptions concerning the markets for the ~WC's 
product and for the factors of production it uses are required. 
It is assumed that the MNC is a price taker on the factor markets 
in both countries. For its product it is assumed that the ~WC 
faces a known downward sloping demand curve in each country. This 
corresponds to the assumption used for the static models and, as 
for those models, by excluding any reference to the MNC's 
competitors, involves an implicit assumption that the MNC is a 
monopolist. For cases of constant and increasing returns to 
scale in production the demand assumption is required in order to 
limit the size of the firm as technology imposes no finite limit on 
its size. 
It is also assumed that the firm maintains an equality 
of output with demand by means of price adjustments. This 
assumption is used to avoid any need to include inventories or idle 
productive capacity in the model. 
6.3 THE MODEL INCLUDING TAXES 
The dynamic model of the MNC presented in the previous 
sections can be extended to include taxes of various types. This 
section describes a possible structure that can be used to include, 
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In a model, some of the main tax variables that an MNC faces. 
As it has already been assumed that the ~WC is one hundred per cent 
equity financed and that the parent firm owns one hundred per cent 
of the subsidiary only taxes paid by the ~~C are considered and 
the personal income tax system and the choice of debt or equity 
financing for the MNC are not considered. 
The full range of taxes that MNC's are subject to is 
complex. In this section only two types of taxes will be considered, 
taxes on corporate profits and tariffs on imports. l It is assumed 
that the rates of profit taxes can be different In each country and 
also that the tariff levels can be different. As profits are 
subject to tax an assumption concerning the repatriation of profits 
is required. The model will follow Horst (1971) in assuming that 
all profits are eventually repatriated to the parent firm and that 
all tax variables can be grouped into a single effective rate. It 
is also assumed that'the home country allows a tax credit for the 
taxes paid by the subsidiary to the host country. As Batra and 
Hadar (1979) point out, if the model has profits taxed at the rate of 
the country where they are earned, the above assumption involves an 
implicit assumption that the home country tax rate is lower than the 
host country rate. Having all profits taxed at the home country 
1. For a more detailed treatment of the tax variables facing an 
MNC see Horst (1977), which was discussed in Chapter Fiv~. 
Additional tax variables include: withholding taxes on Interest, 
dividend, and head office charges paid to the parent firm; 
and a detailed treatment of the tax credits allowed by the home 
country. 
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rate would reverse the relative tax rates involved in this implicit 
assumption. The use of a simplified tax structure is common to 
many of the models of the MNC that have been produced and it is 
used to simplify the models. 
A number of considerations enter into the choice of the 
tax structure. One of these was to have a structure that could be 
used in either an optimal control theory or a dynamic programming 
model of the MNC. Another was to have a structure that did not 
increase the number of state variables in the model. The way in 
which the tax allowance for depreciation was included was particularly 
influenced by this. 
In order to preclude the MNC from choosing an extreme 
value for the transfer price on trade between the two branches of 
the MNC it will be assumed that if the customs and tax authorities 
on both sides were reasonab1y diligent the MNC would probably not 
try to declare the value of its exports to be less than their 
marginal cost of production or greater than their market price ln 
the exporting country_ This assumption was made by Horst (1971). 
An alternative option of assuming a fixed transfer price was used 
by Eden (1978). The option adopted in the dynamic programming 
version is to include a fixed transfer price as a parameter and 
then to try a range of suitable values. 
In the model profits are taxed at a rate T, where 
the term "profits" is used in the accountant's sense of the 
difference between current revenues and current costs excluding 
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capital costs. l Interest payments on loans can be offset 
against tax at a rate e T • This is because interest income 
is also subject to tax at the same rate. This tax deductability 
imp 1 ies that the effective rate of interest is simply r (1 - e T) , 
where r 1S the rate before tax. To simplify the analysis it 
will be assumed that e =1 and that the rate of tax on interest 
1S equal to the rate of tax on profits. Thus, the effective rate 
of interest 1S r (1 - T) If e < 1 in the home country then 
interest payments could be a preferred method of transferring 
profits from the subsidiary to the parent. As the use of intra-
company debt has not been included in the model this is not 
considered. 
In addition to a tax on profits the system includes a 
depreciation allowance, which allows the firm to offset against the 
profits tax payable a sum which mayor may not be closely related 
to the actual amount by which the firm's capital has depreciated 
1n any given period. The assumption that the actual rate of 
depreciation 1S an exponential rate of decay of the capital stock 
at a rate 8 will be retained. For tax purposes a proportion 
(-v(s-t)) ve of the expenditure on capital goods at time t is 
allowed against tax at time s . This 1S a declining balance form 
of depreciation allowance. At time s a proportion l-e 
(-v(s-t)) 
of expenditure has already been allowed against tax and a 
1. The tax structure used here is taken from Nickell (1978, 
chapter 9, pp.199-203). 
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proportion (-v(s-t)) e 1S still remaining to be allowed, and a 
fraction v of the remainder is allowed at time s. If 
equals 0 the depreciation allowed for tax equals the true 
depreciation. If v>8 the depreciation allowed for tax is 
greater than the rate of physical decay and this is termed 
accelerated depreciation. 
v 
There is also a tariff on imports into either country, 
represented by T. The tariff rates can be different for each 
country. Only the tariff of the country into which the good is 
being imported will enter the objective function of the MNC in the 
model, but both tariffs may influence the decisions of the MNC, 
including the extent and direction of imports. 
One other fiscal instrument of governments 1S 
included in the model. This is the direct investment grant, which 
is a payment by the government to the firm of some percentage of 
the cost of all the capital equipment which it purchases. Supposing 
the grant to be 100g%, the effective price of capital goods to the 
firm is then q(t)(l-g) . The extent of these grants \dll differ 
in each country in the model. This allows some consideration of 
how government policies to encourage local investment effects the 
decisions of the MNC. 
In order to incorporate the depreciation allowance into 
the model the simplest thing to do is to compute its present value 
at time t . This avoids the need for a second capital stock 
variable, if accelerated depreciation is to be allowed for. This 
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present value on one unit of expenditure on investment goods is 
given by the discounted sum of all future tax savings, namely, 
co 
J {-r(I-8T) (s-t)} {-v(s-t)} 
o e· VT e ds 
The first term under the integral discounts at the effective rate 
of interest the savings at time s back to time t. The term 
{-v(s-t)} ve lS the depreciation allowance allowed at time s, 
and the T term reduces this allowance to an amount of tax saved. 
Assuming that v, T, r, and 8 are expected to remain constant 
the present value can, by standard rules of integration, be reduced to 
TV 
v+r(1-8T) 
The effective price of capital goods at time t, referred to as 
q(t) , can be stated as, 
{ TV } q(t) = q(t) (l-g) 1 - v+r(1-8T) 
The tax system, as outlined above, can be included in 
the equation for the present value of the MNC. When depreciation 
allowances are included in the model in this way there is an implicit 
assumption that the firm always earns sufficient profits so that the 
depreciation allowance can be fully used to reduce the profits on 
which taxes are to be paid. If this is not the case the revised 
price of capital goods, q(t) , overs~ates the tax savings due to 
the depreciation allowance. 
The model specified here will be developed in the next 
three chapters. First, the optimal control theory version will be 
developed in Chapter Seven. Then the dynamic programing technique 
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to be used will be specified in Chapter Eight and the results 
obtained from it will be given in Chapter Nine. 
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Chapter Seven 
THE 0 P TIM A L CON T R 0 L 
THE 0 R Y MOD E L 
Chapter Seven 
THE OPT I MAL CON T R 0 L THE 0 R Y MOD E L 
This chapter develops a version of the MNC model described 
1n the previous chapter, by using the mathematics of optimal control 
theory. The model is set out as a system of mathematical equations 
in the first section. The results obtained from the model are 
presented in section 2 with the detailed workings of the mathematics 
being put 1n an appendix to the chapter. The results obtained are 
limited and the reasons for this are explained in section 2. 
7.1 PRESENTATION OF THE MATHE~~TICAL MODEL 
As stated previously, the objective of the MNC is to 
maximise the present value of its net income stream. The net income 
of the firm at time t 1n a single country, excluding international 
trade, 1S 
NR (t) = p (t) F (K (t) ,L (t)) - w (t) L (t) - q (t) I (t) (1) 
where the notation is as given below. The symbols are defined below 
without subscripts but when subscripted refer to that item in the 
country specified by the subscript, where this can be a one or a 
two. 











the labour input employed by the firm at time 
the ~nvestment in new capital stock by the firm 
at tlme t . 
the price charged by the firm for its product 
at time t . 
the price of capital goods at time t . 
wet) = the wage rate at time t . 
ret) = the rate of interest at time t . 
= the exponential rate of decay of capital stock. 
t 
F{K(t),L(t)} = the maximum output which can be produced 
by the firm at time t, given K(t),L(t) units 
of capital stock and labour services respectively. 
The following two variables are not subscripted and must be identical 
for both countries. 
N(t) = the quantity of output exported from the firm in 
country one to the branch in country two at time 
rr(t) = the transfer price on N(t) at time t as set by 
the MNC. 
The demand curve faced by the ~mc is represented by the 
following equation, which can be subscripted to refer to the individual 
countries. 
z{p(t)}S(t) (2) 
where < 0 . This demand function is of a separable form where 
p 
the demand curve itself has a constant shape defined by :{p(t)} 
and is shifted up or down over time by Set) . One result of this 
form is that the elasticity of demand, E, and the marginal revenue, 
MR, are both functions of pet) only, time not entering as a 
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1 separate argument. The Set) term will be useful in allowing 
consideration of how growth of demand in a market over time effects 
the investment decision of the MNC. 
The assumption that price is used to keep demand equal 
to production gives the following equation, 
z{p(t)}S(t) = F{K(t),L(t)} (3) 
and this can be rearranged to glve, 
pet) = p{F{K(t),L(t)}/S(t)} (-+) 
Substituting (4) for the pr1ce term in the net income equation and 
including international trade, the objective function of the MNC 
can be stated as follows: 
fOOO e(-R(t)){p {{F {K (t),L (t)} - N(t)}/S (t)}{F {K (t), 
_ III 1 1 11 -
L (t)} - N(t)} - w (t) L (t) - q (t) I (t) + TI(t)~(t) (5) 
1 1 1 1 1 
+ P {{F {K (t),L (t)} + N(t)}/S (t)}{F {K (t),L (t)} 
222 2 2 22 2 
+ N(t)} - w (t)L (t) - q (t)I (t) - 1T(t)N(t)}dt 
2 2 2 2 
! 
This 1S maximised subject to the following conditions,-
• 
K (t) = I (t) 
1 1 
8 K (t) 
1 1 
• 
K (t) = I (t) - 8 K (t) 
2 2 2 2 
(6) 
(~) 
1. This is shown by Nickell (1978, pp.17,2l). ..' 






K (0) = K 
1 10 (8) 
K (0) = K 
2 20 (9) 
In this model exports from country one, N(t) , should 
be constrained to be less than production in country one, 
F {K (t),L (t)} . 
III 
Since investment in country one and the level 
of exports are simultaneously determined and are influenced by the 
same variables the level of investment should always be such that 
" 
the export requirement can be met. This point will be considered 
when the results of the model are examined. 
This model can be set up as an optimal control problem 
where labour employed, investment, and the quantity of exports from 
country one are the control variables and the capital stocks are 
the state variables. The mathematics of this model are worked out 
ln the appendix with the basic model being presented in section 7.3.1 
of the appendix. 
In this model the transfer price is not listed as a 
control variable although it is set by the ~mc. The reason for 
this is that while the control variables involve real quantities 
the transfer price is a financial variable only and is used to 
transfer funds between the two branches of the MNC. When taxes 
are included in the model the transfer price will determine certain 
tax liabilities and certain conditions will result which determine 
the transfer price or which will limit the transfer price to a 
certain range. This is consistent with Horst (1971) where a 
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separate assumption that transfer prices are set so as to minimi:e 
taxes payable was required in order to determine the transfer 
prices. 
7.2 RESULTS OF THE MODEL 
The first results to be presented are a set of equations 
giving conditions involving the marginal revenues in the two 
countries. These are derived in section 7.3.3 of the appendix as 
equations (A17), (AlB), (A2l), (A22) , and (A19), and are given below. 
MR{p (t)}FL (t) = w (t) 1 1 1 (10) 
MR{p (t)}FL (t) = w (t) 2 2 2 ( 11) 
MR{p (t)}FK (t) = q (t){r(t) + 0 q (t)/q (t)} 1 1 1 1 1 1 (12) 
MR{p (t)}FK (t) = q (t){r(t) + 0 - q (t)/q (t)} 2 2 2 2 2 2 (13) 
MR{p (t)} = MR{p (t)} 
1 2 
(14) 
Conditions (10) through (13) state that in each country each factor 
of production is employed up to the point where its marginal revenue 
product just covers its cost. These are fairly standard results 
for a maximizing model to yield. 
These results are similar to some of those obtained in 
some of the comparative static models of the MNC. Horst (1971) 
provides a useful model to compare with as the basic structure of 
the models are similar. Horst, however, had a single term for 
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costs and did not include a production function. His results, 
summarized in chapter five, were that marginal revenue equals 
marginal cost in each country and that the marginal costs for the 
two countries will be equal except for a tax term, and this term 
will vanish if all tax rates are assumed to be zero. The marginal 
revenue/marginal cost conditions correspond to equations (10) to 
(13) where the marginal revenue products of the factors of production 
appear in place of the marginal cost terms. The connection between 
the two countries is expressed in terms of marginal revenues In the 
dynamic model and given the other conditions in the models this lS 
equivalent to the results in terms of marginal costs obtained by Horst. 
The cost of capital term, q(t){r(t) + 0 - q(t)/q(t)} , 
gives the cost of employing the services of one unit of capital stock 
for one time period, or in other words, a flow price of capital. 
The term q(t)r(t) is the interest charged on q(t) for one period, 
• • 
q(t)o is the depreciation charge incurred, and q(t) ·q(t)/q(t) = q(t) lS 
the rise in the price of a unit of capital stock during the course of 
the time period. This term appears with a negative sign since a 
rise in the price of capital stock represents a gain for its o\mer 
and thus offsets the other elements of capital cost. 
The version of the model presented here does not include 
a constraint that gross investment be positive. This allows negative 
investment to take place if it is required in order for condition (14) 
to be met. 
Condition (14), which is due to the inclusion of the term 
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representing exports from country one to country two, states that 
this trade will be used to make the marginal revenue of sales equal 
in the two countries. This equality is due to the lack of any 
taxes and tariffs in the model. This allows the right hand side 
of equation (A19) to equal zero as net) - net) equals zero, which 
it would not do if the positive and negative transfer price terms 
had each been multiplied by different tax or tariff terms. This 
result conforms to those obtained in the static models of the MNC 
that were discussed ln chapter five. It can also be noted that 
due to the omission of all tax terms no condition results that in 
any way limits the choice of transfer price made by the MNC. 
One of the results used in the derivation of the marginal 
conditions shows the net addition to the present value of the firm 
at time zero due to the ~urchase of an additional unit of capital 
stock at time t , assuming- N remains constant. As exports N 
will not always remain constant when investment 1S undertaken this 
pair of conditions must be interpreted and used with care. They 
are derived as (AlS) and (A16) and are given below. 
00 F (s) 




JOO (-R(s)) (-6 (s-t)){ FK2 (s) { o e e 2 z S (s) Q (s) + ~(s)} 
P2 2 2 
(16) 
+ p (s) ~K (s)} ds - q (t)e(-R(t)) = 0 
2 2 2 
These equations will be equal to zero on the optimum path. If the 
value was positive (or negative) the investment in one additional 
(less) unit of capital will increase the net income flow of the MNC. 
It IS also desirable to derive from the model investment 
conditions gIvIng the level of investment in each country as a 
function of the demand and production parameters in both countries 
and to derive a trade condition giving the level of trade as a 
function of the demand and production parameters in both countries. 
This was attempted but no satisfactory results were obtained. Part 
of the reason for this IS the presence of the trade term, N, In the 
demand equation of each country. The equation that should yield a 
value for N, equation (A6) , yields the marginal revenue condition 
gIven in equation (AI9) , but this condition does not include N 
explicitly so can not be solved for N . If the model included 
taxterrns, equation (AI9) would include the transfer price term but 
would still not include N explicitly. 
For each country the demand equation plus the marginal 
revenue product conditions, equations (3), (10) and (12) for 
country one, can give a condition for the level of investment in 
terms of the production and demand parameters of that country and 
the level of trade. Since both the level of investment and the 
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level of trade will change together such a condition is not very 
informative. 
The option of using specific functional forms in the 
equations was considered. In order that any further results be 
attainable an assumption of a constant capital to labour ratio was 
required so that the labour term could be eliminated from the model. 
As the dynamic programing model allows for more freedom of choice 
of functional forms, including the use of a larger number of state 
and control variables, this approach was not pursued here. 
The model developed here can be extended to include 
taxes. The objective function for the MNC, using the tax structure 
described in section 6.3, and the simplifying notation given in the 
appendix, is 
fOOO e(-r(t)){(l_T ){p (t)(Q (t) - N(t))} 
1 1 1 
( 17) 
- (l-T )w (t)L (t) - q (t)I (t) + TT(t)N(t) (l-T ) 
1· 1 1 1 1 1 
+ (1-1" ){p (t)(Q (t) + N(t))} 
2 2 2 
_ (l-T )w (t) L (t) - q (t) I (t) - (l+T )TT(t)~(t) (l-T )} dt 
22 2 2 2 2 2 
In structure the above objective function is identical to equation (5), 
the objective function without tax terms. The constraints imposed 
on this function are the same as those given in equations (6) to (9) 
inclusive. Thus, the same mathematical methods as used to obtain 
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preliminary results in the no tax case can be used to obtain 
corresponding results here. The same problems would arise in 
trying to develop further results. 
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7.3 MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX 
7.3.1 Basic equations of the model 
To solve the model of the MNC as an optimal control 
problem the following Hamiltonian is set up: 
H = e(-R(t)){p {{F {K (t),L (t)} - N(t)}/S (t)}. 
1 1 1 1 1 
{F {K (t),L (t)} - N(t)} - w (t)L (t) - q (t)I (t) 
1111111 
+ Tf(t)N(t) + P {{F {K (t),L (t)} + ~(t)}/S (t)}. 
22222 
{F {K (t),L (t)} + N(t)} - w (t)L (t) - q (t)I (t) 
2222222 
+ Tf(t)N(t)} + AK (t){I (t) - 0 K (t)} 
1 1 1 1 
+ AK (t) {I (t) - 0 K (t)} 
2 2 2 2 
(AI) 
Before proceeding to the necessary conditions the partial 
derivatives of the demand equations should be given. These can be 
obtained by referring back to equation (3), including the export 









z Set) p 
FL(t) 
= z set) p 
1 
= 








To simplify the notation for the rest of the appendix let 
Q(t) = F{K(t),L(t)} 
and 
pet) = P{{F{K(t),L(t)} ± N(t)}/S(t)} 















The necessary conditions give the following: 
e(-R(t)){_ q (t)} + AKI (t) = 0 = 
1 
= e(-R(t)){_ q (t)} 
2 
+ AK2 (t) = 
0 
F (t) 
e(-R(t)){ Ll· {Q (t) - N(t)} + P (t)FL (t) = z S (t) 1 1 1 
PI 1 
W (t)} = 0 
1 
F (t) 
= e(-R(t)){ L2 {Q (t) + N(t)} + P (t)FL (t) z S (t) 2 2 2 
P2 2 
w (t)} = 0 
2 
(-R(t)) 
z ~ (t) {Ql (t) - N(t)} + P (t) (-1) = e I 
PI I 
1 + N(t)} + P (t) (1) + TI(t) + Z S (t){Q2(t) 2 
P2 2 












e(-R(t)){ Kl {Q (t) _ N(t)} + P (t)F (t)} 
z S Ct) 1 1 KI PI 1 





+ AK (t)(-o ) 
2 2 








= dH - ar 
3H - -ar 
2 
1 
The transversality conditions require that 
limA (t)K (t) = 0 t-Ko K 1 1 
and 
limA (t)K (t) = 0 t-Ko K2 2 
7.3.2 Derivation of values for the A'S 
(:\7) 
(AS) 
The adjoint conditions and equations CA7) and (AS) give, 
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= 
+ P (t)FK (t)} 1 1 (A9) 
and 
= 
+ P (t)FK (t)} 2 2 (AIO) 
These can be solved for values of AK(t) . Using a standard formula 
. 1 glves, 
= I 
0 F (t) 
e- - Idt{A + I_e(-R(t)){ Kl {Q (t) _ ~(t)} 
z B (t) 1 
PI 1 
Since 1-0 dt = -0 t this can, omitting the contents of some of 
1 1 
brackets, be restated as, 
= o t{A I (-R(t)){ e 1 +-e (All) 
Multiplying by e-Ol (t) and, from the transversality condition, using 
the condition that as t~ gives, 
}dt 
1. One source for this is Chiang (1974, pp.477-479). 
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where the integral goes from 0 to t and 1S evaluated for the 
upper limit at t = 00 • Representing this by J(oo) and 
substituting the value for A into equation (All) gives, 
= (Al:2) 
Evaluating (AI2) for the upper limit at t glves, 
where J(t) represents the integral evaluated for the upper limit 
at t Combining the integrals into a single integral with the 




00 F (s) 
eOlt(-l)J _e(-R(t)) e(-O (s)){ Kl {Q (s) t 1 Z S (s) 1 
PI 1 




Cancelling the minus terms that are inside and outside the integral 













By similar reasoning as used to get from CA9) to CAl3), from CAIO) 
we obtain, 
00 
= (-0 (s-t)) 
e 2 
Substituting (Al3) and (Al4) into (A2) and (A3) and rearranging so 
that all the terms are on one side gives, 
and 
Joo (-R(s)) (-0 (s-t)){ } ds - q (t)e(-RCt)) t e e 1 
1 
00 
J (-R(s)) e 
t 
(-0 (s-t)){ e 2 } ds - q2(t)e C-R(t)) 
7.3.3 Derivation of the marginal revenue conditions 
Recall that 
FLI (t) 
z 6 (t) 
PI 1 
3p 






F = L 
3F{K(t),L(t)} 
3L(t) 
and that MR 
3p = P + Q3Q where MR IS marginal 








P (t)FL (t) + dQ1 dL




+ dQl Ql(t)} FLI (t) 
1 
= 






MR{P (t)}FL (t) = w (t) 1 1 1 (.-u -;) 
Similar reasoning from (AS) glves, 
MR{P (t)}F L (t) = w (t) 222 
(A1S) 
Starting with equation (A6) and using the above notation 
gives, 
e(-R(t)){ 1 Q (t) _ P (t) + rr(t)} 
z S (t) 1 1 
PI 1 
+ e(-R(t)){ 1 Q2(t) + P2 (t) ~ rr(t)} = 0 z S (t) 
P2 2 
which rearranges to 
ap ap 
~ _ P + _2 Q +.p = (rr(t) - rr(t)) 





1 3Q aN 2 2 
2 
Q (t) = F {K (t),L (t)} - N(t) 
1· 1 1 1 
and that 






= -1 and 
3Q 





lQ _p +_2Q +P 




MR{P (t)} + MR{P (t)} = 0 
1 2 C-\19) 
From equations (AlS) and (A16) two additional conditions 
can be obtained. Starting with (AlS) and taking its time derivation 
gives, 
00 
S f (-R(t)) (-8 (s-t)){ 
u
1 
t e e 1 } ds 
F (t) 
+ e(-R(t)){ Kl (Q (t) - N(t)} + P (t)F
K 
(t)} 
z S (t) 1 1 1 
PI 1 
+ r(t)q (t)e(-R(t)) 
1 
q (t)e(-R(t)) = 0 
1 
Substituting in for the integral from a rearranged (AlS) gives, 
} 
+ r(t)q (t)e(-R(t)) 
1 
q (t)e(-R(t)) = 0 
1 
Cancelling the e (-R(t)) terms and rearranging gives, 
FK (t) 
z B (t) {QI (t) - N(t)} + PI (t) FKI (t) 
PI 1 




By the same reasoning as used to get from (A4) to (Ali), (A20) can 
be reduced to, 
= q (t){r(t) + 0 - q (t)/q (t)} 
111 1 
(,-\21) 
By identical reasoning equation (AI6) will yield, 
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Chapter Eight 
THE A N A L Y TIC S 0 F THE 
PRO G RAM MIN G MOD E L 
D Y N A M I C 
Dynamic programming-is a mathematical technique for 
finding the optimum of a system, where the system is described 
by a set of mathematical relationships. There are a number of 
types of problems that it can be used to consider. Here it is 
used to find a maxlffium for a discrete multistage decision process 
problem, where each decision is associated with a value by some 
rule. The system is the set of equations and conditions used to 
describe the MNC. The decision process involves selecting levels 
of investment, labour usage, and trade between the two countries. 
The value is the present value of the profit stream of the MNC. 
It is a discrete problem as the decisions are made once for each 
time period (conveniently regarded as years). 
Dynamic programming..solves the optimization problem 
numerically. In this it differs from optimal control theory where 
the problem is solved analytically. There are a number of ways 
in which a dynamic progranuniTIK;prcibl-em can be set up. The specific 
program used is described in the first section of the chapter and 
the equations of the model of the MNC are specified in the second 
section. 
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There are two types of problems that can be 
considered. In the first, the original problem has numberical 
values associated with it, such as trying to solve a specific 
engineering problem involved in the production of some good. In 
the second, the original problem is a general class of problem 
without specific numerical values where illustrative results covering 
a range of possible values are desired. The latter case is the 
one considered here. The range and choice of values used and 
the reasons for this choice are given in section 3 of the chapter. 
The final section of the chapter gives a listing 
of the specific computer program used and also gives a sample of 
the output it produced. 
8.1 STRUCTURE OF THE DYNAMIC MODEL 
The dynamic program is used to find an ~ptimum time 
path for a MNC to follow, where this time path is specified in terms 
of the levels of capital stocks, investment, labour usage, and 
trade chosen by the MNC. The MNC is described in Chapter Six 
and is specified by the equations given in the next section of 
this chapter. The optimal time path is defined as that which 
maximizes the present value of the MNC's profit stream over time. 
As explained in Chapter Six, the capital stocks are state variables 
and the other variables listed above are control variables. 
The specific dynamic program used here involves a 
grid search technique, where this search is over the relevant values 
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of the variables that can be chosen by the MNC and across all of 
the time periods included ln the model. Given the way the 
program was set up it was possible to calculate the level of 
trade rather than find its value by a search technique. 
explained in the next section. 
This 1S 
The grid search works by calculating, for each 
combination of capital stocks in countries I and 2, the levels of 
the control variables that result in the maximum present value. 
To find the maximum present value a calculation for each possible 
combination of the control variables is done. The present value 
of the first calculation is stored, along with the values of the 
control variables. The present value of each subsequent calcu-
lation is compared to the stored value and if it is higher the 
full set of stored values is replaced. When all the calculations 
are completed the values stored are the maximum present value and 
the associated values of the control variables. As explained later 
in this section, this calculation was broken into two parts 1n 
order to reduce the total number of calculations required. 
the calculation works backward through the time periods. 
Also, 
The variables for which a search technique was applied 
all have a lower bound of zero. Thus, the range of values used 
started at zero. These variables have no fixed upper value. The 
demand function parameters of the model, by limiting the possible 
sales of the MNC's product, restrict the range that must be 
considered. The largest value used in the search much exceed the 
largest corresponding value appearing In the results. A check 
of the output is sufficient to show if this is the case. When 
it IS not, the program is re-run using the same parameter set 
but a larger range for the search. 
While the variables can change by unit increments it 
is not necessary to use all possible values in the search. A 
limited number of points along the range of values can be used with 
interpolation being used to allow for the in between values. The 
number of points used in the search must be sufficient so that the 
results from any particular set of parameters will be stable if 
the choice of points used is altered, provided both sets of points 
meet the other requirements specified here. To allow for a 
standardized and reasonably simple interpolation procedure to be 
used over the full range searched, it was necessary for the points 
searched for each variable t.o be at evenly spaced intervals. For 
the results to be stable it was found that the value of the first 
non-zero point used could not be too much larger than the lowest 
value used in the results. When this value was zero the use of a 
smaller grid size could be tried and a check of results using 
similar parameters and of the results of the static models discussed 
in Chapter Five helped decide how small the points searched should 
be. 
Re-running the program with different numbers of 
points included in the search indicated that using 10 points for 
each capital stock and investment variable and 20 points for each 
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labour usage variable gave satisfactory results. For some cases 
however, 15 points were used for each investment variable. 
Increasing the number of points used increases the computer time 
required to run the program. 
In the actual computer program the number of 
increments was specified by a variable defined in the program and 
the size of the increments were read in as data by the program. 
Thus it was easy to change the size of the increments used and to 
change the number of points used, as it was only necessary to 
change the specification of a variable and the size of one or two 
arrays. From the information provided the program calculated the 
points to be searched. 
It is possible to carry out the search procedure 
across all time periods while only requiring data from two time 
periods at any point in the calculation. To do this the program 
works backwards through the time periods and for the later of the 
two time periods considered at any point requires a value representing 
the present value for the operations of the MNC in later periods. 
This is required for each combination of capital stocks in countries 
1 and 2 that is used as a search point. To start the process a 
set of present value figures for the final time period is used. 
These can be arbitrary and can be entered as data, but in the 
program used are calculated at an intermediate step. These values 
will effect the time path for the final few periods, but the number 
of periods used is sufficient to allow for this. 
216 
The values calculated in this process are stored 
ln an array, where this array stores values for each combination 
of the two state variables, the capital stocks. The values 
stored are the levels of the control variables, investment, 
labour usage, and trade. The present value resulting from the 
calculation is also stored in the array. 
Once the calculation has been completed for all 
periods the optimal path for the MNC is traced out starting from 
the initial capital stocks put in as parameters. The level of 
gross investment, combined with depreciation glve the capital 
stock in the next period. By interpolating from the stored 
values in the array the levels of labour usage and trade associated 
with these capital stocks and the levels of investment can be 
determined, tracing a path through until the final period is 
reached. When this path is. printed out the prices and quantities, 
which were calculated but not stored are re-calculated and also 
listed. 
A number of features have been used in the program 
ln order to reduce the total amount of calculation involved. The 
calculation of the optimum can, for this problem, be divided into 
two stages. For each time period, for each combination of the 
two capital stocks, the levels of labour usage and trade can be 
determined independently of the levels of investment. The first 
set of variables is sufficient to determine the quantities produced, 
quantities sold, prices, and labour costs for each time period. 
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The levels of investment determine the capital stocks available 
for the next period. 
For each possible capital stock combination that a 
firm can have in a period the best it can do is to maximize its 
net operating income, income less operating costs, ln that period. 
This involves decisions concerning only the first set of the above 
mentioned variables. This decision will remain the same as long 
as the parameters of the problem remain the same. Thus, this 
first calculation does not need to be done for each time period but 
only for each set of parameters used in the model. 
The program allows for two sets of parameter values. 
The parameter values to be used are read into two valued arrays 
and the results array has a similar two valued direction. The 
calculation specified above is done twice with an index variable 
controlling the parameter set used and the part of the results array 
used. In the calculation across time periods a similar index 
variable is used to control the parameter set and set of initial 
results used. The period at which the parameter set should be 
changed is specified in the input. When the calculation is done 
for each time period a test is done to determine whether the first 
or second parameter set is to be used and the index variable set 
accordingly. A similar procedure is used when the optimal time 
path is set out. 
The choice of the levels of investment, and the 
determination of the optimum levels of capital stock, involves a 
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comparison across the present value of the profits associated 
with each future attainable capital stock position. The search 
procedure, by working backward through time, requires data from 
only two time periods at any point in the calculation. This 
calculation required present value figures for the latter time 
period. Thus, to start the calculation process present value 
figures for each combination of capital stocks in the final time 
period must be entered as data. The values used, instead of 
being assumed, were obtained from the calculation of the net 
operating income described above, using the results for the para-
meters set applicable to the final time period. To obtain a 
present value for each capital stock combination the corresponding 
net operating lncome was reduced by the investment expenditure 
required to maintain the levels of capital stock by replacing 
depreciation. This calcula~ion provides reasonable values for any 
parameter set used with the program, thus avoiding the ~eed to 
change a set of assumed values when the parameter set is changed. 
In the main calculation a present value must be 
found for each capital stock combination in the earlier period. 
To do this each combination of levels of investment is used to find 
a capital stock position in the next period and to calculate a profit 
for the present period by reducing the net operating income by the 
level of inv~stment expenditure. The present value of the latter 
period is discounted for one period and added to the profit figure 
to obtain a present value for the earlier period. A comparison 
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across these, using the procedure described above, is used to 
find the maximum present value for each capital stock combination. 
This procedure is used, as described above, to work backwards 
through the time periods, after which the optimal path is determined 
and printed out. 
8.2 MODEL USED 
This section specifies the mathematical form of 
the model used, including the equations used and the methods used 
to include the constraints on the level of investment. The order 
in which the equations are specified is different from that used 
1n Chapter Seven. When the equations are stated subscripts of 
"1" and "2" are used to designate the two countries, and a 
subscript of 1 is used when an equation has an identical form 





The first equation considered is the production 
This is of the Cobb-Douglas form, 
a.. S. 
A lL. 1 . K. 111 
where the form is identical 1n both countries but the values of 







quantity produced in country i, represented in the 
program by Qi. 
the scale factor, represented in the program by 
SCALEi. 
the capital stock of the MNC in country 1, 
represented in the program by Ki · 
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the exponent on the capital stock, represented In 
the program by EXPKi. 
the quantity of labour used by the ~mc In country 1, 
represented in the program by L .. 
I 
the exponent on the quantity of labour, represented 
in the program by EXPLi. 
Since production takes place In each time period 
all the variables and parameters in the above equation can also 
have a time subscript although the values assigned to them may 
be constant or change only once over all time periods. This 
holds true for many of the other equations as well. The previous 
section of the chapter described how the dynamic program was 
arranged to allow for multiple time periods while at the same 
time minimizing multiple calculations of any equation. 
where 
The demand functions are specified as follows: 
P = a -b (Q -N) 
111 1 








= the price charged by the ~wc for its product in 
country i, represented in the program by Pi' 
= the price intercept of the linear demand curve in 
country i and is the price when the quantity sold 
equals zero. It is represented in the program by 
SIZEi. 
= the slope of the demand curve in country i and 
gives the numerical price change for a uni~ incr~ase 
in quantity. b. is positive since there.ls a mInus 
sign in front of lit. It is represented In the program 
by DECLi. 
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N = the quantity of the MNC's product traded between 
the two countries represented in the program by ~. 
When N is positive trade is from I to 2 and when 
N is negative trade is from 2 to 2. 
The terms (Q -N) and (Q +N) are included because the quantity 
1 2 
produced, adjusted by the amount traded, gives the quantity sold 
ln each country. As the sign of N changes when the direction 
of trade changes these two terms are independent of the direction 
of trade. 
It is useful to distinguish between the firm's 
operations ln one period and its operations over all time periods. 
In each time period the firm can use the capital stock it has at 
the start of that period with any quantity of labour to produce 
an output which it will sell in that period. Any investment will 







The equation for the capital stock is 
investment in country 1 ln period t, represented 
in the program by Ii. 
= rate of depreciation in country i in period t, 
represented in the program by DEPi. 
An equation for the MNC's net operating income, l.e. 




(l-T ) (P e(Q -N) - W L + TIN) 
11111 
+ (l-T )(P e(Q +N) - W L - (I+T )TIN) 
22222 2 
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where N > 0 and trade is from country 1 to country 2 and IS 
NR = (l-T )(P e(Q -N) - W L + (l+T )TIN) 
11111 1 
+ (l-T ) (P e (Q +N) - w L - TIN) 
22222 
where N < 0 and trade is from country 2 to country 1. The 
difference between the two equations is the inclusion of either T 
2 
or T , the tariff on imports, and depends on the direction of trade. 
1 
Because the sign of N changes when the direction of trade changes 
no other changes are required. The additional variables are 









the rate of tax on profits in country i as defined 
in section 6.3, represented in the program as TAXi. 
the annual wage rate in country i, represented in 
the program as WAGEi. 
= the transfer price set by the MNC on the good it 
trades, represented in the program as TPRICE. 
= the tariff rate·on imports in country i, represented 
in the program as TARIFFi. 
This equation IS used in the dynamic program to 
determine the levels of labour and trade, and thus prices and 
quantities sold also, that will be used with each combination of 
capital stock considered. A grid search method is used to find 
the two levels of labour utilized but the level of trade can be 
calculated using partial derivaties of the equation for the net 
, 
operating income. The partial derivatives are obtained by 
substituting the demand and production equations into the NR 
equations. 
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for N > 0 
2b N + 'IT) 
1 
+ (l-T )(a - 2b Q - 2b N - (l+T )'IT) 
2 2 2 2 2 2 
and for N < 0 
+ (l-T ) (a - 2b Q - 2b N - 'IT) 
2 2 222 
At a maximum these will be equal to zero and can be re-arranged 
to glve the following equations for N. For N > 0 
N = {(l-T ) (-a + 2b Q + 'IT) 
1 1 1 1 
+ (l-T )(a - 2b Q - (l+T )'IT)} 
2 2 222 
/{(l-T )2b + (l-T )2b } 
1 1 2 2 
and for N < 0 
N = {(l-T )(-a + 2b Q + (l+T )'IT) 
1 1 1 1 1 
+ (l-T ) (a - 2b Q - 'IT)} 
2 2 2 2 
/{(l-T )2b + (l-T )2b } 
1 1 2 2 
Given the way the dynamic program is arranged the quantities 
produced, and Q
1 
' are calculated before N is calculated 
so the above equation can be used in the program. 
In some cases the first calculation will yield a 
value of N that is negative and the second a value that is 
22.+ 
positive. In these cases N IS set equal to zero. When 
either calculation results In an N of the wrong sign it is 
treating the tariff as a subsidy and not as a tax. When both 
equations yield values with the wrong sign it indicates that 
trade in either direction will not improve the profit of the 
MNC and thus a position of no trade is best for the ~mc. 
In the dynamic program the net operating income IS 
calculated after the trade term is calculated. The appropriate 
values are stored by the program. In the remainder of the 
program, single calculations can be used for the variables 
calculated. This occurs because the effect of the difference in 
the treatment of the tariff terms is included in the values 
calculated and the tariff terms do not appear directly in any of 
the calculations used later in the program. 
The next step is to consider levels of investment. 
This involves examining the operations of the MNC across the time 
periods included in the program. To this end, values for all 
possible combinations of capital stock in countries I and 2 
are calculated. 
As discussed in the prevIous section the dynamic 
program requires the input of a set of values to represent the 
present value of operations beyond the final time period considered. 
This can be arbitrary and in the final periods the program will 
show the MNC adjusting to this set of values. In order to keep 
this number of periods small and to avoid having to enter a new 
set of values for each program run with different parameter values 
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the calculation described in the previous section was used to 
produce the required set of values. The equation used is 
Final Value = NR - K 0 ql K 0 2 q2 1 1 2 
In calculating this value there is no need to make fine 
adjustments, so possibly more involved calculations were not 
considered. 
The next stage in the dynamic program is the 
calculation of a cost of capital term that includes the tax 
variables as specified in section 6.3 of the thesis. The specific 
equation used is 
where 









= the effective price of capital goods in country i 
= 
= 
as defined 1n section 6.3, represented in the program 
as PKi 
the price of capital goods 1n country 1, represented 
in the program as PCAPi 
the direct investment grant 1n country i, as defined 
in section 6.3, represented in the program as GRANTi 
= the rate of depreciation allowed for tax purposes, as 
defined in section 6.3, represented in the program as 
DEPTAXi 
= the rate of interest or discount rate, represented 
in the program as R 
= the term expressing tax on interest income as a 
proportion of the profit tax rate, as specified i~ 
section 6.3, represented in the program as PA~ITI1 
Next a profit value is calculated that takes account of the 
investments made in each country. The equation used is, 
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Profit = NR - q.1 
1 1 
Then a present value figure is determined. This 
involves adding current profit to a present value of all future 
profits. The figure available from the program 1S a present 
value figure for the next year which includes in it the profits of 
all later years already discounted back to that year. Therefore 
it is sufficient to discount the total figure back for one more 
year to obtain the appropriate amount. Thus, the equation used is, 
PVCt) = Profit + CPVCt+l)jCI+r) 
Straight line interpolation is used to find values 
between the points stored in the array. Although the total curve 
1S not linear, enough points are used so that a linear interpolation 
is satisfactory. The interpolation is used in the calculation going 
backward through the time periods and in tracing out the optimal 
path. 
Two types of constraints on the level of investment 
were also considered. These were incorporated by modifying the 
program and three versions of the program were produced. The 
investment constraints were designed to limit the investment in 
any time period to the net operating income of that period. One 
constraint imposed a penalty that was equal to some proportion of 
the amount by which the investment exceeded the net operating 
1ncome. The equation used was 
Profit = CI+PENALTY)· Profit 
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It was only used if a test in the program showed profit for a 
specific period to be negative. With this equation a penalty 
value of zero is the same as the no penalty case. 
The second constraint was an absolute constraint 
that did not allow the level of investment to exceed the net 
operating income. This constraint was incorporated in the 
program by a test on the profit variable. If its value was 
negative the levels of investment and resulting present value were 
not stored in the array of results and the previous value was left. 
If all values of investment exceed the constraint this would result 
in unassigned values and would indicate that the same parameters 
should be used with a smaller grid size. 
8.3 CHOICE OF PARAMETER VALUES 
As discussed ln section 8.1, the dynamic program 
requires numerical parameter values, and the problem considered here 
is of the type where illustrative results are to be obtained. In 
particular the results are to be illustrative of the type of re-
spQI1ses or time path that an MNC may follow in a given set of 
circumstances. To this end a range of values for individual 
parameters is used in each type of situation considered, instead 
of using a single value based on some empirical estimate. 
The results of the static models discussed in 
Chapter Five indicate some of the cases that should be considered 
in the dynamic model, where these cases are defined in terms of 
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sets of parameter values. One of these cases 1S one 1n which 
returns to scale depend on the values glven to the parameters 
of the production function. For the various cases the effect 
of variations in other parameter values, such as variations 1n 
tax or tariff rates for a given production function, can be 
considered. Chapter Five also indicated cases where the difference 
in the rate of profit tax in the two countries, when compared to 
the tariff, could be important. The two types of variations 1n 
parameter values, the use of a different value for all time periods 
or a change in the value at period 20, and the use of each type 
were discussed in section I of this chapter. 
The choice of values used and any range of variation 
for those values depends on a number of considerations. One is 
the existence of any limit on the range of permissible values, 
such as the limits on the transfer prices discussed in Chapter Five. 
Another is to have a substantial overall range of variation while 
having close variation around any point that may be an important 
change. Such a point is the change from decreasing, to constant, 
to increasing returns to scale in production. 
The choice of functional forms for the production 
functions and demand functio~s were specified 1n section 6.2. The 
production function has three parameters, A, a, and S. The 
parameter A is a scale factor and changes in it can represent 
changes in the units of measurement for output, provided the other 
parameter values concerned with the same units are also changed. 
If the other values are not changed, changes in A represent 
229 
changes 1n the amount of output that can be obtained for any glven 
input. The choice of A 1S arbitrary and adjusting its value 
while holding other parameter values constant can be used to obtain 
results that illustrate specific points. Increasing the differ-
ence 1n the A terms in the two countries can be used to increase 
the level of trade so that the effect of parameter variations that 
effect the level of trade is clearer. Decreasing both A terms 
can reduce the level of profits in order to obtain cases where 
the effect of the investment constraint will be more pronounced. 
This use of the A terms will be mentioned further when the 
results are discussed, and its value is specified when the results 
are glven. 
The choice of values used for the a and S terms 
determine the returns to scale in production. Douglas (1948) 
provided estimates that can pe used as stylized facts in choosing 
parameter values. A value of a that was one half that of S 
appeared reasonable, with slight decreasing returns to scale. This 
ratio of a and S values was used as a starting point for all 
three types of returns to scale, but variations in this ratio were 
also considered. The values used are specified when the results 
are given in Chapter Nine. For decreasing returns to scale the 
starting point and most common set of values is a = 0.35 and 
S = 0.65. 
Douglas (1948) was a survey of empirical work and 
serves to illustrate, in principle at least, how the model presented 
here could be combined with empirical work. 
230 
Associated with the production function are 
parameters giving the wage rate or cost of labour and the cost 
of capital. Since labour usage is measured in man years a 
cost that can be interpreted as an annual wage or salary is 
required. Thus a value that varies around 5000 was used. 
Capital is measured in pounds sterling. In order to keep the 
resulting numbers reasonable it was decided to use units of 
1000 and thus the cost of capital is 1000. This could be 
. changed to individual units by making a corresponding adjustment 
to the scale term, A and the results of the program would be 
identical. 
The depreciation function used in the model is a 
simple exponential rate of decay of the capital stock, as discussed 
in section 6.2. The rates used here were 10 and 20 per cent. 
These were not given major consideration in the results produced 
here and were always made the same in both countries. Depreci-
ation varies more across industries than it does across countries 
within a single firm so was not considered to be one of the main 
items to be studied here. 
The demand function has two parameters, a and b, 
intercept and slope. The choice of values for these is arbitrary_ 
In conjunction with the other parameter values they can be varied 
so that the results illustrate the points being considered. They 
must be large enough so that it is profitable for the MNC to sell 
its product in both markets. When the investment constraint is 
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considered they must also be small enough that the constraint 
will have some effect. In addition, the market in country 2 
was usually smaller than the market in country 1. This is to 
reflect the fact that for most MNC's the host market is smaller 
than the home country market. .This involves an implicit assump-
tion that country 1 is the home country. This will be further 
considered when the results are discussed. 
When the results were run the slope term was 
usually held constant and had values of 0.2 or 0.3. Changes ln 
the value of the intercept term were used to change the market 
size. The values used are specified when the results are given 
but were usually somewhere between 2000 and 4000. 
The rates of profit tax used in different countries 
cover a wide range and the details of the tax calculations can 
differ substantially between. countries. 1 The work here is not 
concerned with considering tax havens that have very low rates of 
tax. It is more concerned with investments in industrialized 
countries. As a starting point a tax rate of SO per cent was used. 
Variations above and below this are considered and are used when 
the tax rates in the two countries are unequal. The rates used 
are specified when the results are given. 
Tariffs cover a very wide range depending on the 
product imported, and on the country from which it is exported and 
1. For one survey of actual tax rates and structures see 
Ropits (1976, pp.633-64l). 
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to which it is imported. A range of tariff values was considered 
including a value of zero and going as high as 60 per cent. For 
much of the work a value of 30 per cent was used. 
The depreciation rate allowed for tax purposes was 
kept equal to the actual depreciation as specified by another 
parameter. The use of accelerated depreciation as a tax measure 
was not considered. Also, the use of the investment grant as a 
government policy measure was not considered. These could be 
used to consider possible policies designed to encourage investment 
ln a host country. This is not done here but the possibility is 
discussed in section 9.4 where possible extensions to and uses of 
the model are considered. 
The provision in the model for a different tax on 
interest income than on ordinary profits was not used. The model 
presented here does not include financial variables and does not 
allow for the use of intra-firm debt by the MNC. It is only when 
such variables are included that the use of this tax difference 
could be expected to yield interesting results. 
The discount rate was assigned a value of 10 per cent 
and this was used for all of the results presented. The discount 
rate is a financial variable and financial questions have not been 
a concern of this thesis. Thus, the effects of varying the 
discount rate, or of having it change at an intermediate period, 
were not explored here. 
The choice of value for the transfer price depends 
on the limits on it discussed in section 6.3. One limit can be 
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obtained by looking at the prices given as part of the output 
of the program. The other limit was approximated by calculating 
the average cost of production ln the exporting country. The 
value used most frequently for the transfer price was 1000. The 
main variations used were 750, 1250 and 1500, with other values 
considered if necessary. 
When the penalty investment constraint is used 
values for the penalty are required. A value of zero is the 
same as no constraint and a sufficiently high value will have the 
same effect as the absolute constraint. The values used are 
specified with the results and were from 10 to 40 per cent. 
8.4 LISTING OF PROGRAM AND Sfu~PLE RESULTS 
This section includes a listing of the computer 
program used for the dynamic programming model described in this 
chapter, and presents one set of results produced by it. The 
program listing is for the case where there is a penalty constraint 
on the level of investment. The changes needed for "no constraint" 
and for the "absolute constraint" are specified below. The no 
constraint case can also be achieved by using a penalty of zero. 
The results are for the full time path with decreasing returns to 
scale in production discussed in Chapter Nine and in Graph 9.1. 
To have a program for the no constraint case, line 180 
In the program, which imposes the constraint, is removed. 
absolute constraint case line 180 should read, 
IF(PROFIT.LT.O) GO TO 11 
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For the 
As a penalty value is not required the references to it in the 
program can be removed. To do this the phrase ", PE~ALTY" 
should be removed from lines 4S and S9, which read in and print 
out the appropriate line of the input file, and from line 15, 
which defines the parameters. Line 6S can also have ",IX,F4.l" 
removed, as the format statement no longer has to allow for the 
penalty term. The program defines the parameters and variables 
it uses as real variables and uses double precision arithmetic. 
The exceptions to this are the integer variables used to control 
the running of the program and those used in the interpolation 
process. 
A set of results produced by the program is given 
after the program listing. These are usually printed on 
continuous folded computer paper, and are divided into sections 
by printed headings. Here ~he results have been spread over a 
number of pages, with some sections being spread over two pages. 
In particular, the output of the optimal time path has been 
divided into two parts with its column headings repeated. 
Normally it appears as one section without these headings being 
repeated. 
The first section of the results "parameter values 
read in", prints out the parameter values used, in the same format 
as the input file from which they are read. This allows the runs 
to be distinguished after they are produced without any further 
notes being required. In the file, lines one and two give the 
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first set of parameter values for countries 1 and 2 respectively 
and lines three and four give the second parameter set for 
countries 1 and 2 respectively. The order is the same in each 
line and is as follows: the production function parameters, 
scale, capital exponent, and labour exponent; the demand 
function parameters, intercept and slope; the wage rate; the 
price of capital goods; the depreciation rate; and the tax 
parameters, the profit tax rate, the tariff, the depreciation 
rate allowed for tax purposes, the investment grant, and any 
differential tax rate on interest income. Line five lists the 
increments used for the grid search, giving values for country 1 
and country 2 for the capital stock, labour usage, and investment. 
Line six gives the discount rate, the initial capital stocks in 
countries 1 and 2, and the transfer price. Line seven gives 
the period in which the change is made from the first to the 
second parameter set and the penalty used in the investment 
constraint. 
The next section of the results "Maximum Net 
Revenue Values and Associated Values of Ll, L2 and N" lists 
the results of the intermediate calculation. There are two sets 
of these results, one for each set of parameter values. Each 
set of results consists of four sets of ten by ten values, 
giving the net revenue, level of labour usage in countries 1 and ~, 
and level of trade for each combination of values of the capital 
stocks used in the grid search. The value of the capital stock 
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for country 1 increases across the rows and the value for 
country 2 decreases down the colurns. This arrangement also 
holds for the next section of the results, which gives the 
present values used for the final time period. 
The final section gives the values for the optimal 
time path for the MNC to follow. In the headings the numbers "1" 
and "2" refer to countries. From left to right these are, the 
time period, the capital stock, the present value, the level of 
labour usage, the level of gross investment, the level of trade, 
and the price and quantity. 
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TRANSFER PRICE - IS A PARAMETER 
PARAMETER CHANGES - ONE SET ALLOWED FOR 
CALL EMASFC('SETMODE',7,'W=132~,5) 
SPECIFY VARIABLE TYPES 
7 REA L :1: 8 seA L E 1 (2 ) , EX P ~n ( 2) , E X P L1 (2) ,S I Z E 1 (2) ~ It E C l1 (2 ;. . WAG E 1 ( 2 ) , 















REAU:8 SCALE2(2) ,EXPK2(2) ,EXPL2(2) ~:3IZE2(2) ,DECL~(2) .WAGE2(2), 
1 P C A F' 2 ( 2) , D E F' 2 ( 2 ) , T A X 2 ( 2 ) , T A F: IFF 2 ( 2 ;. • D E F' T A ,<2 ( 2 ) ! G R A riT 2 U ) . 
PARMT2(2) 
REA L * 8 r( 1 ( 1 0 ) , r{ 2 ( 1 0 ) , L 1 ( 2 \1 ) , L 2 ( 20) , I 1 ( 1 ~ ) , 12 ( 1 0' 1 ri R • 
1 01 ,Q2,P1 ,P2,ri,R,AK1 ,AK2,NRA(10,10,4,2).Nl,N2.:0'k.IC::: 
REAL*8 MAXV(40,1~,lG,6),PROFIT,VALUE,PENALTY 
REAL*8 K10,K20,K1T,K2T,PKl ,PK2 
REA L ./: 8 INC K 1 , INC K 2 , INC L 1 , INC L 2 , INC I 1 , INC I 2 
INTEGER KMAX,LMAX,IMAX,TI,TIFINAL,TIPC 
SPECIFY REFERENCE VARIABLES FOR INTEROLATION PROCESS 
REA~*8 REF1A,REF2A,Vl ,V2,V3,W(6) ,WI (.~) ,1~2(6) 
INTEGER REF1B,REF1C,REF2B,REF2C 






28 114 FORMAT('l/) 
29 WRITE(6,115) 
30 WRITE(6,116) 
31 115 FORMAT(6X,/DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING MNC MODEL') 
32 116 FORMAT(6X,/PENALTY INVESTMENT CONSTRAINT') 
33 C 












REA D ( 1 , 1 ~ 2 ) S CAL E 1 (.J 1 ) ,E X P ~{1 (J 1 ) , E X P L1 ( .J 1 ) pSI Z E 1 (j 1 ) , DEC L 1 ( J 1 ) , 
1 WAG E 1 ( J 1 ) , PC A P 1 ( J 1 ) , II E P 1 (J 1 ) , T A X 1 ( J 1 ) , TAR IFF 1 (.J 1 ) , Ii E F' T A X 1 (J 1 ) 
1 ,GRANTl (Jl) ,PARMTl (Jl) 
READ( 1, H~2)SCALE2(jl) ,EXP~(2(Jl) ,EXPL2('Jl) ,SIZE2('Jl) ,DECL2(J1) 
1 ,WAGE2(Jl) ,PCAP2('Jl) ,DEP2(J1), TAX2(J1), TARIFF2(Jl) ,DEF'T;;\~(Jl), 
1 GRANT2(Jl) ,PARMT2(Jl) 
21 CONTINUE 
C READ IN INCREMENT SIZES FOR THE GRID 
READ(l ~103)INCKl ~INCK2,INCLl .INCL2,INCll ~INCI2 
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49 C WRITE BACK VALUES READ IN 
5~ WRITE(6,101) 
51 D022.J1=1.2 
52 W R I T E ( 6 , 1 02 ) seA L E 1 (.J 1 ) , EX P ~~ 1 ( .j 1 ;. , EX P L 1 (.J 1 ) , S I Z E 1 (.J 1 ) , [! E C ~ 1 ( j 1 ) • 
53 1 'WA GEl ( J 1 ) , F' CAP 1 ( J 1 ) , DE F' 1 ( .J 1 ) , TAX 1 (J 1 ) , TAR IFF 1 ( J 1 " , II E F' T HI, 1 (J 1 ) , 
54 1 GRANT1(.J1),F'ARMT1(J1) 
5 5 \J R I T E ( 6 , 1 0 2 ) S CAL E 2 ( J 1 ) • E X P K 2 ( J 1 ) , E X P L 2 (.J 1 ) , SIZE 2 (J 1 ) , ~i EeL 2 (.J 1 ) • 
5 6 1 \J AGE 2 ( J 1 ) , P C A F' 2 ( J 1 ) , II E P 2 ( J 1 ) , T A X 2 ( J 1 ) , T A F:I F F 2 (J 1 ) , D E t' T A X 2 ( j 1 ) • 
57 1 GRANT2(Jl),PARMT2(Jl) 
58 22 CONTINUE 
59 W R I T E ( 6 , 1 g 3 ) INC t~ 1 ! I N U( 2 , INC L1 , INC '-2 , H! ell , INC 12 
60 WRITE(6,104)R,K10,K20,TF'RICE 
61 WRITE<6, 113)TIPC,F'EN.I~LT"( 
62 101 FORMAT(/ ~,5X,/PARAMETER VALUES RE~D IN/) 
63 102 FORMAT(lX,F4.1 ,lX,2(F3.2,lX),F5.0,lX,F2.1, 
'4 1 1X ~(F~ a lX) ~~ 1 1v =~ ~ lX F4 ~ l v -~ 1 ~(lV F~ 1)\ o ,.:.. ... J.'!!, . ,1".:.. , ('.,' .j • ..:.., , • .:., 1'1,1-.:.. ,~ 1'1 • . ..J. , 
65 103 FORMAT(6(lX,F5.0» 
66 104 FORMAT(lX,F3.2,2(lX,F6.0),lX,F5.0) 





CONSTRUCT ARRAYS FOR THE GRID 
[101 Jl=l,KMAX 
~(1 ( J 1 ) = INC K 1 :t:( .j 1 - 1 :. 
72 [102 J2=1,KMAX 
73 2 K2 (J2) = INCr~2* (.J2-1 r 
74 [103 J3=1,LMAX 
75 3 L1<J3)=INCL1:t.(J3-1) 
76 [104 J4=1,LMAX 
77 4 L2(J4)=INCL2*(J4-1) 
78 [105 .J5=1 ,IMI~X 
79 5I1(J5)=INCI1:t:(J5-1) 






CALCULATION TO FIND THE MAXIMUM OPERATING NET 
REVENUE FOR EACH COMBINATION OF CAPITAL IN 








CONTROL FOR CAPITAL STOCK 1 AND CALCULATE AKl 
D023 Ja=1,2 
D07 Jl=l ,KHAX 
At'l=SCALEl (J8):t:Kl (,)1 )**EXPK1 (.j8) 
CONTROL FOR CAPITAL STOCK 2 AND CALCULATE AK2 





















SET INITIAL VALUES OF THE NET REVENUE ARRAY 
NRA(J1 ,J2, 1 ,.J8)=-1 fH:*6 
CONTROL FOR LABOUR USED IN 1 AND CALCULATE QUANTITY 
PRODUCED IN COUNTRY 1 
D07 J3=1,LMAX 
(11 =At( 1 *L1 (.J3) :r.:t:EXPLl (8) 
CONTROL FOR LABOUR USED IN 2 AND CALCULATE QUANTITI 
PRODUCED IN COUNTRY 2 
D07 .J4=1,LMAl 
Q2=AK2*L2(J4)**Expt2(Ja) 
CALCULATE OPTIMUM TRADE BETWEEN THE TWO PARTS OF 
THE FIRM AND IMPOSE CONSTRAINTS 
CALCULATION DEPENDS ON THE SIGN OF N 
N 1 = ( 1 - T A X 1 (J 8 ) ) :+: ( - S I Z E 1 ( J 8) + 2 :r DE': L 1 (.J 8 ;, :I: t) 1 ) 
1 +(1-TAX2(.J8»t(+SIZE2(J8) -2*DECL2(J8)tQ2) 
N 2 = 2 :t- ( ( 1 - T A X 1 ( .J 8 ) ) :f: DEC L 1 ( .J 8;' +( 1 - T A X =: (.J 8) ;. :t: DEC ~ :: ( .j.3 " ) 
N=(Nl+(1-TAX1(J8»)*TPRICE -(1-TAX2\J8))t(1+rARIFF2(J8))~TP~ICE)(N2 
IF(N.GT.0) GO TO 31 
111 N = O~ 1 + ( 1 -TAX 1 ( J 8 ) ) :t: ( 1 + TAR IFF 1 .: .J 8 ) )1: T F' R ICE - ( 1 - T A X 2 !J 8 ) ) ",: TF' R Ie ~ ) IN 2 
112 IF(N.GT.0j N=0 
113 31 CONTINUE 
114 IF(N.GT.Ql) N=Ql 
115 IF(N.lT.-Q2) N=-G2 




























F'l=SIZEl (J8) -DECL1 (J8):j:(Ql-i'O 
P2=SIZE2(.J8) -DECl2(J8)*(t)2+N) 
IF(N.GE.0) NR=(1-TAX1(J8)t(PI:t:(QI-N) -UAGE1(J8)*Ll(J3) +TPRICE~~) 
1 +(1-TAX2(J8»t(P2t(Q2+N) -WAGE2(J8)tL2(J4) -(1+TARIFF2(J2» 
1 *TPRICE:t:N) 
I F ( N • LT. 0) N R -= ( 1 - T A X 1 ( J 8 ) ) :1: ( F' J:t: ( I] 1 - N) - WAG E 1 (J 8 ):t: L1 ( .n ) 
1 +(l+TARIFFl (J8»tTPRICE*Nl +(I-TAX2(J8»*(P2t(Q2·N) -UAGE2(J8) 
*L2(J4) -TPRICE*N) 
C CHECK FOR MAXIMUM NET REVENUE 
I F ( N R • LT. r~ R A ( J 1 , .J 2 , 1 , .J 8 ) G I) TO? 
NRA(Jl ,J2, 1 ,J8)=NR 









DOB J2=1 ,~(M(~X 
8 WRITE(6,1@5)(NRA(J1 ,J2,J7,J8),Jl=1 ,KMAX) 
23 CONTINUE 
106 FORMAT(/ /,/MAXIMUM NET REVENUE VALUES AriD ASSOCIATED~, 
1 / VALUES OF Ll, L2 AND N~) 
1~5 FORHAT(10(lX,F10.0» 













CALCULATE MAXIMUM PRESENT VALUE FOR ALL TIME PERIODS 
FOR EACH CAPITAL STOCKS COMBIN~TION AND STORE RESULTS 
CALCULATION OF PRESENT VALUES FIGURES FOR 
FINAL TIME PERIOD AND WRITE RESULTS 
FINAL PERIOD USES THE SECOND PARAMETER SET 
150 DO.9 Jl=l,t(MAX 
151 D09 J2=1,KMAX 
1 5 2 M A X V (T I FIN A L , J 1 ,J 2 , 1 ) = N R A (.J 1 , J 2 , 1 ,:2) - K 1 (J 1 ):to D E P 1 ( ~ )I: F' CAP 1 (2) 
153 1 -K2(J2)*DEP2(2)tPCAP2(2) 















II 0 1 6 J 2 = 1 , tU11~ X 
16 WRITE(6,105)(MAXV(TIFINAL,Jl,J2,1 ),J1=1 ,KMAX) 
112 FORMAT(/ /,5X,/PRESENT VALUES FOR THE FINAL ?ERIOD~) 
r: .. 
C ESTABLISH INDEX FOR TIME PERIODS 
TI=TIFINAL 
J9 = 2 
10 IF(TI.EQ.I) GO TO 12 
TI=TI-l 
IF(TI.LT.TIPC) J9=1 
C CONTROL FOR CAPITAL STOCKS 1 AND 2 AND SET INITIAL 
C VALUES OF PRESENT VALUE ARRAY 
16 9 P K 1 = P CAP 1 ( J 9 ):t; ( 1 - G RAN T 1 (J 9 ) ) * ( 1 - ( (1 A X 1 ( .J 9 ):t: It E F' T A X 1 (.j 9 ) ;t/ ([I E F' r A X 1 
























CONTROL FOR LEVELS OF INVESTMENT IN COUNTRY A~D 1 
DOll J5=1~IMAX 
[1011 J6=1,IMAX 
CALCULATE PROFIT FOR EI~CH' TIM~ PERIOD FOR EACH 
COMBINATION OF Kl, ~{2, 11, AND 12 
F' R 0 FIT = N R A (.J 1 , J 2 , 1 , J 9) - F' E H: I 1 (.J 5) - F' ~( 2 :t: I 2 (J 6 ) 
IF(PROFIT.LT.0) PROFIT=(l+PENALTY)*PROFIT 
DETERMINE CAPITAL STOCKS FOR NEXT PERIOD 
~<1T=~(1 (Jl )*(l-DEPl (J9» +11 (J5) 











I~TERPOLATION TO FIND PRESENT VALUE FROM NEXT PERIO~ 
REF 1 B = O{ 1T I I N U~ 1 ) + 1 
REF1A=\K1T/INCKl )+1-REF1B 






195 IF(REF2B.GT.KMAX-1) REF2C=KMAX 
196 IF(REF2B.GT.KMAX-1) REF2B=KMAX 
197 C INTERPOLATION CALCULATION OF PRESENT VALUE 
198 Vl=MAXV«TI+l ),REF1B,REF2B,1)*(1-REF1A) 
199 1 +MAXV«TI+l),REF1C,REF2B,1):t:REF1A 
200 V2=MAXV( <TI+1) ,REF1 B,REF2C, 1 ):r.( 1-~:EF11~) 
201 1 +MAXV«TI+l),REF1C,REF2C,1):t:REF1A 
202 V3=(Vl*(1-REF2A»tV2*REF2A 
203 C CALCULATION OF PRESENT VALUE AND COMPARISON 
204 C FOR A MAXIMUM 
205 VALUE=PROFIT +V3/(1+R) 
206 IF(VALUE.LT.MAX 1J<TI,Jl,.J2,1)) GO TO 11 
207 MAXV<TI,Jl,.J2,1)=VALUE 
208 MAXIJ(TI,j1 "J2,2)=NRA(.J1 "J2,2,J9) 
209 MAXI"l(TI,J1 ,J2,3)=NRA(J1 ,J2,3,J9) 
210 MAXlJ(TI,J1 ,J2,4)=I1 (,J5) 
211 MAXV(TI,Jl,J2,5)=I2(J6) 
212 MAXV(TI,.Jl ,J2,6):::NRA('J1 ,.J2,4 p J9) 
213 11 CONTINUE 
214 C START CALCULATION fOR NEXT TIME PERIOD 
215 GO TO 10 
216 C 
217 C OUTPUT OPTIMAL PATH 
218 C SEi INITIAL POSITION 












t( 1 T:= ~( 1 0 
~~ 2 T =~(2 0 
iI=0 




107 FORMAT(~ ~p10X,~OPTIMAL TIME PATH VALUES~) 
108 FORMAT(~ ~,~TI~,5X,'K1',7X,'K2~,8X,'PV',8X.~Ll~, 
1 5X "'L?'" 4X "'11'" c:'.JX "I?'" 9X,"W',8X"Pl",lX,"'Ql",7X, , , .. ", " ', . 
1 "'F'!~ 7X '''Q')''') J.. ,I , . .1- I 
242 
231 RE SET TIME PERIOD 
J9 = 1 




DETERMINE GRID POSITION AND I NT E R f' 0 LA -, F F' E n IJ I :;, ~ [I 110 L I ! C" : 
'- ~ _. t \ ......... ~j V I j ...I '- ''''''' 
236 REF1B=(K1T/INCK1)+1 
237 REF1A=(K1T/INCKl )+1-REF1B 
23B REF1C=REF1B+l 
239 IF(REF1B.GT.KMAX-1) REF1C=KMAX 




244 IF(REF2B.GT.KMAX-1) REF2C=KMAX 
245 
246 r -
IF(REF2B.GT .~(MAX-l) REF2B=~(MAX 
CALCULATION OF VALUES 
247 D014 J8=l,6 
248 Wl (J8)=MAXV(TI,REF1B,REF2B,J8)*(1-REF1A) 
249 1 +MAXV(TI,REF1C,REF2B,J8)*REF1A 
250 W2(J8)=MAXV(TI,REF1B,REF2C,J8)*(1-REF1A) 
251 1 +MAXV(TI,REF1C,REF2C,Ja)tREF1A 
252 U(J8)=Ul (J8)*(1-REF2A) +W2(J8)*REF2A 
253 14 CONTINUE 
254 C CALCULATE Pl, 1]1, F'2, AND Q2 
255 
256 
Q 1 = S CAL E 1 ( .J 9 ;i :+: r( 1 T *1: E X F' ~{i (.J 9 j :7: W ( 2 ) .• : .• : :: X F' L 1 (J 9 ;. 
Q2=SCALE2(J9)*K2T**EXPK2(J9>*U(3)**EXPL2(J9) 
F' 1 = S I Z E 1 ( J 9 ) - DEC L1 ( J 9 ) :1: ( Q 1 - W (6 ;. ) 
258 P2=SIZE2(J9)-DECL2(J9)*(Q2+W(6}) 
259 C PRINT OUT VALUES . 
260 WRITE(6,111)TI,K1T,K2T,W(1 ),U(2),W(3),W(4), 
261 1 W(5),W(6),Pl,U1,P2,U2 
262 1 11 FORMAT\I3,2X,2(F7.9,2X),F10.e,2X~4(F5.0,2X),Fc.0~ 
263 1 4(2X,F7.0» 
264 C DETERMINE Kl AND K2 FOR NEXT PERIOD 
265 t(1T=K1T:t:(1-DEF'1 (J9»+W(4) 
266 K2T=K2Tt(1-DEP2(J9»+W(S) 
267 C CHECK IF FINAL PERIOD TREACHED 








LODE 6544 BYTES 
STACK 1048 BYTES 
PLT + DATA 201920 BY'rES 
DIAG TABLES 36 BiTES 
243 
TOTAL 20954~ 2ITE~ 
DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING MNC MODEL 
PENALTY INVESTMENT CONSTRAINT 
PARAMETER VALUES READ IN 
5.0 .3~ .65 4000 .. 3 5000. 1000 •• 2 .40 0.00 .2 0.0 1.0 
4.5 .30 .65 2000 •• 3 5000. 1000 .• 2 .50 0.00 .2 0.0 1.0 
5.0 .30 .65 4000 •• 3 5000. 1000 .• 2 .413 0.00 .2 0.0 1.0 
4.5 .30 .65 3000 •. 3 5000. 1000 •. 2 .50 0.00 .2 0.0 1.0 
900. 300. 80. 40 . 330. 1 1 0. 
• 1 0 5000. 8~10. 10tH.~. 
20 0.00 
MAXIMUM NET REVENUE VALUES AND ASSOCIATED VALUES OF L1, L2 AND N 
0. 3141719. 3975288. 4487968. 486333B. 51~i5594. 53'13~H0 • 5591455. 57 6099Si • 5911361. 
1750838. 3522799. 4197354. 4649653. 4'189176. 5257670. 5476230. 5664497. 5826676. 596/542. 
2418016. 3760251. 4356290. 4767036. 5082926. 5333732. 5541681. 5?1?493. 58/3143. 6008963. 
10 2839061. 3949880. 4488935. 4870055. 5161499. 5400875. 5598701. 57?0068. ~:i91691~j. 604/.J18. 
~ 3148284. 4107742. 4601839. 4956786. 5235557. 5460387. 5648496. 5811272. ~)9556::>j . 6~'8 H'S? +-
3392201. 4249176. 4704948. 5038482. 5:~98074. 55152l:J9. 5698032. 58~:;2955 • 5991540. 6112:360. 
:5592888. 4370440. 4794898. 5108520. 5359995. 5564636. 5740830. ~j8't3035 • 6026026. 61 'I ~j 1 /6. 
3762685. 4481682. 4880522. 5178178. 5415822. ~613539. 5779033. '~,9280}8 . 6~J~)65j/ • 6-I}j·560. 
3909232. 4582626. 4956461. 523998/. 5465781. 5657622. 5820094. 5961068. 6085770. 619'1000. 
4037609. 4673800. 502:5943. 5295445. :5515800. 5697553. 5857252. 59943/4. 61156'j~~. 6223601. 
11 • 880. 880. 960. 960. 960. 960. 960. 881') • 880. 
0. 640. 800. 800. 880. 880. 8813. 880. 8H0. 880. 
0. 560. /20. 80~. 800. 800. 000. 8 8'i'. 8~H) • 800. 
0. 480. 640. 720. 720. 800. 800. 800. l:1@0 • 80~' • 
0. 400. 560. 640. 720. 720. 800. i:l00. t!00. tHJl1. 
o . 400. 560. 640. 72~. 720. ?20. 7:~". 7::"~' • /20. 
iL 400. 480. 64k:). 640. 720. /20. / l~' . }::~, . /:!(L 
0. 320. 480. ~,6~ • 6410. 640. 640. ?:2~' • /bl. /.'0. 
" . 0520. 480. ~-' 60 • 56~. 640. 640. 6 '10. ,.. b). I - ) II I ... 11 • 
(; . j20. 4~' 0. )60. 560. 640. 6 ~ ~, • 6 4~,j • 6 -10. oj '10 " 
i. i. i. 0. ri. 0. @. @. 0. 0~ 
760. 240. 160. 120. 80. 80. 80. 40. 40. 40. 
760. 360. 240. 160. 160. 120. 120. 80. 80. 80. 
760. 440. 320. 240. 200. 160. 120. 120. 120. 80_ 
760. 520. 400. 320. 240. 200. 160. 120. 120. 120. 
760. 560. 400. 320. 240. 240. 200. 160. 160. 160. 
760. 600. 480. 360. 320. 240. 200. 20kL 160. 160 .. 
760. 640. 480. 400. 320. 280. 240. 200. 200. 160. 
760. 680. 520. 400. 360. 280. 280. 240. 200. 160. 
760. 680. 560. 400. 360. 320. 280. 240. 240. 200. 
0. 0. 150. 563. 791. 983. 1149. 1296. 1243. 1358 .. 
-1857. -878. -284. 26. 444. 6,}J;" ..:.;;1. 782. 992. 111 8 • 1234. 
-2287. -1326. -601 • -97. 105. 340. 487. 8l6. 809. 918. 
-2582. -1632. -916. -424. -172. 226. 447. 578. 696. 88? 
-2815. -1938. -1233. -753. -284. -58. 335. 546. 664. 773. 
N -3010. -2060. -1291 • -803. -326. -168. 42. 242. 353. 454. 
~ -3179. -2178. -1612. -913. -672. -204. 1 '" • 132. 325. '126 .. U1 
-3330. -2431. -1663. -1183. -711 • -492. -289. 104 .. 214. 402. 
-3466. -2543. -1771 • -1223. -994. -525. -397. -20~5. 188. 379. 
-3590. -2596. -2038. -1261. -1029. -631 • -427. -232. -129. 51-
MAXIMUM NET REVENUE VALUES AND ASSOCIATED VALUES OF L1, L2 AND N 
0. 3260522. 4370329. 5073741. 5581524. 59/4650. 6292283. 6557007. 6785548. 6983382. 
1750838. 3761685. 4685975. 5301789. 5755742. 6114465. 6410168. 665/b//. 6870877. 7056134. 
2418423. 4095312. 4908953. 5466080. 5885619. 6222796. 6499120. 6736118. 6937855. 7116988. 
2851794. 4362681 . 5094032. 5606204. 59'17740. 6315198. 657't~51. 68031:.35. 69982//. · /169844. 
318279/. 4586234. 5254114. 5729576. 6098878. 6397828. 6646995. 686379/. ?051450. 721/.379. 
3453134. 4781275. 5395023. 5839112. 6187871. 6473160. 6714178. 6920960. 7100629. 7261?17. -3682811. 4945803. 5521465. 5940481. 6271180. 6543378. 6772851. 6972515. ? 1 Jl82~'5. ?303960. 
3883109. 5092164. 5638033. 6031781. 6346820. 6608092. 6829750. 7021053. 7190321. l340829. 
4061071. 5222727. 5743045. 6118541. 6418841. 6667786. 6882284. ?069209. 72J31?4. 7]?8~:d 1 • 
4221413. 5339655. 5840876. 6196219. 6484255. 67:!6524. 6931600. 7112452. 72/2140. /41'5239. 
0. 1040. 1200. 1280. 1280. 1280. 1280. 1200. 1200. 1200. 
0. 880. 1040. 11 20 . 1200. 1200. 1200. 1120. 1120. 1 120 .. 
0. ?2~. 960. 1040. 1120. 1120. 11 20. 1120. 1 12£1 • 1120 " 
0. 64£1. 880. 960. 1040. 1040. 1040. 11040. 1040. 104~'. 
0. 560. 8130. 880. 960. 960. 960. 1040. 104~). I!:i 40 .. 
o . 560. 720. 880. 880. 960. 960. 960. ';160. 960. 
0. 560. 720. 800. 880. 880. 960. 960. 9b0. 9M' . 
0. 480. 640. 720. 800. 880. 880. 88!d. 9 6 ~j. 960. 
0. 480. 640. 720. 800. 800. 880. 880. 880. 880. 
0. 480. 560. 720. 720. 800. 800. 88£1. 880. 880. 
0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. o . 0. 0. o u 
760. 320. 240. 1 60. 120. 80. 80. 80. 80. 40. 
760. 520. 360. 240. 200. 16" . 120. 120. 1 2~) .. 80. 
760. 640. 440. 320. 280. 240. 200. 160. 160. 120 .. 
760. 720. 5213. 4013. 320. 280. 240. 2~H1. 1 M). 160. 
I J 760. 760. 600. 44£1. 400. 320. 280. 240. 2~HJ .. 2~HL 
+- 760. /60. 600. 480. 400. 360. 280. 240. 2H' • ',!00. ()\ 
760. 760. 680. 560. 440. 360. 320. 320. 240. 2f)0. 
760. 760. 680. 560. 480. 440. 360. 320. :~ 8~) • :!8~) • 
760. 760. 760. 600. 520. 440. 400. 320. 280. ~!8 0. 
o • 707. 1 381 • 1842. 211/. 2347. 2547. 2564. 2/18. 28~9. 
-1857. 28. 751. 1281. 1726. 2006. 2198. :~20L 2350. 2 ~-, ~j 6 ~ 
-2251. -513. j91 . 965. 1404. 1 674. 1922. 20ti5. 2 2~L:! • 24 '10. 
-2386. -862. 85. 6<':') J ... 1083. 1343. 1 58~. 1802. 194::5. 2'14 -1. 
-2492. -1164. -220. 338. 82lL 10/='. 1301 . 16'71. 1904. 2~H3 • 
-258~. -129/. -525. 222. 496. 960. 1191. 111 ~j / • 1 61 J. 17]5. 
-2657. -1374. - 5 91 . -34. 44~. 689. 1 1 51 • 1 j/ 1 . 1 ~/tH • 1/0,J. 
-2726. -1565. -897. -35L. 180. 64/. 872. 1 0 I :~ • 1472, -.. 16,' 4. 
-2787. -1627. -954. -403. 7 'J J06. /65. "1/6. t 1 / / , 1293. I ... 
-2844. -168.5. -1264. -511. -19? • 266. '182. 944. 1 I iHI. 1 :!6.L 
PRESENT VALUES FOR THE FINAL PERIOD 
" . 3080522. 4010329. 453:3741. 4861524. 50l4650. ~}212283. 52970137. 5345548. 5363382. 1690838. 3521685. 4265975. 4701789. 4915742. 5154465. 5270168. 533/67/. 53/£I87? 53?6134. 
2298423. 3795312. 4428953. 4806080. 5045619. 5202796. 5299120. 5356118. :537/855. 5370988. 
2671794. 4002681. 4554032. 4886204. 5097140. 5235198. 5319£151. 536:3135. 53782//. 5369844 .. 
2942797. 4166234. 4654114. 4949576. 5138878. 525/828. 5326995. 5363797. 5371450. 53573/9. 
3153134. 4301275. 4735023. 4999112. 5167871. 5273160. 5334178. 5:360960. 53·S0629. 5341717. 
3322811. 4405803. 4801465. 5040481. 5191180. 5283378. 5332851. 53~52515 • 534EI20'5. ~d23960. 
3463109. 4492164. 4858033. 5071781. 5206820. 5288092. 5329750. 534105:3. 533~n21 • 53~}0829 • 
3581071. 4562727. 4903045. 5098541. 5218841. 5287?86. 5322284. 5329209. 531.3174. 52/85]1. 
3681413. 4619655. 4940876. 5116219. 5224255. 5286524. 5311600. 53124t)2. ~:) 2 S) 2 1 'ilL ~S255~J]9 • 
OPTIMAL TIME PATH VALUES 
TI ~~ 1 V'> I.:,. PV L 1 L2 . I 1 12 N P1 en P2 U2 
5000. 800. 52243061 . 800. 1.32. 1283. 293. 373. 2623. 4962. 1649. ?98. 
') 5283. 933. 52598976. 799. 130. 1076. 196. 403. 2609. 5040. 1631. 8"'''1 .:.. ,;,." . 
I 
N 3 5302. 942. 52670414. 799. 130. 1062. 189. 404. 2608. 5045. 1629. 831 • +-'-
- J 4 5303. 943. 52727946. 799. 1 30. 1061 . 189. 4114 • 2608. 5046. 1629. 8] 1 • 
c 5304. 943. 52789828. 799. 130. 1 061 • 189. 404. 2608. 5046. 1629. 8J 1 • J 
6 5304. 943. 52857805. 799. 130. 1061. 189. 404. 2Mf8. 5046. 162'1. 831. 
7 5304. 943. 52932574. 799. 1 30. 1061 . 189. 404. 2608. J046. 1629. 831-
8 5304. 943. 53014818. 799. 130. 1 061 • 189. 404. 2608. 5046. 1629. 8,1 1-
9 5j04. 943. 53105288. 799. 13" . 1061. 1 89. 404. 2608. j046. 1629. 831 • 
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I 1 
1 061 • 
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1 061 . 
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1 41 2. 
1 41 7 • 
1 41 7 • 
1 41 7 • 
1 41 7 • 
1 41 7 • 
141/ • 
1 41 7 . 
1 41 7. 
1 41 7. 
1417 • 
1417. 
1 417 • 
I 41 ? • 
1 41 ? • 
1 41? 
1 4 1 / • 
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RES U L T S 0 F THE 0 Y N A M I C 
PRO G RAM MIN G MOD E L 
CHAPTER NINE 
RES U L T S 0 F 
MOD E L 
THE D Y N A M I C PRO G R A ~ M I ~ G 
The results of the dynamic programming version of 
the MNC model are In the form of a time path, over 39 periods, 
of levels of capital stock, investment, and labour usage in each 
country, and the level and direction of trade between the two 
countries, where these are chosen by the MNC. Also given are 
the quantities produced and the prices charged In each country, 
which depend on the levels of the above mentioned variables and 
in turn influence the choice of the level for those variables. 
This time path depends on the parameter values used and upon any 
changes in those values during the time periods considered. In 
the first section descriptions of three time paths are given, 
one for each of the decreasing, constant, and increasing returns 
to scale in production cases. 
The results to be considered can be broken down into 
a number of cases, but the categories used may not be mutually 
exclusive. The divisions can depend on: the types of variations 
In parameter values considered; the types of constraints put 
on the time path, such as constraints on the level of investment; 
and on combinations of selected parameters, such as those giving 
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the returns to scale in production. In this chapter the cases 
will be considered in the following way. First, variations in 
the values given to selected individual parameters for all time 
periods will be considered. This will be done only for parameters 
which it is appropriate to consider individually and each set of 
variations will be done for a number of combinations of other 
parameters. Next, changes in the value of an individual parameter 
or a set of parameters at period 20 will be considered, both for 
the case of no investment constraint and for the case of an 
investment constraint. This corresponds to the comparative static 
results, but instead of just considering the new equilibrium 
position the time path by which it is reached will also be 
considered. This section will be divided into three groups of 
results where these are defined by the returns to scale in 
production specified by the ~arameters. 
The chapter will conclude by looking at a number of 
the possible extensions that could be made to the model. 
A large number of computer runs were required to 
produce the results reported here. Not all of the runs are 
reported in full detail, not only would this require large amounts 
of space, but it is not the most appropriate way of comparing 
different runs when the values of selected parameters, or the 
investment constraint, are being varied. Also, some runs done to 
check extreme cases are noted, but are not reported in detail. 
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9.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE RESULTS 
The general description of the time path that 
results from the dynamic program is given for three cases, one 
for each of the decreasing, constant and increasing returns to 
scale in production cases. The parameter values used for these 
results are generally from the middle of the range of variations 
considered later. No investment constraint is included in the 
results presented here. The results are presented graphically 
in this section and in the rest of the chapter. 
The time path can be divided into two sets of periods, 
a set where the values of the variables are changing from one 
period to the next, and a set where the values of the variables 
stay the same from one period to the next. The first set 
constitutes an adjustment phase and the second set constitutes a 
stationary phase. 
A stationary phase is associated with a set of 
periods when the parameter values are constant and the MNC has 
adjusted its capital stock in each country to those parameter 
values. Thus, the levels of capital stock will remain constant. 
Investment will be used to replace depreciation so will remaln 
constant, with net investment equal to zero. Labour usage in 
each country will also remain constant as the same level will be 
appropriate in each period. 
The adjustment phase occurs when the ~~C has some 
reason to change either its capital stock or its level of labour 
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usage in either or both countries. There are three reasons 
why this can occur in the model. The main one of interest is 
when there is a change in the set of parameter values at some 
period. Another occurs for the first few periods as the initial 
capital stock assigned with the parameter set may not be the one 
that is appropriate to those parameter values. This phase can 
be reduced or eliminated by changing the initial capital stocks 
specified. The third occurs in the final few time periods. As 
discussed in Chapter Eight, the program requires that a set 
of values, representing the present value for future time periods, 
be used in the program. As the values used do not represent a 
continuation of the final set of parameters the ~WC will adjust its 
capital stock and labour usage to the final period value. This 
is not a problem as the number of time periods is sufficient that 
the last few periods can be disregarded. Since no parameter 
values can be associated with the final value used there is no way 
to interpret this adjustment phase. These have been omitted from 
the graph of the full time path and the stationary values have been 
extended to period 36 with periods 37 to 39 being omitted. 
The stationary phase can be related to the 
equilibrium position in comparative static analysis. The adjustment 
phase is the process of moving from one equilibrium position to 
another that is not considered in static analysis. 
The time path for the case of decreasing returns to 
scale in production is gIven In Graph 9.1. In this case there is 
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from country I to country 2. With production in both countries 
there is a capital stock, a level of investment, and a level of 
labour usage in each country. 
The production function parameters can be the same 
or different in the two countries. In the case presented the 
scale term is different, but the exponents are the same, with the 
production function in county I being 5.0K· 30 L· 65 and in 
country 2 being 4.5. 30 L· 65 . With the difference in the production 
functions there 1S a shift in production towards the more 
efficient country. The shift is not complete due to decreasing 
returns. As the returns in the more efficient country become 
smaller it eventually becomes appropriate to split the production. 
If the difference in efficiency is large, or the total quality 
produced small a concentration of production in one country may 
occur. Such results were produced in some of the computer runs 
not reported here. 
The rate of profit tax can also be the same or 
different in the two countries. Where they are identical there 
is no incentive to shift profits in order to reduce taxes. Where 
they are different the appropriate shifting of profits can affect 
taxes paid. In the model both production costs and income can be 
shifted. Moving production from one country to the other while 
using trade to maintain the same distribution of sales will do 
this. The shifting of production causes the shift in costs. 
The use of trade shifts income through the use of the transfer 
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price. The higher the transfer price the more income that is 
moved. Any tariff on imports will combine with the transfer 
price to impose a cost (a tax) on the use of trade. If the 
amount of production costs shifted exceeds the income shifted , 
production will move to the high tax country and reduce profits 
and taxes there. If the amount of income shifted exceeds the 
amount of production costs shifted, production will move to the 
low tax rate country and increase profits there. This shifting 
of production is discussed further when transfer price and other 
parameter variations are considered. 
In the run presented the rates of profit tax are 
different and equal 40 per cent in country I and 50 per cent in 
country 2. As discussed in Chapter Six, with the tax assumptions 
used this implies that country I is the home country. 
In the run pre5ented there is a difference in the 
size of the markets in the two countries, with the market in 
country I being largev than that in country 2. The size of 
the market in country I is constant for all time periods with 
a price intercept of 4000 and a slope of 0.3. The size of the 
market in country 2 increases in period 20 with the intercept 
equal to 2000 before that and 3000 after, while the slope is 
always equal to 0.3. The difference in the market si:es results 
in the difference in the two prices with PI greater than P2. 
The change in the market si:e at period 20 results 
In a change in all variables. There is an increase in sales in 
country 2 made up partly from local production and partly from an 
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increase ln imports ln country 1. The lncrease ln production 
in country 1 changes the marginal costs and this leads to a 
decrease in sales and increase in price in country 1. This 
price change is much smaller than the change in country ~ The 
increase in production leads to an increase in capital stock and 
in labour used. The levels of investment show a large jump at 
period 20 in order to increase the capital stocks. The levels 
of investment then fall back to the level required to meet the 
depreciation from the increased capital stock. 
The new investment here occurs almost all in one 
period. This is due to the lack of any constraint on the level 
of investment. In a later section two alternative constraints 
on the level of investment will be considered. These have the 
effect of increasing the number of periods over which the adjustment 
of the capital stocks take pJace. 
The change in the parameter set at period 20 results 
ln two stable time paths being produced. In the next section, 
where individual parameter values are varied for all time periods, 
two observations are obtained from each computer run. 
The time path for the case of constant returns to 
scale in production is presented in Graph 9.2. There are 
considerable differences between the parameters used in this 
case from those used in the decreasing returns to scale case. 
Here the production functions in both countries are the same and 
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and remains constant, with a price intercept f 2100 d o an a slope 
of 0.3. 
In the constant returns to scale case, with equal 
production functions and costs of inputs, production can be 
either consolidated in one country or split between the two 
countries. The choice will depend on any difference in the 
rates of profit tax and on the rates of tariffs on imports. 
This is the case illustrated here. The profit tax rate is 
greater In country 1 than in country 2 with rates of SO per cent 
and 40 per cent respectively. The tariff is zero in periods 
1 to 19 and is 20 per cent In periods 20 to 39. 
In the first set of periods, all production IS 
concentrated in the high tax country which is the host country 
given the tax assumptions used. This increases the production 
costs incurred there more than it increases the income there so 
reducing the total tax bill. In the second set of periods 
production is split between the two countries and there is no 
trade. This change occurs because the increased tariff costs 
now exceed the savings on profit taxes. Sales are slightly 
higher and price slightly lower in the low tax country for both 
situations. Sales in the exporting country remain constant 
when the tariff is introduced but decline in the importing 
country. These differences reflect the inclusion of tax and 
tariff terms in the first order conditions, which were obtained 
for the static case, with decreasing returns to scale, In 
Chapter Five. 
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In the constant returns to scale case a situation 
where there is production in both countries and trade will not 
occur, except during an adjustment phase. Since negative 
investment is not allowed the capital stock can only be reduced 
by depreciation with zero gross investment. During the period 
when the capital stock In country 1 is declining it can ra \. 
1:"' • 
the MNC to continue to use it and to export to country ~, while 
also maintaining production in country 2. This is not an 
equilibrium position and the trade eventually falls to :ero. 
Such a situation only exists for two periods in the case 
illustrated. It may be longer when an investment constraint IS 
included, or when the capital stock must decline to a much 
greater extent than in the case considered here. 
The time path for the increasing returns to scale 
in production case is given in Graph 9.3. In the case 
illustrated the production functions are equal and are 1.OK· 35 L· 80 . 
The market size in country 1 is larger than the market in country ~ 
and both of these increase at period 20. For countr;' 1 the 
intercept terms are 2100 and ::2400 and for country 2 the;' are 
1750 and 2000. For both countries and for all time periods 
the slope equals 0.2. 
In the increasing returns to scale case production 
tends to be concentrate in one country in order to take advantage 
of the returns to scale. In the case illustratej the rates of 
profit tax are equal at 50 per cent. The tariif on imports are 
~60 


























GRAPH 9.3 Time Path 













L----__ ------~------~------~---~------~---~------~------: Period 
28 32 36 20 24 o 8 12 16 
261 
the same for both countries at 20 per cent. The presence 
of tariffs causes production to be located in the country with 
the larger market so as to reduce the amount traded. Changes 
in parameter values can alter this result and very high tariffs 
can result in production in both countries. 
in the next section. 
This is considered 
The quantities sold and prices are greater in 
country 1 than in country 2, due to the larger market si:e in 
country 1. The adjustment of the capital stock to the increased 
market size again takes place in one period because there is no 
constraint on the level of investment. The effects of two 
alternative constraint are considered later. 
The run illustrated here is used as a starting 
point for variation in the transfer price level and in the tariff 
level with increasing return5 to scale, which is considered in the 
next section. 
9.2 VARIATIONS IN PARAMETER VALUES 
This section is concerned with the effect on the 
results of changing the value assigned to an individual parameter 
for all time periods. This variation involves running the program 
using three or four values for the parameter under consideration, 
while holding the rest of the parameter set constant acrosS all 
the runs. In looking at the results only the changes in the 
stable path phases of the results are considered. The adjustment 
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phases are the concern of the next section. They involve 
alternative constraints on the level of investment, and it lS 
better to consider the two types of results separately. 
The variations in parameter values were considered 
separately for each of the three types of returns to scale in 
production. This is necessary because the importance of the 
changes in the values of some of the parameters depends on the 
type of returns to scale being considered. In particular, 
how changes in the values of some parameters effect the level of 
trade is strongly influenced by the type of returns to scale. 
For each parameter whose value is being varied the 
total number of possible combinations of values of the remaining 
parameters that could be considered is large. In order to keep 
the number of results considered within reasonable bounds only 
certain possible combinations were considered. 
The first parameter to be considered is the transfer 
price. When there is trade between the two countries the level 
of the transfer price influences the amount of the MNC's income 
that is shifted from the importing country to the exporting 
country, thus influencing the amount that must be paid due to 
profit taxes in each country and due to tariffs in the importing 
country. If"there are no tariffs and the rate of profit tax 
IS the same in both countries the transfer price will have no effect 
on the results. The choice of transfer price values to be used 
is discussed in section 8.3 and is indicated on the graphs 
presented here. 
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Transfer prlce variations with decreasing returns 
to scale in production will be considered first. In order to 
ensure that production occurred in both countries and that trade 
took place between them, production fuctions were chosen with 
the scale term being larger in country 1 than in country 2. 
The market size was larger in country 1 than in country 2 and 
a change in the market size in country 2 at period 20 was used 
to obtain two stable paths. 
There are two situations to be considered here. 
One where the rates of profit taxes are equal and there is a 
positive tariff on imports, and a second where the rates of 
profit taxes are different and the tariff on imports IS zero. 
The results are illustrated in Graph 9.4, with lines A and B 
illustrating the first situation and lines C and D the second. 
The graph shows how the level of trade changes as the value of 
the transfer price changes. The associated' changes in the values 
of other variables are discussed below. 
In the first situation the production function for 
30 6S .30 .65 
country 1 is 6.0K· L' and for country 2 is 4.0K L . 
The market size defined by the intercept term in country 1 is 
4000 and in country 2 is 2000 for periods 1 to 19 and 3000 for 
periods 20 to 39. The rates of profit tax are 50 per cent and 
the tariff is 30 per cent and is the same for both countries, 
With a positive tariff, increases in the transfer 
price will increase the amount of import duties payable, and this 
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causes trade to decline, as illustrated by lines A and B in 
Graph 9.4. With the profit taxes equal there is no other effect 
to offset the reduction in trade. The decline 1n trade \\-ill 
stop when trade reaches zero and is independent of the initial 
direction of trade. The decline in trade is accompanied by 
a shift in production from the exporting to the importin a 
• I::> 
country with total production decreasing only slightly, in this 
case by less than 5 per cent, as the transfer price increases 
over the full range considered. There was an increase in sales 
and fall in price in the exporting country and a decrease 1n 
sales and an increase 1n price in the importing country. With 
decreasing returns to scale the reduction in the quantities produced 
results in more efficient production and leads to a decrease in 
price. With falling exports, domestic sales can be increased 
while production is declining. In the importing country the 
increase in production leads to a higher price and with the decline 
in imports to lower sales. The present value of the firm also 
declined. This is due to the shift to less efficient production 
and to the higher import duties paid. 
In the second situation the production function in 
country 1 is 
30 65 .30 .65 5.0K· L' and for country 2 is 4.5K L . 
The market sizes are the same as for the first case. The rate 
of profit tax 1n country 1 1S 40 per cent and in country 2 1S 
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1. Trade is due to a difference in the values of the scale 
factors in the production functions in the two countries. 
2. Line B has larger trade values than line A because the 
market size in country 2 is larger in case B. 
3. For lines A and B the profit tax rates are equal and the 
tariff on imports is positive. 
4. For lines C and D the profit tax rates are different and 
the tariff on imports equals zero. 
In this situation changes in the transfer price effect 
the amount of income moved from the importing to the exporting 
country. by the MNC. The amount of income moved relative to the 
amount of production costs moved due to trade will determine where 
the production should be located in order to minimi:e the taxes 
paid by the MNC. Changing the transfer price ~ill change these 
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relative amounts. If the amount of income moved due to trade 
exceeds the amount of production costs moved, trade will flow 
from the low tax country country to the high tax country ln 
order to minimize the taxes paid on the lncome. If the 
production costs moved exceed the income moved, trade will flow 
from the high tax country to the low tax country country in order 
to gain the maximum advantage from the tax deduction allowed for 
the costs of production. 
In the cases illustrated by lines C and D in 
Graph 9.4 there is a reversal of the direction of trade when the 
transfer price is increased from £750 to £1000. This represents 
a change from exporting from the high tax country to exporting from 
the low tax country. As the transfer price is increased further 
the amount of trade lncreases and further advantage is taken of 
the low tax rate. The pre~ence of decreasing returns to scale ln 
production prevents a complete shift of all production to one 
country or the other. Increasing production in one country results 
in increasing costs due to the effect of decreasing returns to 
scale. Production will be shifted to the point where the increases 
in costs are equal to the tax saving. In the cases illustrated 
the total quantity produced increased as the transfer price was 
increased. Sales in the high tax country increased as price 
decreased and in the low tax rate country decreased as price 
increased. This reflects the changes in production costs that 
Occur under decreasing returns to scale when the quantity produced 
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changes which was discussed for the previous situation. 
In this second situation the present value of the 
MNC increased as the transfer price increased thus indicatina 
o 
that· this is a situation in which the MNC would desire a high 
rather than a low transfer price. 
With decreasing returns to scale in production the 
shifts in production are gradual. This will not hold when cases 
of constant and increasing returns to scale are considered. 
Conflicting results due to an increase in the 
transfer price have been observed, with trade either increasing 
or decreasing. A variety of cases could be considered including 
cases with a difference in the rates of profit taxes and a 
positive tariff on imports. If an actual policy change were 
being considered the parameter values could be estimated and 
used in the model to obtain ~ome estimate of the responses of the 
MNC's. Since a very large number of combinations of parameter 
values are possible further cases will not be considered here 
and attention will be glven to cases involving constant and 
increasing returns to scale in production. 
To consider transfer price variations with constant 
returns to scale two situations were again considered; one where 
the rates of profit taxes are equal and tariffs on imports are 
positive and a second where the rates of profit taxes are 
different in the two countries and there are no tariffs on imports. 
In the first situation it was necessary to use unequal production 
functions in order to achieve reasonable levels of trade over the 
range of transfer prices considered. 
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With constant returns to scale the costs of 
production do not depend on the level of production. If these 
costs are equal in the two countries any costs of trade are 
sufficient to cause there to be no trade with local production 
being used to serve each market. With unequa~ costs of 
production, however, all production will take place in the low 
cost country and the second market will be served by exports 
provided the difference in the costs of production exceeds the 
costs of trade. When the costs of trade exceed the difference 
in the costs of production there will be no trade and each market 
will be served by local production. This is the case illustrated 
in Graph 9.S by lines A and B. 
Graph 9.S Variation of Trade against Transfer Price 













200 400 600 800 1000 
Level of Trade 
A and B trade is due to a difference in th~ sC3le 
. f . . the two countrIes. the productIon unctIons In . 
C and D trade is due to a difference In the rate 
tax in the two countries. 
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In the first situation the production function 
, l' 2 5 .35 .65 35 6-In country lS . K L and in country 2 is 2.0K' L'~. 
The market Slze in both countries increases at period 20 for 
country 1 from 2400. to 2700. and for country 2 from 2000. to 
2250. The rate of profit tax equals 50 per cent for both 
countries and the tariff on imports equals 30 per cent for both 
countries. 
The sales in the exporting country should remain 
constant as changes in the level of production have no effect on 
costs and this was found in the results, although there were 
slight variations in this quantity from one transfer price level 
to the next with the direction of change not being consistent. 
This could probably be eliminated if a finer grid size was used 
in the dynamic program but would not appear to be worth the costs 
and computer time required. ' 
The sales in the importing country decline as 
imports decline until local production is started. As the costs 
of importing increased, the quantity sold is reduced and the price 
increased. The curves should show an abrupt fall to zero at the 
changeover point, and the exact point at which this occurs could 
be obtained by trying more transfer price values. For line B 
this point should be near a transfer price of £1250. as the 
results obtained showed both trade and local production of 86 units 
in the importing country. This indicates that the costs of trade 
and the costs of local production are equal at this point. 
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In the second situation with constant returns to 
scale the production functions in the two countries are identical 
The market sizes are the same as in the 
first of these two situations. The rate of profit tax ln 
country 1 is SO per cent and in country 2 is 40 per cent. The 
tariffs on imports for both countries are equal t o zero. 
In this situation production takes place in the 
high tax country and the low tax country is served by exports. 
The level of trade shows a slow decline as the transfer price is 
increased. There is a decline in sales and an increase in price 
in the importing country. Increasing the price in the importing 
country increases the fraction of income that is subject to tax 
at the lower rate of the importing country for any given transfer 
price. Thus, the after tax revenue is not independent of the 
price in the importing countlY and the increase of price results 
in a shift in the revenue curve that benefits the MNC. In the 
exporting country there is no change ip the quantity sold or the 
price. Higher transfer prices than those reported here were 
considered and it was found that a switch of production to the low 
tax country occurred at a transfer price of about £1750. The 
present value of the MNC was lowest at the transfer price where 
the switch in production occurred and increased as the transfer 
price moved in either direction from that point. 
The results concerning the present value correspond 
with those reported in Chapter Five where the ~WC will choose the 
minimum or the maximum allowable transfer price, depending upon 
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the situation, but will not choose an intermediate value for 
the pr1ce. The Chapter Five result, however, involved decreasing 
returns to scale, not the constant returns to scale considered 
here. 
For transfer price variations with increasing 
returns to scale in production two cases are again considered. 
In the first case the rates of profit tax are equal at SO per cent 
and the tariff on imports is positive and equals 20 per cent. 
The market size in both countries increases in period 20 and ln 
country I grows from 2100 to 2400 and in country 2 from 1750 to 
2000. In this case the production functions are identical, and are 
1.OK· 35 L· 80 . This is illustrated as lines A and B in Graph 9.6. 
There is a concentration of production ln country 1. The increase 
in the transfer price increases the costs due to import tariffs 
and this 1S reflected in the- fall in the level of trade. Since 
there is no production in country 2 this also represents a fall ln 
the level of sales ln country 2. The increase in trade costs 
are not sufficient to cause production in both countries but such 
a case is shown when the variations in the level of the tariff are 
considered. The decline in sales in country 2 is equal to the 
decline in the level of trade and results in an increase in the price 
in country 2. 
In the second case the rates of profit tax are 
different in the two countries and equal 40 per cent in country 1 
and 50 per cent in country 2. The tariff rate equals zero for 
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both countries. The production function and market si:es are 
the same as in the first case. This is illustrated as lines C 
and D in Graph 9.6. 
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1. Trade is due to the concentration of production due to 
increasing returns to scale. 
2. Line B has larger trade values than line A because the 
market size in country 2 is larger in case B. 
3. Lines C and D are discontinuous due to the reversal of the 
direction of trade and the location of production. 
The case considered here also illustrates a point 
about the initial capital stocks that are assumed. With 
increasing returns to scale all production will be concentrated 
in one country. One country will result in the maximum profit 
for the MNC but if the initial values assumed have the capital 
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stock in the other country it may not pay the firm to s~itch to 
the other country. Lines C and D illustrate this situation. 
For transfer price values of £750 and £1500 the ~~C will switch 
production between countries to achieve maximum profits. For 
values of £1000 and £1250 the MNC will maintain production ln 
whichever country possesses the initial capital stock, as the costs 
of switching the location of production exceed the increase in 
profits. Part of this is due to the assumption that the existing 
capital stock cannot be sold but can only be reduced by 
depreciation. This is considered further when the adjustment 
process is considered in the next section. 
Variations in the level of the tariffs on imports 
were also considered. Again cases of decreasing, constant, and 
increasing returns to scale were considered. The cases considered 
involved equal rates of profit tax in the two countries. In 
this situation increasing the tariff with a constant transfer 
price increases the costs of trade and the results are basically 
the same as those obtained for transfer price increases where 
the rates of profit tax are equal and the tariffs are positive. 
Here, however, a zero tariff, and tariffs high enough to stop all 
trade can be considered. Tariffs are also instruments of 
government policy and can be varied directly, while the choice of 
transfer price by the MNC can be limited, but can not be directly 
controlled, by the government. 
With decreasing returns to scale, increases in the 
tariff reduce the level of trade. This is sho"TI in Graph 9.7. 
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and for country 2, 4.0K· 30 L· 60 . The market si:e 
in country 1 1S 4000 and 1n country 2 is 2500 for periods 1 to 
19 (case A) and 3000 for periods 20 to 39 (case B). 
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1. Trade is due to a difference in the value of the scale factor 
in the production functions in the two countries. 
2. Line B has larger trade values than line A because the market 
size in country 2 is larger in case B. 
For case A the increase in the tariff was sufficient 
to eliminate all trade. This was not so for case B, but further 
increases in the tariff could have achieved the same result. The 
change in the tariff had little effect on the prices and quantity 
sold in the exporting country. This has been discussed when 
the corresponding transfer price variation was considered. An 
increase in sales and a decrease in price is expected, and would 
show up more strongly if the returns to scale were more strongly 
decreasing. 
For both cases there is a fall in the quantity sold 
in the importing country as the tariff is increased, accompanied 
by a rise in the price and an increase in the quantity produced 
locally. Thus, in the situation described the importing country 
can use tariff increases to encourage the replacement of imports 
with local production, but will impose a cost of higher prices 
and decreased sales on local customers. 
In considering changes in the level of tariffs on 
imports with constant returns to scale in production, distinct 
production fuctions in the two countries were used in order to have 
trade between the countries. The same production functions and 
market sizes were used as for the case of transfer price variation 
with constant returns to scale and equal rates of profit taxes 
(Graph 9.5, lines A and B). In the case considered here the 
transfer price is set at £1000 and the tariff is varied instead 
of setting a tariff equal to 30 per cent and varying the transfer 
price. Increasing the tariff, like increasing the transfer price, 
increases the costs of trade, and the same type of results were 
found. With a low tariff production is concentrated in the more 
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efficient country. When the tariff lS increased above a level 
such that the costs of import duties exceeds the difference in the 
production costs in the two countries, trade will stop and local 
production will start In the high cost country. This occurs at a 
tariff of 40 per cent as illustrated in Graph 9.8. The price and 
the quantity sold in the exporting country remain constant while In 
the importing country the quantity sold decreases and the price 
increases. This change in quantity sold and price in the importing 
country stops when local production is started. Thus, the import-
ing country can again use tariff increases to cause the ~~C to switch 
from imports to local production while again incurring an increase 
in local prices. This result depends 'on the presence of non-
increasing returns to scale. When the increasing returns to scale 
case lS considered a result is obtained where increases in the 
tariffs result in imports falling to zero but local production is not 
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With increasing returns to scale, production is 
usually concentrated in one country. Increasing the level of 
tariffs can reduce the quantity imported to the second countr:". 
At a sufficiently high tariff level imports will cease and either 
sales of the good in the importing country will cease or local 
production will start. These situations are illustrated as 
cases A and B in Graph 9.9. The production functions and market 
sizes are the same as for the variation in the transfer price with 
increasing returns to scale and equal profit taxes (Graph 9.6, 
lines A and B). 
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increasing returns to scale. 
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1800 
When imports are being used, as the tariff increases 
the quantity sold in the importing country decreases, the price 
increases, and there is a fall in the quantity produced in the 
exporting country. 
In case A when trade falls to zero the ~~c withdraws 
from the host country market. This indicates that the host 
country market is too small for production serving that market 
alone to be profitable. 
In case B, when there was a switch to local production 
the quantity sold in the importing country increased from the 
quantity imported at the next lower tariff level, specifically to 
1543 from 958. This reduced the fall in the quantity sold, and 
the increase 1n the price, that occurred from the zero tariff 
level. The falls in quantity were 15.1 and 45.8 per cent and 
the increases in pr1ce were ~.2 and 9.8 per cent. This situation 
reflects a delay 1n cutting back production in the exporting 
country in order to retain advantages of· large scale there. Once 
the change to production in both countries occurs the increase in 
sales in the host country reflects the increasing returns to scale 
in production there. In case B the present value declined as the 
tariff increased and continued to decrease when the change from 
trade to local production occurred. This further reflects the 
loss due to decreased scale that occurs when production is split. 
Variations in the values of some parameters have been 
considered here and there are a number of additional parameters for 
279 
which such variations could be considered. These include 
variations In the exponent terms of the production functions for 
given returns to scale, the wage rate, the price of capital goods, 
the depreciation rate, and the discount rate. A large number 
of computer runs would be required to consider all of these. 
would be more appropriate to develop these when specific policy 
proposals or questions are to be considered. This could be 
It 
combined with the empirical estimation of the parameter values as 
discussed in the next section. 
9.3 ADJUSTMENT PATHS AND INVESTMENT CONSTRAINTS 
The adjustment process and the effects on it of 
the introduction of constraints on the level of investment In any 
one time period remain to be considered. The adjustment process 
takes place when there is a change in the parameters of the model 
that the MNC is subject to. This IS usually in period 20 of the 
computer run and what is reported is the adjustment from the 
previous stable path to the new stable path. This takes place 
between periods 16 and 25 and only these periods are reported here. 
Parameter changes can be of two types: one where the parameter 
change is anticipated; and one where the change is not anticipated. 
The first of these is represented in the model when the parameter 
set IS changed at period 20. The second is represented by t~o runs 
of the model. In the first run the initial stable path is obtained, 
and in the second run the initial capital stocks are taken from the 
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first run stable path and the second set of parameter values 
is used. 
this run. 
The adjustment phase starts in the first period of 
The effects of the parameter changes can be divided 
into two groups, those where the capital stock in one or both 
countries is increased and there is no decrease in either capital 
stock and those where one or both capital stocks are reduced by 
depreciation. 
The investment constraints being used were discussed 
in Chapter Eight. They are of two types: an absolute constraint, 
where the investment expenditure in any period must be financed 
from the net revenue of the MNC in that period; and a penalty 
constraint, where the expenditure on investment can exceed the net 
revenue of the same period but a penalty equal to some proportion of 
this excess must be paid by the MNC. It may be possible to 
interpret this penalty as the costs of uSlng external sources of 
finance, but this will depend in part on the level of penalty 
required to have any effect on the investment expenditures. The 
levels of penalties used in the cases considered below were chosen 
to give results that were between those given by no constraint and 
the absolute constraint. It was found that a strong enough penalty 
will give the same results as the absolute constraint. 
The adjustment process will first be considered 
using constant returns to scale in production. Two cases will 
be considered. Both start with production concentrated in one 
country and trade used to serve the market in the second country. 
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In the first case an increase in the size of both markets 
causes the adjustment and it results in an increase in the 
capital stock In the one country. In this case the adjustment 
path 'for both an anticipated and an unanticipated change is 
considered. In the second case a change in the tariffs on 
imports in the importing country causes the adjustment and it 
results in a change to production in both countries with no 
trade, which requires a decrease in one capital stock and an 
increase In the other capital stock. Only the response to an 
anticipated change is considered in this case. 
In the first case the market size In country I goes 
from 2400 to 2700 and in country 2 from 2000 to 2250. The 
production function is the same in both countries and is 2.0K· 35 L· 65 , 
The rates of profit tax are unequal and are 50 per cent in 
country I 'and 40 per cent in-country 2. The tariffs on imports 
are equal to zero for both countries. The difference in profit 
tax rates causes the concentration of production, in this case in 
the high tax country. Thus, all production and investment 
Occurs in country 1, with none In country 2, so only the graph 
for country I is required to present the results. 
The results for the first case where the parameter 
change is anticipated are illustrated in Graph 9.10. Two 
penalty functions were used and had values of 10 and 20 per cent. 
In the model, before and after the adjustment the level of 
investment will be sufficient to replace depreciation from the 
capital stock. d b th lues of investment This is illustrate Y e va 
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for the end periods of the graph. The values for the last 
periods are higher than the values for the first periods as the 
capital stock has been increased. In the case where there IS no 
investment constraint the entire adjustment takes place in one 
period. This is in period 19 which is the period before the 
parameter change and thus the increased capital stock is available 
as soon as it is required. When an investment constraint is 
imposed the adjustment is spread over more periods. It starts 
one period sooner in period 18 and reaches its maximum in period 
20, the period when the parameter change has become effective. 
The more important the constraint is the less of the adjustment 
that takes place before period 20 and the more of the adjustment 
that takes place in or after period 20. This reflects the fact 
that the increased market size increases the revenue of the firm 
and provides more funds from· which to finance the investment. 
When the parameter change is not anticipated the 
adjustment process will not start until after the changes takes 
place, that is in period 20 in the model considered here. The 
results for this case are illustrated in Graph 9.11. Where there 
is no investment the full adjustment again takes place in one period, 
but here it is in period 20 and not in period 19. That is after, 
instead of before, the parameter change. When investment 
constraints are imposed,again using penalties of 10 and =0 per cent, 
the adjustment is spread over a number of periods but does not 
start before period 20. When the penalty function is used the 
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GRAPH 9.10 Adjustment Paths with Investment Con5:ra~~t5 
Constant Returns to Scale in PrOduction 

















type of constraint 
none 




16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
1. The adjustment is due to an increase in the si:e of the markets in 
both countries. 
2. The change in the market Sl:e 1S anticipated by the \r:-;c. 
GRAPH 9.11 Adjustment Paths with Investment Constraints 
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Time Period 
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by the ~l\C . 
peak of the investment curve 1S 1n period 20 but when the absolute 
constraint is used the peak occurs ~n period 21. The present 
value figures were also looked at, and the stronger the constraint 
the lower these are. 
The fact that it is useful to correctly anticipate 
the parameter change is shown by the fact that the ~~C will chose 
to make part or all of its adjustment before the change if it 
knows about the change 1n advance. It should be recalled that 
the model is dealing with changes that are known with certainty 
as uncertainty is not included in the model. 
For the investment constraint to be effective the 
level of investment must exceed the net operating income of the 
same period. Some runs were produced where this was not the 
case and the investment constraints had no effect. 
With a constraint, the capital stock is reduced, from 
what it would be without the constraint, during those periods over 
which the adjustment-making investment is spread. For these periods 
production is reduced and price therefore increased. That there is 
a loss of profit is shown by the faster adjustment used in the no-
constraint case, and by the higher level of capital stock maintained 
when the stable path 1S reached. The per period profit, once the 
stable path is reached, is independent of any constraint. 
Wi th the penal ty investment constraint the ~1:.iC is 
making a choice between reducing the costs of investment and 
foregoing potential profits in the next period. The higher the 
penalty the more profits it pays the firm to forego in order to 
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reduce the costs of rapid investment. This is shmm in the 
results by the increase in the adjustment periods as the penaltv 
is increased. 
With an absolute constraint, the ~~C is no longer 
making a choice, but simply must keep investment within what it 
can finance internally, whatever the loss of profits. 
In the second case with constant returns to scale 
in production a tariff increase in period 20 causes a switch 
from concentrating production 1n country 1 and serving country , 
by trade to having production 1n both countries with no trade. 
Only an. anticipated parameter change is considered in this case. 
The market size remains constant and is the same for both 
countries at 2100. The production function is the same In both 
. d' 2 OK· 35 L· 65 Th f f' countr1es an 1S . . e rates 0 pro It tax are 
unequal ,and are 50 per cent in country 1 and 40 per cent In 
country 2. Tariffs on imports are zero for periods 1 to 19 and 
20 per cent for periods 20 to 39. 
The difference in the rates of profit taxes causes 
the initial concentration of production in country 1. With 
the increase in tariffs the costs of trade exceed the profit tax 
saving of trade so split production results. The time path of 
investment in both countries is illustrated in Graph 9.1~ a and b. 
In this case the MNC will want to reduce the capital 
stock in country 1 after period 19. As the model does not allow 
for the sale of capital stock (or negative investment) this 
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in tariffs in Country 2. 
~!~C . 
capital stock. This leads to the period of zero investment 1n 
country 1. As there is still production 1n country 1 positive 
investment starts again, in period 22, after the capital stock 
has fallen to the desired level in order to maintain that level 
of capital stock. The period of zero investment was the same 
for all investment constraints and was almost the same when there 
was no constraint. In country 2 no capital stock 1S required 
until period 20. Investment starts in period 19 to have the 
capital stock in place for period 20. Most of the adjustment 
takes place in period 19 with a small part of it taking place 
in period 20, and trade stops in period 21 when there is no 
constraint on the level of investment. The spreading of the 
adjustment over two periods is due to the time it takes for the 
capital stock in country 1 to decline in size. With the 
investment constraints the adjustment is spread almost evenly 
between periods 19 and 20 but still takes only two periods. 
The use of a tariff increase to encourage local 
production was discussed in the previous section. This section 
shows that the effect of such a policy can be fairly quick and if 
it 1S sufficiently anticipated local production will start as soon 
as the tariff increase becomes effective. For an unanticipated 
change the delay in response in the previous case was one period 
(year). Th ' I 1 depends on the omission from the model 1S resu t part y 
of any time required to design and install new capital. 
The effects of the investment constraints when there 
1S decreasing returns to scale in production were considered for a 
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a parameter change anticipated by the ~WC. The parameter change 
is an increase in the market size in both countries, going from 
2400 to 3200 in country 1 and from 1600 to 2400 in country ~ 
The production function for country 1 1S 5.0K· 30 L· 65 and for 
2 · 4 5K· 30 .65 country 1S. L The rate of profit tax equals 
40 per cent in country 1 and 50 per cent in country:, and the 
tariffs are equal to zero. 
In the case being considered there is production in 
both countries and trade between them. The increase in the market 
sizes results in an increase in the capital stocks in both 
countries which is achieved by increased investment in both 
countries. The investment paths are given in Graph 9.13 a and b, 
and are similar to that given in Graph 9.10. With no investment 
constraint the adjustment in both countries is concentrated in 
period 19 so that the increased capital stocks are in place for 
period 20 when they are required. The penalty levels used were 
20 and 40 per cent. With a level of 20 per cent the adjustment 
in country 1, which has the larger capital stock, is spread over 
periods 18 to 20 with the largest investment occurring in period 19. 
In country 2 the full adjustment is still concentrated in period 19. 
With the penalty of 40 per cent and the absolute constraint the 
adjustment in country 1 is spread over periods 18 to 20 ~ith the 
maximum reached in period 20. In country 2 there is over investment 
in period 19 and very small investment in period 20. This reflects 
the decreasing returns to scale, investment may be concentrated 
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may be greater there, but this will partly depend on the scale 
factor of the production function. 
A penalty of 10 per cent was also tried and gave 
the same results as the penalty of 20 per cent, while a penal t:' 
of 30 per cent gave the same results as the penalty of 40 per cent. 
The effects of the investment constraints with 
increasing returns to scale in production and an anticipated 
parameter change were also considered. In this case the 
production functions are identical at 1.OK· 35 L· 80 and the market 
sizes are constant being 2400 in country 1 and 2000 in country 2. 
In this case a change in tax rates is used to achieve a complete 
switch of production from country 1 to country 2. For periods 
one to nine the tax rates are 50 per cent in country 1 and 40 in 
country 2, and are reversed for periods 10 to 39. The tariffs 
on imports equal zero for bo~h countries for all time periods. 
Given the implicit a'ssumption about which country is the home 
country this change implies a reversal of the home country. It 
1S used instead of a combination of tax and tariff changes in order 
to illustrate certain points concerning a complete switch of 
production from one country to the other. The parameter change 
was put in period 10 to allow for more periods after the change. 
In this situation production is concentrated in the 
high tax rate country. Investment in country 1 continues up to 
and including period 9 so the capital stock is maintained until 
period 10, and this holds independently of any investment 
constraint: Investment in country 2 does not start until period 
12 
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and there is no investment in either country in periods 10 and 
11. With the depreciation rate of 20 per cent that is used the 
capital stock in country 1 takes until period 39 to fall to 9, 
and labour usage and the quantity produced have fallen to 1 at 
this point. Even with this slow decline the investment 
constraint still has some effect. With no constraint and a 
penalty of 10 per cent investment in country 2 reaches its maximum 
in period 13, but with a penalty of 20 per cent or an absolute 
constraint the maximum is' reached ln period 14. In cases 
investment reaches a stable level ln period 25. The capital 
stock in country also increases steadily until period 25. The 
investment paths are illustrated in Graphs 9.14 a and b. 
With higher depreciation rates the time required 
for the capital stock to decline to zero is reduced but the 
equilibrium level of capital· stock is reduced as the cost of 
replacing depreciation is also increased. 
·but are not reported in detail. 
Such results were run 
Alternative structures for the depreciation could 
change the result. Forms where capital goods have a fixed life 
would limit the adjustment period to the life of the capital good. 
If the sale of the MNC's existing capital stock were 
allowed, either at the existing market price or at a reduced 
price, these results would be modified. By selling off some or 
all of its capital stock the MNC could reduce the adjustment period. 
The reasonableness of ei ther al ternative depends on the indu~tr:' 











GRAPH 9.14 Adjustm~nt Paths with Investment Cons:r~in:, 
IncreasIng Returns to Scale :n ?ro~uc:ion -
a. Investment in Country 1 
type of constraint 
none 
penalty = .1 
penalty = 
absolute 
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Time Period 
1. In this case all time paths are identical so only the path for 










b. Investment In Country 2 
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Time Periods 
1. The adjustment is due to a change in profit tax rates. 
2. The change is not anticipated by the ~~C. 
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MNC's in the industry. If many firms try to sell their capital 
at the same time it will depress the prices for used capital goods 
of that industry. 
The direct shipment of capital goods from one country 
to another has also been excluded. There would be some, possibly 
prohibitive, costs to this depending upon the industry involved . , 
and governments may take steps to prevent such a direct loss of 
capital and jobs. To consider these questions in more detail 
involves extending the model, which is considered further in the 
next section. 
The penalty values used ranged from 10 to 40 per 
cent, which may be somewhat high to be interpreted as costs of 
borrowing. With prices in the model being constant, the 
penalties would have to be interpreted as real rates of interest. 
The penalty of 10 per cent always had some effect, however, and 
the possibility of such an interpretation could be explained further, 
in part by looking at the effects of lower penalty values. 
Alternative penalty functions, based on the absolute level of 
investment, could be devised to reflect the costs of rapidly 
adjusting the size of the firm, but these were not considered here. 
This section has considered the two main types of 
adjustments: those involving increases or decreases in the 
capital stock of the MNC. Additional combinations could be 
considered, such as decrease in both countries, but the additional 
results obtained would be limited. 
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9.4 POSSIBLE EXTENSIONS TO THE MODEL 
This chapter has presented some results from the 
dynamic programming model of the MNC. These are illustrati':e of 
what the model can do, but do not represent its full potential. 
A number of extensions to the model are possible. One is to make 
some of the parameters of the model dynamic, such as having the 
demand in one or both countries increase over time. Another 
is to use the model to consider specific questions and to combine 
it with empirical work. 
Making a parameter dynamic could be used to consider 
a number of questions. For example, increasing demand in the host 
country could be used when considering the minimum si:e to which a 
market must grow before the MNC will start local production. The 
effects of tariff increases, investment grants, and accelerated 
depreciation allowances on this could be considered by varying the 
values assigned to these over a number of runs of the model. By 
having the rate of growth of demand as a parameter of the model the 
effect of this rate on the investment decision could also be explored. 
Making a parameter dynamic would require some changes 
to the computer program used here. In particular, the two stage 
calculation used here would no longe~ be appropriate. With a 
different parameter value being used for each time period all of 
the calculation would have to be done for each period and a single 
calculation over all six dimensions of the grid search would be 
more efficient than the two stage process used here. Another 
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change would be the need to specify the value of the a p rameter 
for each time period. One way to do this would be to specify 
either the initial or final period value and a rate of growth, 
which could be negative, and allow the program to calculate 
the remaining values. 
Empirical studies could be used to find functional 
forms and parameter values that would be appropriate to the model. 
This would be particularly appropriate where the model is used to 
conside.r specific policy questions. The policy question would 
provide a context for the empirical work, defining the home 
country, the industry or set of industries to be considered, and 
the major host countries. 
In using the model for this purpose a number of 
modifications can be made to it. The functional forms used for 
the production, demand, and tax functions can be changed by changing 
the equations of the model, with the choice of functional forms 
depending on the results of empirical work. Major revisions to 
the model that could be made include extending it to include a third 
country or to include two levels of production. The latter 
results ln a vertically integrated model. The modification 
required would depend on the particular question being considered. 
An example of a model developed to consider a specific policy 
proposal, discussed in more detail in Chapter Five, is Horst el g- I ) 
which was concerned with changes in the tax credit allowed in the 
United States for taxes paid abroad. 
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This chapter has presented a type of model that can 
be used to consider a number of questions concerning ~~C's, and 
illustrated the type of results that can be obtained from it. 
The computer time required to run the model increases as the 
complexity of the model is increased and thus it is appropriate 
to tailor the model to the specific questions being considered, 
instead of developing a very general model. Some ways in 
which this could be done have been suggested here. 
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Chapter Ten 
CON C L U S ION 
Chapter Ten 
CON C L U S ION 
This thesis has extended the theoretical work 
on the MNC in two directions. Theoretical explanations of the 
reasons for and processes of FDI have been extended by the use 
of the managerial theories of the firm and the mathematical 
models of the profit maximizing MNC have been extended from 
static to dynamic models. To start, Chapter Two provides a 
context for this. Definitions of the MNC and of For are 
provided and the possible range of objectives for the ~mc are 
considered. 
The reasons for FOI were discussed in Chapter Three 
by considering what set of conditions would be necessary and 
sufficient for FDI to occur. The effect of allowing different 
firms to have different objectives upon the set of conditions was 
also considered. The conditions are: 
1. The firm possesses net ownership advantages vis a vis 
firms of other nationalities in serving particular 
markets where these ownership advantages largely 
take the form of the possession of intangible a~s~ts 
and are, at least for a time, exclusive or speclflc 
to the firm possessing them. 
2. It must be more beneficial to the firm possessing these 
advantages to use them itself rather than to sell or 
to lease them to foreign firms. 
299 
3. It must be profitable for the firm to utili:e th 
d . '. ese a vantages ln con]Unctlon with at least some fact 
. 'd . h or lnputs outSl e ltS orne country, otherwise all 
production would take place in the home countr\" and 
foreign markets would be served entirely by exports. 
When firms can have alternative objectives those 
emphasizing the growth of the firm are more favourable to FOI 
than are those emphasizing profit maximization. Objectives 
of the former type can be treated as an advantage under condition 1, 
or can be considered as a separate item in the explanation of FOr. 
As a separate item they weaken the need for the first condition 
and have a role to play in explaining which firms may be leaders 
or followers in FOI in a given situation. 
The attitude of the firm or its management to FOI 
was also considered. A positive attitude will lead to For by 
the firm under weaker conditions than are required if the firm 
has a negative attitude. This may be another part in the 
explanation of which firms are leaders or followers ln under-
taking FOI activities. 
In Chapter Four the managerial theories of the firm 
approach was used to look at the process by which firms expand or 
diversify and this was related to the FOI decision. The skills 
a firm uses to serve one market can provide a basis for expansion 
to other related markets. The process by which the firm considers 
these opportunities gives rise to a pattern, with expansion to 
related home country markets being first and to related foreign 
markets being second. The relation between a firm's existing 
markets and other markets is based on some aspect of the firm such 
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as product type, production technology, or marketing skills. 
The closer the relation the more information the firm will have 
about the opportunities in the market. This gives rise to the 
precedence of market opportunities in the home country. As the 
pattern of skills used to serve a given market can differ between 
firms, firms starting from the same industry can have different 
patterns of expansion. Cross investments between developed 
countries can be explained. Firms in both countries will have 
skills that can be used in the markets of the other country. 
Other empirical observations on MNC's can also be explained. 
MNC's tend to be among the larger firms in any industry because 
of the use of domestic expansion before foreign expansIon. The 
costs of investigating opportunities gives a preference for large 
opportunities thus explaining why subsidiaries may be among the 
larger firms in the host country. 
Chapter Five presents a consolidation of the static 
models of the profit maximizing MNC. The consolidated model is 
of a two country MNC that produces a final good in both countries 
and an intermediate good in one country. The model is general 
enough to include, as special cases, many of those in the existing 
literature. It goes beyond them in having the MNC export both a 
final and an intermediate good from one country. The model 
developed IS used to show a number of limitations on the inter-
pretations of the results of the static models. The models in the 
literature represent special cases and can produce conflicting 
comparative static results. These resul ts are concerned h'i t h 
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items such as the change in the level of trade that OCcurs in 
response to a change in the levels of profit taxes or tariffs. 
The difference in the results may be due to differences in the 
assumptions concerning relative profit tax rates in the home and 
host countries. Also, allowing for two types of trade from one 
country may lead to indeterrninant results. One conclusion was 
that, as a real policy situation may involve the responses of 
a number of MNC's, where these may be represented by different 
special cases, the total response to a policy change will depend 
on an aggregation of a number of changes where some of these may 
offset one another. 
The thesis then turned its attention to dynamic 
models of a profit maximizing MNC, with the structure of the model 
being specified ln Chapter Six. Two mathematical techniques were 
used to develop the dynamic ~odel, optimal control theory and 
dynamic programming. The optimal control theory version ~as 
presented in Chapter Seven. The structure of the dynamic program 
was presented in Chapter Eight and the results obtained from it 
were discussed in Chapter Nine. 
The optimal control theory version of the model 
achieved very limited results. First-order conditions that hold 
at any point in time were obtained, but a condition for the levels 
of investment by the MNC could not be obtained and comparative 
dynamic results were not obtained. This was due to the lack of 
1 f h f · 1 equatl'ons that resulted from a so ution or t e set 0 Slmu taneous 
the model. The use of restrictive functional forms, including an 
assumption of a fixed capital to labour ratio, would have allowed 
for a solution. As a less restricted set of specific functional 
forms can be used with the dynamic program this approach h-as not 
pursued using the optimal control theory model. The lack of a 
solution for the model using general functional forms appeared to 
be due to the inclusion of the term for the level of trade in the 
demand equations. Without trade, however, the ~WC becomes the 
simple sum of two one-country firms. 
The dynamic programming version of the model both 
illustrated the technique and provided certain specific results. 
One set of results concerned the effects of varying the levels of 
tariffs and transfer prices on the level of trade by the MNC 
between the two countries of the model for each of decreasing, 
constant, and increasing returns to scale in production. The 
effect was found to depend on the relative rates of profit tax 
in the two countries. With equal taxes and a positive tariff, 
increasing the transfer price reduced the level of trade. With 
unequal taxes, changes in the transfer price can change the 
direction of trade. With the use of trade there is a shift of 
Income due to the transfer price and there is a shift of costs due 
to the change of location of production. With a low transfer 
price the change in production and trade would shift more costs 
than it would income, so production would be located in the high 
tax rate country, and with a high transfer price the reverse 
situation would hold. 
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In the model, increasing the tariff was found ~o 
reduce the level of trade by the MNC. Usually there was an 
increase in production in the importing country but this h·as 
obtained at the expense of higher prices and reduced sales to 
local customers. Under increasing returns to scale in produc:ion, 
however, if the local market is small and is served entirely by 
imports, increasing the tariff could result in the ~!r;C wi thdra,.;ing 
from the market by stopping trade to it without starting local 
production. 
A second set of results of the model looked at the 
time (in terms of numbers of the discrete periods used by the model) 
required for the MNC to adjust its stock of capital in each country 
in response to a change in the value of some parameter, usually 
of the demand function or the tax rates. This was considered 
both with no constraint and with a financial constraint on the 
level of investment. When the change required the capital stock 
to be increased, with no constraint the entire adjustment takes 
place in one period (assumed to be a year), and with a constraint 
the adjustment will be spread over three and sometimes four periods. 
Decreases in the capital stock, however, depended on the rate of 
depreciation. Where a partial reduction in the capital stock was 
required it could be achieved in two to four periods. A reduction 
of the capital stock to zero could, given the form of depreciation 
used in the model, take 20 or more periods, although most of t~c 
reduction would occur in the first few periods. 
304 
A number of ways in which the dynamic programming 
model could be extended were also considered in section 9.~. 
The main one was to use the model to consider specific questions, 
with the functional forms and parameter values required by the 
model being estimated empirically. The policy question being 
considered would provide a contest both for the empirical work 
and for choosing the structure of the model. 
The extensions to the theory of the MNC presented 
in this thesis have looked at two main questions. The first was 
the conditions under which and reasons why an MNC would engage 
in FDI. This could be used to consider policies by which host 
countries or home countries could encourage or discourage specific 
types of FDI. The reasons for such actions would depend on the 
overall policy objectives of the host or home country. The 
second looked at the respons~ of the MNC to changes in its external 
environment. Where these changes are policy changes by govern-
ments it allows the time lag before the response to the policy 
occurs to be considered. The dynamic programming model can be 
extended or modified to suit a specific policy question to be 
considered, thus having a wide potential range of application. 
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